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The purpose of this study is to explore whether pension plan reporting readability affects earnings volatility. Moreover, as SFAS 158 requires firms to fully recognize their funded status on the balance sheet, the firms’ pension liabilities (inside debts) and financing ability have the corresponding change. This study further investigates whether pension plan reporting readability affects earnings volatility from the SFAS 158 and funded status perspectives.

This study follows Li (2008), Lehavy et al. (2011) and Rennekamp (2012) to use the FOG and SMOG variables as the readability proxies and investigates whether pension plan reporting readability affects earnings volatility from the perspectives of inside debts and SFAS 158 by using a sample of 3,077 American firms from the year 2006 to 2009.

Empirical results of this study show that firms with low readability of pension plan reporting have high earnings volatility, revealing that less readable pension plan reporting increases the assessed variance of a firm’s inside debts, financing flexibility, investment ability and therefore profitability. In addition, the implement of SFAS 158 enhances the effect of pension plan reporting readability on earnings volatility. Moreover, the authors also find that the funded status plays a moderating role for the effect of pension plan reporting readability on earnings volatility. Finally, the results are robust to endogeneity issue.

Earnings stability measures how consistently earnings have been generated over time, and its importance has been acknowledged by most firms. For example, prior literature has documented that manipulating financial reporting to smooth earnings is becoming a business common practice (Burgstahler et al., 2006; Liu and Espahbodi, 2014). The empirical results suggest that pension plan reporting readability is a significant determinant of earnings volatility.

As a practical implication, this study points out that manipulations of the pension reporting readability are not costless. It incurs the costs of earnings instability.

This study indicates that the issuance of SFAS 158 makes firms more likely to engage in pension plan readability manipulation. As a result, it has policy implication that the regulator should consider how the policy change alters the firm financial reporting behavior.

The empirical results suggest that firms may be more likely to engage in obfuscating pension plan disclosure after FASB’s issuance of SFAS 158. This would further increase outside investors’ assessed variance for inside debts and earnings volatilities. When policymakers require firms to recognize their funded status in statement of financial position, they should consider the costs or benefits that the firm manager face and, therefore, how this policy change alter the firm financial reporting behavior.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the significant clustering of defined benefit (DB) pension plan freeze announcements during 2001‐2006 is motivated at least in part by accounting concerns due to the Financial Accounting Standards Board's pending adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158 (SFAS 158).

Using logistic regression models, the paper compares 147 “freeze firms” with a matched sample of firms that did not announce a DB plan freeze. Empirical models control for other DB plan motives including as a response to stricter contribution requirements under the Pension Protection Act of 2006 and improving the firm's competitive position.

The potential SFAS 158 impact is significantly associated with firms' decisions to freeze their DB plans. Firm profitability is also significantly associated with the freeze decision. However, there is no significant association between cash flow positions or pension plan contributions and the freeze decision.

It is possible that economic conditions adversely affecting the funded status of DB plans also motivate the freeze decision. While this study controls for the economic environment, economic factors could exacerbate the potential effect of SFAS 158.

This paper considers potential effects of accounting policy by examining its influence on real management actions and has consequences for a variety of stakeholders including investors, creditors, and, importantly, pension beneficiaries and workers, as DB plans represent implicit contracts between firms and their employees.

The purpose of this paper is to examine, in the context of movement towards a fair‐value based pension accounting standard, the value relevance of both recognized and disclosed pension accounting information.

Using hand‐collected data from Fortune 200 firms, this study includes both recognized and disclosed pension accounting measures (aggregated and disaggregated) in multivariate regression models. The investigation employs tests of relative and incremental value relevance in both equity and credit rating evaluation contexts.

Findings indicate that pension information recognized under a fair‐value‐based accounting model is no more or less value relevant than pension information recognized under the SFAS 87 model. Also, the disclosed off‐balance sheet pension amount is incrementally value relevant for determining share prices. However, it is not value relevant for the credit rating decision.

This study tests the relevance and reliability of accounting information jointly. Theoretically, however, relevance and reliability affect information usefulness and, thus, valuation decisions independently.

This paper yields a number of significant implications for standard setters. The unique evidence that investors apply off‐balance sheet pension amounts in the equity valuation context implies that required recognition under a fair‐value standard may not provide a significant incremental benefit over DB plan disclosures. However, such a standard may yield potential improvements in the credit rating decision context and may be much more likely to impact credit rating decisions going forward. Considering the continued shift towards fair‐value‐based pension accounting standards internationally, recognizing transitory elements of fair‐value pension cost separately from operating income is essential for mitigating any potential loss in value relevance.

This paper aims to examine the association of accruals and disaggregated pension components with future cash flows and also to investigate whether investors distinguish between pension information that is recognized (SFAS 158) versus disclosed (SFAS 132).

Regression analysis is used with a proxy for expected future cash flows as the dependent variable, and the components of pension disclosures as well as controls for the 2008-2009 financial crisis as the independent variables.

The results reveal that incorporating disaggregated pension components increases the ability to predict future cash flows, and that investors attach different pricing multiples to the various components in the models. The authors also find that during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the signs of the coefficients on these components changed. Finally, the results indicate that investors assign more significance to pension accounting information that is recognized, as opposed to disclosed, and that disclosure affects the allocation of pension assets.

The authors provide empirical support for the conjecture posited by Amir and Benartzi (1998) that the prediction of future cash flows will be enhanced by the incorporation of the components of pension assets and liabilities. Importantly from a standard setting perspective, the authors also find evidence that investors assign more significance to pension accounting information that is recognized in the financial statements than to pension information that is disclosed.

In this paper, we aim to answer two questions. First, whether firms manipulate reported earnings via pension assumptions when facing mandatory contributions. Second, whether firms alter their earnings management behavior when the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) mandates disclosure of pension asset composition and a description of investment strategy under SFAS 132R.

Our basic approach is to run linear regressions of firm-year assumed returns on the log of pension sensitivity measures, controlling for current and lagged actual returns from pension assets, fiscal year dummies and industry dummies. The larger the pension sensitivity ratios, the stronger the effects from inflated ERRs on reported earnings. We confirm the early results that the regression slopes are positive and highly significant. We construct an indicator variable DMC to capture the mandatory contributions firms face and another indicator variable D132R to capture the effect of SFAS 132R. DMC takes the value of one for fiscal years during which an acquisition takes place and zero otherwise. D132R takes the value of one for fiscal years after December 15, 2003 and zero otherwise.

Our sample covers the period from June 1992 to December 2017. Our key results are as follows. The estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on DMC is 0.308 (6.87). Firms facing mandatory contributions tend to set ERRs at an average 0.308% higher. The estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on D132R is −2.190 (−13.70). The new disclosure requirement under SFAS 132R constrains all firms to set ERRs at an average 2.190% lower. The estimate (t-statistic) on the interactive term DMA×D132R is −0.237 (−3.29). When mandatory contributions happen during the post-SFAS 132R period, firms tend to set ERRs at 0.237% lower than they would do otherwise in the pre-SFAS 132R period.

When firms face mandatory contributions, typically firm experience negative stock market returns. We examine whether managers manage earnings to mitigate such negative impact. We find that firms inflate assumed returns on pension assets to boost their reported earnings when facing mandatory contributions. We also find that managers alter earnings management behavior, in the case of mandatory contributions, following the introduction of new pension disclosure standards under SFAS 132R that become effective on December 15, 2003. Under the new SFAS 132R requirement, firms need to disclose asset allocation and describe investment strategies. This imposes restrictions on managers' discretion in making ERR assumptions, since now the composition of pension assets is a key determinant of the assumed expected rate of return on pension assets. Firms need to justify their ERRs with their asset allocations.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the existence of behavioral biases, disposition effect and house money effect in investment decisions of defined benefit pension funds. It investigates the determinants of portfolios by examining whether pensions display risk seeking or risk aversion behavior in reaction to prior gains and losses.

The first research question is to examine the impact of prior period’s return and αs on existing portfolio allocation in equity, debt, real estate and other assets. In order to test this relationship, four separate regressions are estimated using the pooled data. Regression helps in examining the relationship between prior gains with current allocation in four categories of assets of varying degrees of riskiness (stocks, debt, real estate and other assets). In order to investigate the second research question on whether pension funds increase (decrease) their investments in risky (safer) assets due to prior gains and αs, the four variables representing the changes in portfolio allocation for each asset class over one period are employed. These changes in allocation are regressed against the prior year’s actual return, expected return, αs and a set of control variables.

The results suggest significant negative (positive) relationship between prior positive returns and αs with portfolio allocation in risky (safer) assets. Also, there is an increased (decreased) investment in safer (risky) assets following prior period’s positive returns and αs. The findings confirm the existence of disposition effect, while there is no evidence of house money effect.

The portfolio allocation of pension plans provides unique setting to investigate the relevance of behavioral finance and examine the role of psychological biases on risk taking. This study attempts to contribute to the literature by empirically investigating whether the tenets of behavioral finance are relevant in defined benefit pension fund’s portfolio allocation decisions. Specifically, it focuses on the determinants of portfolio choices by directly investigating pension funds’ reaction to prior period’s actual as well as risk adjusted return (or αs – the difference between the actual and expected return).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of firms using derivatives applying Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 133. It aims to measure the magnitude of cumulative effects of changes in accounting principle from the income statement in the year of adoption, market reaction to earnings announcements, and key financial ratios effects.

Search of the Compustat Industrial database for firms reporting a cumulative effect of a change in accounting principle in their annual income statements for fiscal years ending after 15 June, 2000. We then examine the impact of firms using derivatives applying SFAS No. 133.

The sampled firms reported an absolute cumulative effect on income of $6.8 billion, 65 per cent of which was negative. Significant negative unexpected returns were observed around earnings announcement dates. Abnormal returns correlated with the cumulative effect, rather than with change in earnings per share from operations, showing that the surprise related to the accounting change. Ratio analyzes and regressions results show sampled firms with material unrealized gains and losses related to hedging with derivative instruments. Earnings‐related ratios, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and measures of other comprehensive income decreased significantly from 2000 to 2001 after experiencing prior period significant increases.

The results presented in the paper should lead to further research on the effect on new authoritative standards on the financial reporting process.

Rather than judge SFAS No. 133's relative merits and shortcomings, the Standard's actual (rather than predicted) effects were analyzed. Focus was on the magnitude of the impact of SFAS No. 133 and the effect on key financial ratios. The impact of adopting the Standard was analyzed and it was found that it violated a basic tenet of financial accounting pronouncements: a “value neutral” basis was examined.

The paper's aim is to research and discuss the issue of the lack of transparency in financial reporting and how companies take advantage of accounting rules in ways that inhibit transparency.

A literature review was carried out to see what had been written and discussed. Various legal cases were studied as well as Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) studies of the impact of off‐balance‐sheet arrangements allowed by the FASB and SEC.

There are many ways that companies accomplish off‐balance‐sheet financing by taking advantage of rules‐based accounting. If there is not a rule to prevent an entity from handling a particular transaction a certain way, then it is difficult for the auditor to stop it from happening.

The paper is of descriptive nature. There are many policy implications from the results of the paper for all regulatory agencies. The economic substance of transactions needs to be communicated.

Financial managers and financial consultants need to refocus the structuring of financial transactions so that they comply with generally accepted accounting principles and that the economic substance of financial transactions is communicated. More accountability and ethical awareness needs to be instilled in the individuals who deceitfully structure financial transactions. Regulatory bodies need to ensure more transparency by closing loopholes and better enforcement of accounting standards. Boards of directors, especially the audit committees, need to be sure that a company is communicating the true economic reality of the financial transactions and financial position of the business entity. Off‐balance‐sheet financing is one of the most significant ways, among others, that the user of financial statements can be misled. It is time for regulatory bodies to eliminate overly rules‐based standards, clearly state the economic objective of each standard, and require firms to disclose the economic motivations for the accounting practices they adopt.

The value of the paper is that it studies the problems of the lack of transparency in financial reporting. It then suggests that if what is currently being done, (i.e. rules‐based accounting), is not working, then a new approach, principles‐based accounting needs to be implemented by the regulatory agencies. This paper provides an overview of the lack of financial statement transparency.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of US firms' postretirement benefits choices.

The paper uses empirical methodology (univariate and multivariate) to test the research hypotheses.

Industry norm, average employee age, financial structure, and firm size are significant factors in the determination of the proportion of compensation that is deferred. Industry norm, financial structure, and firm size are significant factors that determine the percentage of deferred compensation that is negotiated as defined benefits. Finally, industry norm, corporate tax rates, and cash flow help explain the percentage of defined benefits that are paid in the form of retiree health benefit plans.

Data requirements might bias the sample towards larger sized firms. Data availability limits the number of observations in 2000 and 2001.

The trends in post‐retirement benefits reported in this paper are important for policy makers.

These findings have implications for the baby boomers. The trend to offer smaller proportion of compensation as deferred benefits reflects the increasing costs of deferral to the employers. This increases the employees' responsibilities to save on their own. This also would shift the retirees' dependence on the public pension system for their retirement income. The trend to favor defined‐contribution plans instead of defined‐benefit plans reflects the employers' attempts to diversify their risks of paying promised post‐retirement benefits by transferring the risk to the employee. On the other hand, the popularity of defined‐contribution pension plans also reflects the increased Government's incentives to encourage savings via 401‐k plans and employee's willingness to manage their own pension portfolios.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate how audit quality affects the cost of equity (COE) defined benefit pension risk relation. As an antecedent to these tests, this study first uses implied COE measures and their pension intensity risk predictors to examine the relation between a defined benefit plan (DBP) firm’s implied COE and pension intensity risk. Then, using these measures, the authors provide new evidence on how audit quality affects this relation.

Using panel data over fiscal years 1999–2014, fixed effects models regress dependent variable, implied the COE on controls and proxies that measure pension intensity risk and pension intensity risk conditional on the quality of the audit.

This study documents that audit quality attenuates the positive relation between a sponsoring firm’s COE and pension risk. The authors rationalize these findings by asserting that the positive relation between a sponsoring firm’s COE and pension intensity risk reflects increased financial risk associated with higher pension obligations but the quality of the auditor attenuates this risk. This paper further documents that these findings are robust to a sponsoring firms’ level of financial distress.

A limitation of this research is that the sample is limited to DBPs companies only. Although results of the tests show similar results for controls that are used in other COE-related studies that include DBP and non-DBP firms, the generalizability of the findings may be limited to the extent that the financial characteristics of firms without defined contribution plans differ from the sample.

Results of this study suggest that while pension intensity risk has COE implications, managers may be able to mitigate these effects by managing their plans and utilizing high-quality auditors.

Using implied COE and pension intensity risk measures, this study provides new information on the favorable effect that high-quality audits have on the COE – pension risk relation.