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We investigate how firms’ responses to misconduct change when the institutional environment becomes more stringent. Organizational theory offers conflicting perspectives on whether new legislation will increase or decrease pressure on firms to take remedial action following misconduct. The dominant perspective posits that new legislation increases expectations of firm behavior, amplifying pressure on them to take remedial action after misconduct. A more recent perspective, however, suggests that the mere necessity to meet more stringent regulatory requirements certifies firms as legitimate to relevant audiences. This certification effect buffers firms, reducing the pressure for them to take remedial action after misconduct. Using a temporary, largely arbitrary exemption from a key provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we show that firms that were not required to meet all the regulatory standards of good governance it required became 45% more likely to replace their CEOs following the announcement of an earnings restatement after Sarbanes-Oxley. On the other hand, those that were required to meet all of Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions became 26% less likely to replace their CEOs following a restatement announcement. Ironically, CEOs at firms with a legislative mandate intended to increase accountability for corporate misconduct shoulder less blame than do CEOs at firms without such legislative demands.

I examine patterns of making or deferring strategic repatriations that firms can use to either meet analysts' forecasts or defer to maintain future reported earnings flexibility. First, I examine the extent to which firms repatriate earnings from high foreign tax subsidiaries to decrease US tax expense, resulting in increased net income and lower cash taxes. Using federal tax return information, I find evidence that firms strategically repatriate these earnings to meet or beat current analysts' forecasts. Next, I find evidence that firms that are able to obtain current year tax reductions defer these repatriations in an attempt to build cookie-jar reserves. Lastly, I find that firms do not disclose high foreign tax repatriations (HTRs), even when required by SEC rules. This study contributes to the earnings management, tax avoidance, and disclosure literature by examining a discretionary tax planning strategy.

This chapter aims to examine the impact of whistleblowing policy (WH) on earnings management (EM) in an emerging market, Egypt. Our sample period from 2014 to 2019: the pre-whistleblowing policy period is 2014–2016 and the post-whistleblowing policy period is 2017–2019 with a total of 780 observations and the data are analyzed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. Data are collected from annual reports, corporate governance reports, and companies’ website. The empirical analysis shows that whistleblowing policy coefficient is negative and significantly impacts EM in Egyptian firms. The result shows that when the firm adopts a whistleblowing policy, it led to decrease in EM. In addition, we provide strong and robust evidence by the difference-in-difference (DID) method to show that whistleblowing is significantly negatively associated with the extent of EM, which indicates that firms have an effective whistleblowing policy and can have several benefits. Firstly, it can help to identify and prevent illegal or unethical behavior within an organization, which can ultimately save the company from potential legal and reputational damage. Secondly, a whistleblowing policy can empower employees to speak up about any concerns they have, without fear of retaliation, which can help to create a more transparent and ethical work environment. Overall, an effective whistleblowing policy can contribute to the long-term success of a company and the broader economy. The findings of this chapter are relevant to policymakers, governments, management, employees, and shareholders to constraining EM in Egyptian firms.

This chapter investigates the effect of the geographical distance between institutional investors and firms on managers' financial misconduct. The evidence shows that the likelihood of committing financial misconduct by management is positively associated with distance. The distance effect is more prominent for firms with higher information asymmetry and more dedicated institutional investors. In line with the balance between risk-taking and benefit extraction from misconduct, the severity of financial misconduct is higher for firms closer to their institutional investors. Results show that geographical proximity can significantly reduce the cost of information production and facilitate monitoring through access to soft information.

Organizational wrongdoing is still very much prevalent in today’s society. Traditional and social media are full of examples of organizations engaging in unethical or illegal behavior. While it is difficult – if not impossible – to establish whether the ever-increasing number of reported cases of wrongdoing is due to an actual increase in the phenomenon (objectivist view of wrongdoing) or to more attention being paid to it (social-constructivist view of wrongdoing), the fact remains that organizational wrongdoing seems to have become the norm rather than an exception in our everyday life. This is concerning, as organizational wrongdoing tends to undermine trust in fundamental institutions, such as the Market, the State, Religion, and Law, and may lead to them being replaced by other – sometimes less desirable – institutions or create an “institutional void.” Because of its potential impact on established institutions, organizational wrongdoing deserves to be closely monitored and further examined. This volume of Research in the Sociology of Organizations is an attempt to draw attention to the theoretical and empirical relevance of the topic, consolidate and extend the knowledge accumulated in this area of research, and highlight potential direction for future research. The volume focuses in particular on the variegated consequences and impact of organizational wrongdoing.