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To properly assess the relative places of China and the United States in the world system, the fact of the transformation of old, and the emergence of new, centers of capital accumulation needs to be established, and some attempt made to develop means of measuring these developments. This paper, working within the framework of Uneven and Combined Development, will suggest a new metric by which we can assess the geography of capital accumulation in the world economy, a metric with three components. The first component examines national income, both per capita and as shares of the world total. The second component refines the latter to an examination of share of world manufacturing, with a specific examination of distribution of the key sector of high-technology manufacturing. The third and final component examines the distribution of large corporations through the world economy, and introduces a new term – the relative weight of large corporations. All components of this metric suggest that key aspects of the modern economy remain “territorially bound” and clearly reveal the steady, long-term decline of the United States as the dominant center of capital accumulation, and the simultaneous emergence of new centers of capital accumulation in an increasingly multi-polar world economy.

In the “shareholder primacy” (SP) view of the modern corporation, shareholders are endowed with ownership rights over the corporation. This view stems from the property rights and agency theories of the business firm formulated by financial and business economists in the 1970s and 1980s, which subsequently fed into US corporate law debates. It relies on positive legal assumptions that have largely been debunked by legal scholars, and on normative economic ideas that are equally problematic. However, SP is still very influential – if not the dominant paradigm of corporate governance, especially in the United States. The goal of the present study is to come back to the theoretical debates around the foundations of the SP paradigm to seek to identify key ideational properties that may explain, in part, the resilience of such paradigm in policy, scholarship and business practice. In particular, this paper proposes that one important reason for the persistence of the SP ideology lies in the latter’s foundation on the radically contingent nature of shareholders’ claims over the corporation.

To fulfill their economic and social missions, it is imperative yet challenging for hybrid ventures to demonstrate legitimacy (fitting in) while simultaneously projecting distinctiveness (standing out). One important means for doing so is by adopting and promoting the recent B Corporation certification. Drawing on a comprehensive analysis of the emergence of this certification, we argue that when it comes to promoting their businesses, hybrid ventures should not adopt a one size fits all approach. Rather, their promotion strategies need to be adapted to their specific contexts. We theorize and develop a typology of certification promotion strategies for hybrid ventures based on the relative prevalence of other hybrid ventures in the same regions and industries. We conclude by articulating why the B Corporation movement is a rich and underexplored context for scholarship on hybrid ventures, and highlight several promising future research directions.

This study analyses the threshold for debt of corporations under the debt-bias corporate tax system. We adopt a contingent claim model of the corporation to reflect the incentive effect of the debt-bias corporate tax system. This framework is based on aspiration level theory and the required probability for the successful completion of a project that is identical to decision weight probability in prospect theory. The proposed framework incorporates the debt-bias tax regulations prevailing in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. When the OECD countries’ financial and non-financial corporation data were applied into framework, we observe that the government achieve equilibrium by employing contradictory corporate tax regulations. Moreover, we observe that corporations are intrinsically equity-loving, although the debt-bias corporate tax system stimulates corporations toward debt. This situation makes the government corporate revenue sensitive by placing it at the disposal of corporations’ financing choice instead of corporate profitability. The corporations’ threshold for debt assists in distinguishing between debt and equity-loving corporations. Moreover, corporations’ threshold for debt assists policy makers in deciding the appropriate combination of such reform policies as the Allowance on Corporate Equity and Comprehensive Business Income Tax. A transition from debt-oriented capital structure to equity-oriented capital structure may play an important role in promoting Islamic finance.

The over 125-year-old economic miracle called the Corporation is suddenly shaken in its foundations. The corporate business world is rapidly changing not only in the USA, but also across the globe. The front covers of business magazines and dailies, once dominated by names and faces of “Corporate Giants,” are now being replaced with success stories of great startups and small business entrepreneurs. The reasons for these radical changes progressively reveal the imperfections existing in the current corporation and the business boardroom paradigm. For over a century, huge corporate entities spawned by capitalism have established and entrenched themselves in their respective industry arenas and have since been ruling the world, dominating money, capital, cash, and market opportunity. Once they provided solutions to people’s employment and career needs, they have made a fortune for themselves thereby. In the course of their evolution, the businesses have transformed into corporations, seeking people’s money for doing business and, in turn, giving a share of proportionate ownership to the investor people in the form of dividends and capital gains. Such a brilliant method of raising capital has empowered the corporations to grow and expand beyond physical and political boundaries. Today, however, the corporations are run by the BOD, most of whom are representing gigantic promoter-investor institutions. That is, the main administrative role is now replaced by private equity firms and hedge funds that provide the required capital but who also exert undue pressures on CEOs to focus on short-term strategies that have massive profitability potential, thus defying the usual business management model and paradigm the CEOs were trained for in B-schools. The massive CEO exodus that has migrated from the traditional corporations to newly created startups and smaller business entrepreneurial ventures has also made the corporation an endangered species. In such a market turbulence, how do we redefine, redesign, and reinvent the morally embattled corporation? This chapter explores solutions.

Punitive damages is a controversial topic in the legal profession and in the field of economics. This chapter explores the economics of punitive damages as they relates to corporate defendants. The economic difference between large corporations and other potential defendants, such as individuals or smaller closely held companies, causes the effects of a punitive award to be different. In some circumstances, these differences raise significant questions as to the appropriateness of punitive damages when imposed on large corporations.

Considering a macro view of business and higher education interactions, this chapter explores key facets for business interest in other organizations (e.g., other businesses and their social agendas, nonprofits, and higher education) and a trend toward the creation of signature programs, which allow most companies to focus efforts by highlighting Carroll's (1991) Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility and Jacoby's (1973) Three Models of Behavior of the Business Enterprise. This chapter also addresses ethical opportunities and problems.

Major concern over monopolies and trusts was one of the distinguishing marks of the American Economic Association from its foundation and lasted well into the early 1900s (Coats, 1960). The failed merger attempt of the Northern Securities Company and the subsequent panic of 1902–1903, the 1907 financial crisis and its aftermath, as well as the ostensibly illegal financial practices of many conglomerates, all contributed to keep the trusts issue alive on academic circles. But it was only after the 1911 Court decisions that the debate on the trust problem and the necessary measures to amend the existing antitrust legislation acquired new vigor and incisiveness.³

This chapter investigates Marx’s Capital as a theoretical resource for analyzing both the form and content of the modern corporation. We assess two recent contributions critiquing the corporation. The chapter argues that Marx advanced from his initial ambivalent comments on the form of the joint stock company and the credit system to a more categorical critique. We assess Marx’s concepts of the concentration and centralization of capital, fictitious capital and rent in analyzing the corporation. Next, we note Engels important contribution filling in from the early limited liability company to monopoly capital and modern imperialism. The chapter ends with two examples of how these concepts apply in concrete analysis. The work is highly preliminary and is intended to open a more theoretically informed approach to analysis and critique of the multinational corporation.

How do corporations define their communities? Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is one issue that may help us to answer this question. We argue that CSR represents actively adopted strategies in response to the pressures corporations face in the local institutional environments in which they are embedded, where corporations define geographically situated institutional variations as community. We show corporations (especially publicly traded corporations) have been aggressive in adopting CSR practice when they are located in (1) areas high in union density or (2) federal appellate jurisdictions that have been aggressive in protecting workers' rights, while being far less philanthropic if located in Right-to-Work jurisdictions. Drawing on research in neoinstitutional analysis, we interpret these findings to indicate corporations respond to localized union strength by adopting strategies that allow them to appear responsive to their social contract, and hence legitimate. Interestingly, corporations appear more concerned with their community's union strength than with regard to their own particular union exposure, at least as related to CSR practices.