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This chapter analyzes the campaign against race norming in the 2013 National Football League (NFL) concussion settlement that caregivers of retired players designed, and it considers how their collective action throws new light on activism in sport. While there is a substantial literature on how individual athletes engage in protest, less work has focused on how families – partners, children, siblings, and parents – of athletes organize as a group to answer back to anti-Black racism in professional sport. I argue that a group of spouses used their position as caregivers to shame the NFL, the presiding judge of the settlement, Class Counsel, and even the Department of Justice into acknowledging not only individual suffering from traumatic brain injury but also of the distribution of that suffering across households. Specifically, the wives group expanded definitions of risk and damage to include not only individual illness but also family and group suffering and demanded inclusion of gendered and racialized aspects of social care. Through their campaign, the group recast what is considered protest in the world of sport and who has the ability to access an activist subjectivity.

This study investigates the relation between lawsuit attributes that support an inference of fraud and the probability and the size of securities lawsuit settlement. A sample of 607 securities lawsuits between 1996 and 2006 is used in the analysis of the probability of settlement and a subsample of 261 lawsuit settlements is used in the analysis of the size of settlement. The empirical results indicate a positive association between the probability of a settlement and accounting irregularity, SEC enforcement action and stock offer. Accounting irregularity and SEC enforcement action are also documented to be positively related to the size of the settlement. The results imply that a stock offer supports a strong inference of fraud and the presence of accounting irregularity and SEC enforcement action in a lawsuit filing strengthens the fraud allegation and increases the likelihood of a settlement. The findings also suggest that the stronger the inference of fraud, the greater the size of the settlement. The results of this study add to our understanding of the determinants of securities lawsuit settlement. Studies using securities litigation as a proxy for fraud can use the results of this study to distinguish between fraud-related and nonfraud-related lawsuits.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. is a challenge to conventional antitrust analysis. Conventional civil antitrust cases are decided by a preponderance of the evidence. This means that conduct challenged under the rule of reason is only condemned if the conduct resulted in more competitive harm in the actual world than a world without the alleged violation. Under conventional analysis, the intent of the parties also plays only a supporting role in determining whether the conduct was anticompetitive. A holder of a valid patent has a right to exclude others practicing the patented technology. And, the patent holder is not assumed to have market power because it expended resources in maintaining exclusionary rights. Actavis creates doubts about these propositions in circumstances beyond the “reverse” payment settlement of a patent suit that may have delayed an alleged infringer market entry. This chapter explores whether applying Actavis logic to antitrust litigation can result in condemnation of practices where there is little chance of an anticompetitive effect, where the patent holder likely has a valid and infringed patent, where there is little reason to believe that the patent holder has market power, and where only one party, or no parties, to an agreement have an anticompetitive intent. This chapter also investigates whether Actavis creates new problems with standing analysis, damages calculations, and the balancing of efficiencies against anticompetitive effects. Nevertheless, the lower courts have begun to extend the logic of Actavis. This is apparent in the condemnation of no-Authorized-generic settlements.

Patent litigation consists of non-market actions that firms undertake to access intellectual property rights defined by prior legislation and enforced by the courts. Thus, patent litigation provides an interesting context in which to explore aspects of firm’s non-market strategies. In contrast with prior non-market strategy research that has largely focused on how political institutions define the rules of the game for market competition, non-market actions within patent litigation primarily seek to access and apply these broad policies to specific situations, products, or assets that matter to the firm. Furthermore, because such non-market actions are directly influenced by the firms’ market strategies, they represent a promising area for research on integrated (market and non-market) strategies as well.

The goal of this paper is to explain how generic patent strategies that firms use to support their competitive advantage in the product-market influence non-market outcomes related to the timing of patent litigation resolution. In contrast with prior research that has studied settlement in patent litigation essentially as a one-shot bargaining game, this paper seeks to explain litigation resolution as an outcome of the competing mechanisms of settlement and adjudication that operate continually during litigation. Using a large sample of patent litigations in research medicines and computers, I model the timing of patent litigation resolution in a proportional hazards framework, wherein settlement and adjudication are competing risks. The evidence found is consistent with the proposition that the speed with which patent litigation is resolved by either settlement or adjudication reflects the use of proprietary, defensive, and leveraging patent strategies by firms. These findings also help to explain unexpected and anomalous findings regarding the settlement of patent litigation reported in prior research.

We investigated how an institutional settlement concerning Native Indian gaming (the operation of gambling establishments such as casinos or bingo halls by Native Indian tribes) was preserved over time in spite of three significant challenges. Building on previous literature on settlements and institutional logics, we see settlements as institutional arrangements that manage power dynamics and competing institutional logics. Based on our analyses of the settlement and three challenges in the Native gaming field, we suggest that even seemingly volatile institutional settlements can be maintained when powerful actors balance each other’s ability to modify the settlement and different actors invoke alternative institutional logic(s). We also find that these processes can be facilitated by the embeddedness and formality of the settlement. We contribute to the settlement literature by showing how settlements can be maintained when actors draw on equally strong sources of power and different logics to counter the actions of other actors. Furthermore, we shed light on “how institutions matter” by demonstrating how institutional settlements can facilitate field stability.

Previous research on the success of the WTO dispute-settlement system may miscalculate the true benefits of the dispute process due to the nature of the datasets used. Approximately 33 percent of all disputes filed at the WTO are classified as pending or inactive and thus omitted from most studies. Further investigation reveals that many of these inactive cases were actually settled by the countries involved or considered in a similar WTO dispute, and, as a result, no further WTO action was taken. This suggests that the WTO dispute settlement process may be more effective in resolving disputes than otherwise thought. For those disputes not successfully resolved, I empirically estimate why countries may choose to initiate WTO dispute settlement action but fail to follow through, thus allowing the offending party to continue with the alleged WTO illegal activities. The results suggest that developing countries are less likely to resolve their complaints in the WTO dispute settlement system, a troubling implication for the equity of the system.

This chapter focuses on dispute resolution in French labor courts. We empirically investigate the forces that shape decision-making in the pretrial conciliation phase. For that purpose, we compiled a new database from legal documents. The results are twofold. First, conciliation is less likely when plaintiffs are assisted by a lawyer. Although this result might be interpreted in various ways, further analysis shows that the lawyers’ remuneration scheme is the most likely cause of this effect. Second, we find that the likelihood of settlement decreases as the amount at stake increases. These results contribute to the ongoing debate about French labor court reform.

The current security trade settlement life cycle presents several inefficiencies derived from intermediaries involved in the transaction between buyers and sellers. This chapter examines distributed ledger technology (DLT), the underlying technology of all blockchain applications, including trade settlements. It also reviews the implications of using blockchain in trade settlements for cryptoassets. Emerging blockchain technology provides investors, exchanges, regulators, and countless potential intermediaries with the most up-to-date technology with the highest efficiency, transparency, credibility, and automation enabled by smart contracts. Smart contracts allow an ecosystem to manage the process of trade settlements starting from execution to clearing and then settlement. These contracts reduce reconciliation and recordkeeping costs and streamline repetitive processes present in today’s trade settlement system. The chapter highlights the benefits of implementing DLT in financial markets globally in all trading aspects, including cryptoassets.

Under the patent system created by Congress a patent enjoys only a rebuttable presumption of validity. The resulting probability of invalidity has an economic value. The incentive for a challenger to capture that value creates consumer benefit. In contrast, a payment by the patent holder to the challenger to recognize validity changes the congressionally mandated rebuttable presumption into a conclusive presumption. When a patent holder enlarges the reward granted to him by Congress, by paying a potential rival to confess validity, he reduces efficiency and consumer welfare and, therefore, commits a per se violation of the antitrust laws.