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Cryptoassets have recently attracted the attention of national and international financial regulators. Since the mid-2010s blockchains have increasingly been adapted to automate and replace many aspects of financial intermediation, and by 2015 Ethereum had created the smart contract language that underpins the digitization of real assets as asset-backed tokens (ABTs). Those were initially issued by FinTech companies, but more recently banks active on international capital and financial markets, and even central banks, for example, the Bank of Thailand, have developed their own digital platforms and blockchains. A wide variety of real and financial assets underpins ABTs, viz., real-estate, art, corporate and sovereign bonds, and equity. Consequently, owing to the significant market capitalization of cryptocurrencies, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published two consultative papers delineating its approach on cryptoasset regulation. In this study, the authors analyze the mechanics of ABTs and their potential risks, relying on case studies of recent issuance of tokens in equity, real-estate, and debt markets, to highlight their main characteristics. The authors also investigate the consequences of the increasingly oligopolistic structure of blockchain mining pools and Bitcoin exchanges for the integrity and security of unregulated distributed ledgers. Finally, the authors analyze the BCBS’ regulatory proposals, and discuss the reaction of international financial institutions and cryptocurrency interest groups. The main findings are, firstly, that most ABTs are akin to asset-backed securities. Secondly, nearly all ABTs are “off-chain/on-chain,” that is, the underlying is a traditional asset that exists off-chain and is subsequently digitized. The main exception is the World Bank’s bond-i that is genuinely native to the blockchain created by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, and has no existence outside it. Thirdly, all ABTs are issued on permissioned blockchains, where anti-money laundering/anti-terrorist funding and know-your-customer regulations are enforced. From a prudential regulatory perspective, ABTs do not appear to pose serious systemic risks to international financial markets. This may account for the often negative reactions of banks, banking associations, and cryptocurrency interest groups to the BCBS’ 2021 proposals for risk-weighted capital provisions for cryptoassets, which are viewed as excessive. Finally, we found that issuance of ABTS and other smart contracts on permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum could potentially generate financial instability. A precedent involving Ethereum and The DAO in 2016 shows that (i) there is a significant accountability gap in permissionless blockchains, and (ii) the core developers of blockchains and smart contract technology, and Bitcoin mining pools, exercise an unexpectedly high- and completely unregulated-amount of power in what is supposedly a decentralized network.

This study first replicates, then perturbs, the centipede game as implemented by McKelvey and Palfrey (1992). It is thus both a replication study and an original research study. We use controlled laboratory experiments, with computer interfaces for each treatment, anonymous round-robin matching among the subjects across rounds, multiple (10) rounds within each treatment, and incremental changes between adjacent treatments allowing for an assessment of effects at the margin of different game configurations. We find unraveling to the subgame perfect equilibrium somewhat faster than did McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), when using their exact design. Perturbations to that design show that setting non-taker payoffs to zero induces earlier unraveling, as does the use of higher stakes (as in Murphy, Rapoport, and Parco (2006), and Rapoport, Stein, Parco, and Nicholas (2003), respectively). Other, subsequent perturbations show: that there is at most a subtle effect associated with using a 10-second timer with a default move, relative to untimed active moves; and that clock format versus tree format has a minimal effect in common information, unchanging payoff-parameterization environments. We verify the robustness of some key past findings in real-time games. We also explore in a common information environment, the effect of design features previously used in independent private values settings; here we find new evidence that features which might modulate information acquisition and/or processing in an independent private values setting may not restrict behavior in a common information setting.

The title of this book suggests the possibility that new ways of managing innovative processes may favour an evolution of the economy towards an altruistic model. This chapter argues that the acceleration of innovative processes at the turn of the millennium has produced, or at least has not avoided, phenomena of the concentration of wealth and power in which it is difficult to discern an altruistic root. It is observed that the cultural models developed to interpret innovative phenomena are also focused on the profit of individual companies and not on altruistic values. The author goes on to indicate the appropriateness of referring to less limited phenomenological models and suggests exploring an analogy of innovation with Darwinian evolution. An outline of this approach is provided.

Blockchain is creating many opportunities for business as it is transforming the way sustaining technologies operate in organizations. In blockchain, transactions are recorded as digital blocks and contain immutable properties to preserve data validation, encryption, and algorithms. The goal is to provide uniqueness and resistant to fraud. For example, digital currencies use a shared network to permanently record transactions but operate in decentralized mode to secure independence among participants. The potential applications of blockchain are unlimited and proliferating although several initiatives are still in development. Many industries are already capitalizing on experimental blockchain projects. Leaders in those industries are partnering with R&D and start-up companies to determine opportunities. Also, research universities have dedicated labs to focus on new theoretical concepts or improvements that can be leveraged in healthcare, global rights management, and decentralized publishing to name a few. Blockchain is called as “trustless system” because it can disrupt entire industries. This chapter explores the blockchain origins and its underlying technologies to understand concepts and become familiar with the latest development. A crypto-digital currency like Bitcoin will be introduced in some detail to bring awareness to the benefits, risks, and ethical concerns. A discussion on regulations will be included to investigate how government policy affects cryptocurrencies and related security. In the interest of blockchain inspired projects, the chapter will also introduce a broader discussion on new ventures adopting blockchain attributes and the trends of gradual technology implementation among early adapters.

Purpose: Blockchain technology has exploded in popularity in the social economy over the years. Because blockchain technology offers so many advantages, it was first employed for Bitcoin transactions. The interaction between blockchain technology and financial industries will grow more personal and interwoven with the introduction of Bitcoin. As the value of blockchain technology became evident, more financial companies began to test its use in monetary operations. Numerous financial companies have been experimenting with blockchain technology to reduce the transactional costs and to improve the efficiency of operations, specifically in the domain of financial notes, cross-border payments, and asset-backed securitisation. Blockchain will have a broad range of applications in the financial industry shortly.

Methodology: Through financial tools and methods, trust may result in successful businesses. In the long term, blockchain technology is generally a significant source of the finance industry revolution. It allows you to create immutable transaction histories available to everyone on the network. A blockchain system consists of a sequence of blocks connected by a connection to the block before each block. Each block comprises more than one transaction representing changes in the ownership of assets on the ledger. A consensus procedure is employed to add new blocks to the existing chain, in which members of the public blockchain confirm that transactions are accurate.

Findings: Blockchain technology is still in its infancy. The challenges of sustainability, privacy, secrecy, and latency, among others, have surfaced. Financial markets must get a deeper grasp of Blockchain to provide trustworthy alternatives.

Significance: The book chapter highlights the architecture, protocols, and applications of Blockchain Technology. The chapter will also enlighten the readers about the challenges and solutions of Blockchain Technology in the Financial Market. Moreover, the chapter also discusses the future research scope of Blockchain Technology in the Financial Market.