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This whistleblowing case study engages students in discussions about when and how to disclose differences of opinion on a revenue recognition matter with higher-ups in an organization. Factors to consider include the morality of whistleblowing, confidentiality obligations, the rules of conduct in the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Code, Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), Dodd–Frank, and the US Supreme Court ruling in Digital Realty, Inc. v. Somers that addresses when to report matters to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Case questions are designed to promote students’ critical thinking skills, ethical reasoning skills, and decision-making. A flowchart of AICPA ethics rule 2.130.020 (Subordination of Judgment) provides the framework for making decisions when differences exist in financial reporting. The case provides learning objectives, implementation guidance, and teaching notes. The case was used in an accounting ethics course taught at the undergraduate senior level but can also be used in auditing, fraud examination, and advanced financial reporting courses.

The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of audit committee financial experts on the risk of financial corruption in public companies.

A time-lagged, matched-pairs sample of 352 corporations was utilized to test the study's hypotheses (176 financially corrupt firms plus 176 compliant firms). To uncover financially corrupt firms, 2,895 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases from the Securities and Exchange Commission were thoroughly evaluated.

The results show that financial experts on audit committees generally increased financial corruption. However, the impact was reversed when audit committees had three or more financial experts, showing that having at least three financial experts reduced financial corruption.

The study's findings call into question the long-held practice of appointing at least one financial expert to audit committees. This study offers a novel approach to improve corporate oversight and reduce financial corruption by having at least three financial experts on audit committees.

The primary objective of this research is to chronicle how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other United States Federal Government Agencies (USFGA) agencies have played a role in shaping the trajectory of financial reporting for sustainability, with a particular emphasis on triple bottom line (TBL). This exploration extends to other indexes reporting sustainability data encompassed within financial, social and environmental reporting.

This study adopts an illustrative methodology, utilizing data sourced from governmental, business and international organizational documents.

Sustainability accounting predominantly finds its place within the framework of TBL. However, it is crucial to note that sustainability reporting remains voluntary rather than mandatory. Nevertheless, accounting firms and professional accounting societies have embraced it as a supplementary facet of financial accounting reporting.

The research highlights the historical evolution of sustainability within the USFGA and corporate entities. Corporations’ interest in accounting for sustainability performances has significantly contributed to the emergence of voluntary sustainability accounting rules, as embodied by the TBL.

Taking advantage of a unique measure of corporate culture obtained from advanced machine learning algorithms, this study aims to explore how corporate culture strength is influenced by board independence, which is one of the most crucial aspects of the board of directors. Because of their independence from the corporation, outside independent directors are more likely to be unbiased. As a result, board independence is commonly used as a proxy for board quality.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, the authors execute a variety of additional tests, i.e. propensity score matching, an instrumental variable analysis, Lewbel’s (2012) heteroscedastic identification and Oster’s (2019) testing for coefficient stability.

The results show that stronger board independence, measured by a higher proportion of independent directors, is significantly associated with corporate culture. In particular, a rise in board independence by one standard deviation results in an improvement in corporate culture by 32.8%.

Conducting empirical research on corporate culture is incredibly difficult due to the inherent difficulties in recognizing and assessing corporate culture, resulting in a lack of empirical research on corporate culture in the literature. The authors fill this important void in the literature. Exploiting a novel measure of corporate culture based on textual analysis, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to link corporate culture to corporate governance with a specific focus on board independence.

The purpose of this research paper is to investigate the perspectives of key stakeholders on strategies to improve the effectiveness of audit committees (ACs) in African economies, with a specific focus on the Libyan banking sector.

The study uses a mixed-methods approach, combining questionnaire surveys and semi-structured interviews. The data collection process involves gathering responses from participants through questionnaires and conducting in-depth interviews to gain deeper insights into the subject matter.

The research findings highlight several key points. Firstly, fortifying Libya’s accounting and auditing profession emerges as the most widely endorsed suggestion for enhancing AC effectiveness. Secondly, participants identified various actions that can strengthen ACs, including appointing members with financial expertise, refining the legal requirements governing AC responsibilities, securing board support, enhancing Libya’s legal and regulatory framework, adequately compensating AC members and reducing government intervention in AC practices.

This research contributes to the field of corporate governance by providing valuable insights into the perspectives of stakeholders on enhancing AC effectiveness in the Libyan banking sector, within the broader context of African economies. The findings offer actionable plans for regulators and policymakers seeking to improve AC effectiveness in Libya.

The purpose of this study is to extend the Fraud Diamond Theory to celebrity Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) and investigate their post-Initial Public Offering (IPO) stock market performance.

After obtaining a sample of celebrity SPACs from the Spacresearch.com database, fraud risk characteristics were obtained from Lexis Nexus searches. Buy and hold abnormal returns were calculated for celebrity SPACs versus a small-cap equity benchmark for time intervals after IPO, and multiple regression analysis was performed to examine the relationship between fraud risk features and post-IPO returns.

Celebrity SPACs exhibit Fraud Diamond characteristics and significantly underperform a small-cap stock portfolio on a risk-adjusted basis after IPO.

This study only examines celebrity SPACs that conducted IPOs on the NYSE and NASDAQ/AMEX and does not include those that are traded on the Over the Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB).

Celebrity endorsement of SPAC vehicles attracts investors who may not be properly informed regarding the risk characteristics of SPACs. Accordingly, investors should be warned that celebrity SPACs underperform a small-cap equity portfolio and exhibit significant elements of fraud risk.

The use of celebrity endorsement as a marketing device to attract investment in SPACs has regulatory implications.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the fraud risk characteristics and post-IPO performance of celebrity SPACs.

This paper examines the effect of firms’ takeover susceptibility on the manipulation of financial statements through classification shifting.

The paper applies ordinary least squares regression (OLS) with fixed effects analyses to a sample of United States listed firms over the period 1992–2014. We use takeover index as a proxy for takeover susceptibility of firms, with high values representing higher takeover susceptibility and lower values representing lower takeover susceptibility.

The study finds that firms engage in classification shifting through core expenses, suggesting that takeover threats reduce the incentive to manage earnings through classification shifting. We also find that takeover susceptibility improves the monitoring mechanism for firms with low profitability because these firms have greater incentives to engage in classification shifting. Finally, we find that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act strengthens the monitoring mechanism influenced by takeover threats. Overall, the results provide evidence of the important role of takeover susceptibility in mitigating classification shifting. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests.

The results emphasise the disciplinary role of the legal environment around corporate takeovers. The study suggests that policymakers and regulators should be cognisant of antitakeover laws which may increase agency conflicts between managers and shareholders and promote managerial self-seeking behaviours such as classification shifting.

The paper highlights the important role of takeover threats as an external governance mechanism to mitigate classification shifting which is detrimental to investors’ value. From prior literature, this study is the first to provide evidence of the effect of takeover threats on classification shifting.