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Prior research suggests that managers engage in classification shifting using discontinued operations as an earnings management tool. The authors investigate the role of managerial ability in this type of classification shifting because prior research links high ability managers to reduced levels of earnings management. Using a large sample from 1988 to 2014, the authors find that more-able managers better mitigate the extent of classification shifting using discontinued operations. The authors also find that our results are mainly driven by firms with income-decreasing discontinued operations.

This study investigates how disclosure of the board of directors’ leadership and role in risk oversight (BODs oversight disclosure) influences investors’ judgments when information on risk exposures is disclosed. The theoretical lens through which we examine this issue involves negativity bias. Sixty-two stock market investors who engage in the evaluation and/or investment of stocks on a regular or professional basis participated in our study. Our results reveal that the addition of BODs oversight disclosure (positive information) does not carry significant weight on investor judgments (i.e., attractiveness and investment) when financial statement disclosures indicate a high level of operational and financial risk exposures (negative information). In contrast, under the condition of a low level of risk exposures, BODs oversight disclosure causes investors to assess higher risk in terms of worry, catastrophic potentials and unfamiliarity about risk information and, in turn, make less favorable investor judgments. Our findings add to the literature on negativity bias and contribute to the debate on the usefulness of disclosures about risk.

Purpose – We investigate the impact of CEO turnover on performance and accounting-based outcomes following major business restructurings.

Design/Methodology/Approach – We analyze a sample of 217 major operational restructurings during the period 1999–2007 using regressions and other statistical tests.

Findings – We document significant improvements in postrestructuring operating and investment efficiencies with little differentiation between restructurings that involve a change in CEO and those that involve continuing CEOs. However, we find evidence of lower accounting quality for the continuing CEO firms. First, restructuring charges of CEO turnover firms are associated with lower current period unexpected core earnings and higher future period unexpected core earnings (lower levels of classification shifting). Second, CEO turnover firms have a significantly lower percentage of (i) restructuring charge reversals and (ii) prereversal shortfalls (in meeting analyst forecast estimates) followed by reversals (suggesting lower levels of subsequent earnings management). Therefore, turnover CEOs are less likely to manipulate restructuring charges to mask true economic performance than continuing CEOs. Overall, our evidence suggests continuing CEOs undertake less substantial restructurings, while opportunistically reporting similar charges and performance improvements, consistent with attempts to pool with new CEO hires to keep their jobs.

Originality/Value – Overall, our results highlight the key economic role played by top corporate managers in major business restructurings, suggesting that CEO turnover leads to both real changes in managerial actions and altered reporting incentives.

This study examines the impact of FASB Interpretation No. 48 (FIN48), Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, on earnings management (EM) activity, by focusing on changes in the deferred tax asset valuation allowance (DTVA). FIN48 was adopted, in part, over concerns that firms were using the reserve for uncertain tax positions (cushion) to manage earnings. However, there are reasons to believe that the adoption of FIN48 may have impacted the extent to which firms utilize DTVA changes as a strategic accounting choice. As the provision for income taxes is one of the final accounts closed prior to an earnings announcement, income tax accounting is generally regarded as a final opportunity to strategically meet earnings goals. To the extent that FIN48 reduced cushion-based EM, firms may have increasingly used DTVA changes as a substitute. Alternatively, the attention that FIN48 brought to firms’ income tax footnotes may have curbed the strategic use of income tax accounting, in general. This study employs a sample of publicly traded US firms over the period of 2003–2010. A regression model and an analysis of the frequency of DTVA-based EM reveal no evidence of a systematic change in behavior attributable to FIN48. However, further analysis reveals that firms identified as managing earnings to meet analyst forecasts increasingly used discretionary DTVA changes relative to changes in tax cushion in the post-FIN48 period. The results have implications for existing research on income tax-based EM.

Multiple stakeholders in the financial reporting process have articulated concerns over the rules-based orientation that U.S. accounting standards have adopted. Many argue that a more principles-based approach to standards setting, typified by international accounting standards, would improve the quality of financial reporting and strengthen the auditor's position when dealing with client pressure, thereby enabling a focus on transparency and fairness of financial reports. In early 2009, the U.S. appeared poised to transition U.S. accounting standards to international accounting standards. The transition decision was made after the recommendations of the SEC Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting (i.e., SEC Pozen Committee) publicly expressed strong support in its final report (SEC, 2008a). The SEC in turn issued its “Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers on November 14, 2008” (SEC, 2008b) outlining the transition procedures. However, with Shapiro taking over as chairperson of the SEC, this move now appears less likely pending a stronger review of how principles-based international standards may impact the strength of financial regulatory oversight – a potential delay met with disdain by the pro principles-based European regulatory community (Doran, 2009). While transition to international standards continues to progress, little research examining whether principles-based standards affect auditor decision-making has been conducted. The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of principles- vs. rules-based standards on auditors' willingness to allow preparers leeway in reporting practices and to consider how auditors' decision behavior is influenced by potential client pressure and/or opposing pressure from the SEC. Based on a sample of 114 experienced auditors, the results show that auditors are more willing to allow clients to manage earnings under rules-based standards; and, these results are persistent even under external pressure. Results also indicate that more experienced auditors are less willing to allow clients who exert high pressure to report earnings aggressively, while SEC pressure has more affect on less experienced auditors. These results provide important insights to the FASB, SEC, and IASB as they weigh arguments underlying the principles- vs. rules-based debate.

This chapter examines the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to market-adjusted returns and changes in earnings for high-tech (HT) firms vis-à-vis firms (NHT) in other industries. Consistent with the hypotheses, this chapter uncovers the following evidence: First, the sensitivity of executive bonus compensation to market-adjusted returns is weaker and more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms (a control group), which implies that the problem of ex post settling up, documented in Leone et al. (2006), may be far less serious in HT firms than in NHT firms. Second, the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to earnings changes is generally more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms, which is consistent with the view that HT firms engage in more conservative financial reporting than NHT firms. Third, the sensitivity of executive equity-based compensation to market-adjusted returns is significantly negative for HT firms compared to NHT firms when bad earnings news is announced. The results imply that HT firms, with a strong motive to attract and retain their highly talented executives, judiciously use both short-term and long-term incentive compensation schemes by compensating for a reduction of short-term incentive pay with an increase in long-term incentive pay. The issue of executive compensation has been a longstanding one in the United States and Canada, and the issue of executive compensation-performance sensitivity for HT firms is also relevant in this era of the information technology (IT) revolution, especially when prior research has shown that HT firms differ from NHT firms in their market-valuation process.

We investigate auditor objectivity as it relates to engagement quality reviews by examining whether engagement quality reviewers (EQRs) exhibit lower levels of objectivity when they have administrative, economic, or social ties with the audit engagement partner. Motivated reasoning theory suggests that EQRs with ties to the engagement partner will reach less conservative conclusions and be more willing to accept an engagement partner's decision relative to reviewers who have no connections with the engagement partner. We conduct an experiment where EQRs must review a decision by an engagement partner related to a contingent liability.

Results suggest that engagement quality reviews are an effective mechanism for reducing the effects of engagement partner biases to accept client-favored accounting choices. Participants with ties to the engagement partner (i.e., from the same office) and without ties (i.e., from the national office) both challenged the decision of the engagement partner and recommended disclosure of a contingent liability, which client management opposed. We also find an interaction of ties with the engagement partner and the probability of the contingent liability. National office EQRs were less likely to decide that disclosure was necessary than were local office partners when the probability of the contingent liability was low. With regard to the need to recognize a liability, EQRs with and without ties to the engagement partner concurred with the decision of the engagement partner.

Both American and International Accounting Standards lead to the invisibility of most brand values in financial statements, as these standards recognize only those brands acquired externally either through a purchase or a merger. Nonetheless, over the last several decades, it has become increasingly evident that company value is primarily driven by intangible assets such as brands and other intellectual property. As such, in a knowledge-based economy, it is increasingly important for companies to develop these assets. Empirical evidence produced by prior research also demonstrates that brand values are market value relevant, that is, knowledge about their existence and value is important to investors. Consequently, and in tangent with the increased use of fair value measurements based on projected future cash flows, we argue in this chapter that it might be time to end the invisibility of brands.

We investigate the interaction of debt covenants and tax accounting on the adoption of Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48). We examine how firms respond to the potential tightening of covenant slack upon FIN 48 adoption and whether these actions are penalized by creditors and anticipated by equity markets. We find that upon FIN 48 adoption, the majority of sample corporate borrowers increase their tax reserves and reduce equity. Firms close to debt covenant violation were even more likely to increase tax reserves upon FIN 48 adoption; however, the size of the adjustment was relatively smaller, suggesting that the FIN 48 standards limited, but did not eliminate, firms use of discretion in reporting uncertain tax positions to avoid costly covenant violations. For firms near net worth debt covenant violation, the act of decreasing equity upon FIN 48 adoption imposes real economic costs, as the average cost of debt increased by 43 basis points. Finally, we extend prior research on the market response to FIN 48 by showing how the market response to FIN 48 adoption is a function of debt covenant slack and tax aggressiveness. Specifically, the cumulative abnormal return at the FIN 48 exposure draft release date is negative only for tax aggressive firms that are close to debt covenant violation.