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This paper investigates the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act on top executive compensation and empirically examines the changes in relationship between top executive compensation and corporate performance expectations.

A theoretical framework is presented based on previous literature and testable hypotheses are proposed. The Pearson correlation is calculated to examine the inter-correlation among various measures of performance and compensation variables. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression was conducted to test the hypotheses.

The results show that in the pre-SOX period CEO compensation is strongly related to market-based performance measures while in the post-SOX period accounting-based performance measures showed a significant positive relationship with CEO compensation. The results confirm the impact of the SOX Act where it requires stronger internal control systems and reliable financial reporting. The board relies heavily on accounting-based performance measures in determining top executive compensation in the post-SOX period.

This paper shows the composition and level of CEO compensation have changed following the SOX Act and provide important evidence in explaining changes in the relationship between top executive compensation and firm performance expectation in the post-SOX period.

CEO duality occurs when the same individual holds both the CEO and board Chair positions. In some countries (such as Britain) CEO duality is considered to impair good corporate governance. In the United States, however, CEO duality is still a common practice. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) included many corporate governance reforms, but the Act did not address the issue of CEO duality. However, we suggest that the corporate governance environment surrounding the passage of SOX may have influenced corporate board decisions regarding CEO duality when appointing new CEOs. In this study, we seek to determine whether CEO duality changed in the post-Sox environment by investigating the likelihood of CEO duality when CEO changes took place before and after SOX. Using a sample of 182 CEO succession events before and after the passage of SOX, we find that the likelihood of combining the CEO and Chair positions for newly appointed CEOs significantly decreased in the post-SOX period relative to the pre-SOX period. Our results suggest the SOX environment fostered a greater focus on governance issues even beyond the specific provisions of SOX.

Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) altered the relationship between auditors and their clients by requiring an external audit of companies’ internal controls. Regulatory guidance is interpreted and applied by external auditors to comply with SOX. The purpose of this paper is to apply service operations management theories and techniques to the internal control audit process to better understand the role regulatory guidance plays in audit services. We discuss service operations management theories that apply to the production of audit services and employ the operations management technique of simulation to examine the effects of a historical relationship between the client and the auditor, information sharing between the client and the auditor, and the auditor’s perceived risk of the client on the internal control audit process. The application of service operations management theories and the simulation results illustrate that risk and information sharing are key factors for the audit process. The results suggest the updated Public Company Accounting Oversight Board guidance from Auditing Standard 2 to Auditing Standard 5 appropriately increased audit effectiveness by encouraging risk-based judgments and information sharing. This paper merges accounting and service operations management research to examine the effects of regulatory guidance on the internal control audit process. The paper uses simulation to illustrate the importance of interpreting regulatory guidance and the specific effects of risk and information sharing on the internal control audit process.

This article is the third in a trilogy of articles that discuss the professionalism (or deprofessionalism) of the accounting profession. The first examines the slow uphill climb of accounting and auditing practice to the level of being recognized as a highly trusted profession. The second examines the stagnation in professionalism leading to deprofessionalization of the accounting profession. This third article looks at the resulting directionless efforts of accounting and auditing firms in the wake of major deprofessionalization events. The interest in this study is the time period immediately following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 which is described in this paper as the “Post-SOX” history of public accountancy in the United States. During this time period, nearly equally mixed activities of professionalism and deprofessionalism have resulted in a status quo with directionless efforts doing little if anything to reverse decline in professionalism. Public accountants continued to experience conflict with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over independence rules. The large Certified Public Accountant firms generated controversies and squabbles concerning “auditing and consulting,” while at the same time they faced questions regarding the marketing and selling of aggressive tax shelters. In addition, most of the self-regulating aspects of the profession declined dramatically following passage of SOX. While initially both tax fees and audit fees of CPA firms increased during this time period, concerns are again arising as the large CPA firms more recently have renewed the emphasis on advisory services. While revenues have both increased and changed in composition during the post-SOX era, public opinion has maintained a status quo. The post-SOX era has also seen a weakening in the Code of Conduct, providing more liberties for CPAs to maximize self-interest. Meanwhile, the PCAOB faced constitutional challenges, while at the same time the AICPA experienced strong divisions in its membership. To provide some sense to these directionless efforts, this study, similar to the prior two articles in this trilogy, concludes with a summary analysis based on the nine SOCRECELIST criteria, and the question whether public accountants have learned their history lesson.

This study examines whether dividend payout, an internal corporate governance mechanism, is a substitute for or an outcome of product market competition, an external corporate governance mechanism. The sample includes firms in six of the world’s most prominent economies. We find that firms in more competitive industries pay less in the way of dividends to their shareholders, which is consistent with the notion that dividends and competition are substitutes. We also determine that the above negative relationship is weaker in countries with stronger regulation protecting minority shareholders against corporate self-dealing. Furthermore, the relationship has attenuated following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that increased regulation and enhanced governance standards. Collectively, our findings provide consistent evidence across countries that the two corporate governance mechanisms examined in the study are substitutes, and greater regulation weakens the substitution effect. Our empirical findings are robust to alternative measures of dividend payout, industry definition, and shareholder protection.

The time period from the mid-1980s through 2002 is described in this series of research as a “pre-SOX” era of rapid deprofessionalization in U.S. pubic accountancy resulting in the loss of professional status. This was a period, however, when all professions were suffering some deprofessionalization. During the pre-SOX period it appears that leadership in public accountancy responded to a nearly perfect storm of changes confronting the profession with a corporate mentality of management by objectives, commercialization, and profit maximization resulting in constant and substantial net deprofessionalization greater than that of other professions. Starting in the late-1970s and continuing through 2001, some critics of public accountancy have asserted that leaders in the profession either lost or forgot what was required for public accountancy to be recognized as a profession. The conclusion stated in this paper is that public accountancy has lost its professional status in or before 2002. The reasons and events leading to this conclusion are presented and discussed. In the United States it appears as though once professional status is lost, regaining the elite status is more difficult. The question is if public accountancy can learn from history going into the substantial changes to be confronted in the post-SOX era of public accountancy and regain or at least make progress toward regaining professional status.

In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives of firm stakeholders and taxpayers, many of the executives of these rescued firms received bonus compensation as the year closed, which called into question the relationship between pay and performance. Equity compensation is viewed by many as the answer to the principal–agent dilemma. By giving an executive stock in the firm, as an owner, his interests will now be aligned with those of shareholders, and the executive will work to enhance firm performance. Equity compensation was on the rise during the 1990s when stock options became the largest component of executives’ compensation packages [Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485–2563]. During the first decade of the new millennium, usage of restricted stock in compensation plans contributed to the executives’ total package. Whatever the form, equity compensation should induce managers to make decisions for the betterment of the firm.

Empirical evidence, however, has contradicted this ideal notion that mangers who are partial owners of the firm work to maximize firm value. Rather, managerial power in the form of earnings management and manipulation of insider information come to the forefront as a means by which executives can maximize the equity portion of their compensation packages. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as new accounting rules set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board may help to remedy some of the corporate ills that have surfaced in the past. This will not be possible, however, without compliance and increased corporate governance on the part of firms and their executives. Compensation committees must take great care in creating a compensation package that incites the executive to not only act in the best interest of his firm but also consider the welfare of the common good in his actions.

This study examines the relation between internal control material weakness (ICMW) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and real earnings management. Our measures of real earnings management are abnormal cash flow from operations (ABCFOs), abnormal discretionary expenses (ABDISEXP), and abnormal production cost (ABPROD). We use a sample of 1,824 manufacturing firms over the period 2004–2011 to run regressions of ABCFO, ABDISEXP, and ABPROD on ICMW and other independent variables. We find that ICMW is negatively associated with ABCFOs. Another result that emerges from this study is a positive relation between ICMW and ABPROD. Our results imply that manufacturing firms with materially weak internal controls predominantly use overproduction and excessive price discounts to manage operational activities to achieve earnings targets. As SOX Section 404 is designed to reduce the instances of firms having ICMW, our finding that ICMW firms engage in real earnings management suggests that the use of real earnings management could be reduced as SOX Section 404 succeeds in reducing ICMW.

This study’s purpose is to examine whether providing prior consulting services influences internal auditors’ subsequent assessments when providing assurance services to assist management in its assessment of internal control over financial reporting. A behavioral experiment is used, with internal auditors as participants. We provide some evidence that internal auditors who perform prior consulting services are less likely than others to conclude that an identified control deficiency is a material weakness, but only when the deficiency is directly related to the prior consulting services performed. Limitations include relatively small sample sizes and manipulation check failure rates that, although consistent with several prior studies, are somewhat high. If internal auditors have provided consulting services, they may want to consider limiting the assurance services provided to management that are more directly related to their consulting services. While prior studies have examined the effects of internal auditors’ role in designing internal controls on subsequent services, this is the first study to focus on the impact of providing internal audit consulting services on subsequent assurance services.

This paper aims to help auditors manage the risk of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) violations of the companies that they audit, particularly those with operations in Latin America.

First, the paper describes the relevant provisions of the FCPA. Second, it identifies the common schemes and transactions associated with heightened risk of FCPA liability in Latin America and provides recommendations to minimize this risk. Third, it discusses the responsibilities of auditors under U.S. securities laws and regulations with respect to the FCPA violations of their clients. Finally, it describes the sanctions that auditors could face if they fail to fulfill their responsibilities regarding these FCPA violations. The paper is based on data collected from various documents including laws, cases, accounting and auditing standards, litigation releases, press releases, deferred prosecution agreements, and enforcement actions.

Auditors have a responsibility under Section 10A(a) of the Exchange Act to design procedures that provide reasonable assurances of detecting the FCPA violations of their clients, which are illegal acts with direct and material effects on the financial statements. In addition, auditors have a responsibility under Section 10A(b) of the Exchange Act to report the violations of the FCPA that they detect during the audit to the appropriate level of management. If management does not take the necessary remedial steps, auditors must report FCPA violations to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. In order to reduce their FCPA-related liability and fulfill their responsibilities under U.S. securities laws and accounting standards, auditors should closely scrutinize transactions with a high risk of FCPA liability. An analysis of FCPA cases occurring in Latin America reveals six categories of transactions with heightened FCPA risk.

While there is much literature regarding a company’s compliance with the FCPA, there has not been much literature about the auditor’s responsibilities with respect to the FCPA violations of their clients. This paper attempts to start bridging this gap by providing guidance to auditors regarding their responsibilities to detect and report FCPA violations.