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To explore income inequality in urban China, this paper investigates disparities between- and within-urban locals and rural migrants from 2002 to 2013, using three waves of the China Household Income Project (CHIP) data. While the existing literature concentrates on the wage disparity between these two groups, our results show that the Gini among the migrants increased by 17.86% between 2007 and 2013 and that among the locals increased by 15.54% from 2002 to 2007. The urban–migrant average income gap decreased during the whole period mainly due to higher growth in migrants’ average income. Estimates based on Mincerian earnings functions for both groups reveal the significant role of the education, occupation and type of contract in determining the within-group inequality. In addition, using a recentred influence function (RIF), we observe that short-term and other types of contracts, duration of the job, in-system ownership, marriage and skill have inequality-enhancing effects for migrants. The variation of skills has a larger impact on the income disparity among migrants than on that among urban locals. The RIF-based Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition of the mean difference of incomes shows that labour market discrimination between the two groups is not significant; however, both pure explained and unexplained differences are significant when applying the RIF decomposition to the variance of the logarithms of incomes. While the type of contract significantly reduces the pure explained difference between migrants and urban locals, occupation has a positive impact on this difference between these two groups. The heterogenity analysis shows that the factors influencing incomes in these two groups are different. We recommend labour market intervention to reduce unreasonable occupational and sectoral disparities, especially in the net inflow provinces, to mitigate urban inequality in China effectively.

The implicit assumption underlying the work of most anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) is that they need to change public attitudes toward corruption to ensure a cleaner future. The means of achieving this objective usually rest on sanctions, prevention, and sermons. Changing attitudes is seen to be largely a matter of prosecuting the corrupt, putting preventive measures in place, emphasizing the negative social and criminal consequences of corruption, and exhorting the public to achieve higher moral standards. Engaging the public is rarely undertaken directly. If it were, it would entail a community relations approach based on face-to-face, decentralized interaction between the ACA and the public. In principle, this approach might have three significant advantages. First, it could enable the anti-corruption message to be communicated more directly and, possibly, more effectively. Second, it might assist the ACA in identifying groups within the community which have developed, or are developing, attitudes which are potentially antithetical to its objectives. Third, it could serve as a springboard for local anti-corruption initiatives which might help to embed desired practices in the community or groups within it. In this chapter, we examine the extent to which one of the few agencies to adopt a full-blown community relations strategy – Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) – has been able to achieve those benefits.

Songkhla Lake is the largest lake in Thailand along the Bay of Thailand, situated at latitude 7°08′ and 7°50′ north and longitude 100°07′ and 100°37′ east (Fig. 4.1). The lake covers an area of approximately 1,042km², and consists of four interconnected lake ecosystems (Ratanachai & Sutiwipakorn, 2005): Thale Noi (approximately 27km²), Thale Luang (approximately 473km²), Thale Sap (approximately 360km²), and Thale Sap Songkhla (approximately 182km²).

The role of firm attributes as a source of competitive advantage has been discussed previously in the tourism marketing strategy field. Benchmarking, a recognized learning model, is recommended as a tool to identify and improve the competitiveness of a firm. The present study employs the importance–performance analysis (IPA) to benchmark five nature- and culture-based attractions in Northern Norway. Altogether, 701 respondents participated in the on-site survey, i.e., during their vacation experiences. The present study reveals several interesting and useful managerial insights and implications for the tourist attraction industry in general as well as for the individual tourist attraction firm measured. Consequently, this study contributes to management by integrating theory and empirical data to investigate whether benchmarking, as a company learning tool, may lead to improved performance. Based on the study results, the present work suggests strategies and potential improvements for the respective tourist attractions.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the world's largest official creditor nation with its outstanding debt claims on the rest of the world totaling an estimated US$5.5 trillion in 2019 or more than 6% of global GDP. However, given Beijing’s very limited transparency in its disclosures when it comes to its external lending (and now its alleged culpability in the spread of the coronavirus) the accusation that the PRC has for years engaged in “debt-trap diplomacy” has come under renewed scrutiny. Specifically, the charge is that the Chinese government, which is the world's leading creditor lending via its multibillion dollar “Belt and Road Initiative” as well as various state-owned and controlled entities, lures developing countries, in particular, low-income countries, with easy money to fund often economically unviable projects. This is because China's ultimate goal is to get access to the borrowers' local markets and natural resources and indirectly controlling or outright seizing assets and resources, including extracting economic and political concessions when these countries fail to service their loans – which is often given at market or above-market interest rates and carry shorter maturities, thereby requiring regular refinancing. This paper reviews this claim and concludes that it seems exaggerated.

The Burmese military has been successful in maintaining its authoritarian rule in the past decades. In 2011, however, the junta shifted its power to civilian government despite the absence of severe political pressure from inside or outside. Since then, the new government has introduced many reforms that allow greater political liberty in Burma. This chapter locates the junta’s power shift as part of a wider process of the military consolidating political legitimacy. It argues that as the junta’s power consolidation reached its bottleneck in the 2000s, political reform was imperative as the pre-condition for international legitimacy and economic development. Yet, regarding aspects of the content of the new constitution, military-civilian power relationships, and ethnic minority-central government relations, it remains to be seen whether Burma will move toward actual democratization. For President Thein Sein, one of the big challenges will be satisfying the high expectations of the international community and domestic opposition parties while still being able to control the pace of reform and maintain power.

Luxury and communism are perceived to be ideologically incompatible values. Prior to the end of the Cold War, luxury tourism and socialist economies had an accommodating relationship and were rationalised at the national level for foreign exchange revenues, showcasing national development in some instances and finally promoting leisure and political education. However, contemporary scholarship on political ideology and luxury tourism is limited given changes in the political and tourism domain over the last two decades. The start of luxury travel and increasing private promotion in Vietnam comes at a time where the communist regime is hurriedly developing the economy at a breakneck speed. Key cities like Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City have become the forefront of luxury travel for Vietnam. Luxury malls, fine dining and five-star hotel resorts have sprung over the years in tandem with Doi Moi (economic restructuring). Tourism literature has seldom ventured into regime politics and luxury tourism. Using a historical approach, the chapter traces the preamble of luxury tourism in the age of Vietnam's modernity. A critical assessment of contemporary luxury tourism in Vietnam reveals a favourable relationship with socialist principles.