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This study aims to compare and contrast the core organisational processes across high and low performing mental health providers in the English National Health Service (NHS).

A multiple case study qualitative design incorporating a full sample of low and high performing mental health providers.

This study suggests that the organisational approaches used to govern and manage mental health providers are associated with their performance, and the study’s findings give clues as to what areas might need attention. They include, but are not limited to: developing appropriate governance frameworks and organisational cultures, ensuring that staff across the organisation feel “psychologically safe” and able to speak up when they see things that are going wrong; a focus on enhancing quality of services rather than prioritising cost-reduction; investing in new technology and digital applications; and nurturing positive inter-organisational relationships across the local health economy.

Highlights considerable divergence in organisation and management practices that are associated with the performance of mental health trusts in the English NHS

The study aimed to understand the significance of how employee personhood and the act of speaking up is shaped by factors such as employees' professional status, length of employment within their hospital sites, age, gender and their ongoing exposure to unprofessional behaviours.

Responses to a survey by 4,851 staff across seven sites within a hospital network in Australia were analysed to interrogate whether speaking up by hospital employees is influenced by employees' symbolic capital and situated subjecthood (SS). The authors utilised a Bourdieusian lens to interrogate the relationship between the symbolic capital afforded to employees as a function of their professional, personal and psycho-social resources and their self-reported capacity to speak up.

The findings indicate that employee speaking up behaviours appear to be influenced profoundly by whether they feel empowered or disempowered by ongoing and pre-existing personal and interpersonal factors such as their functional roles, work-based peer and supervisory support and ongoing exposure to discriminatory behaviours.

The findings from this interdisciplinary study provide empirical insights around why culture change interventions within healthcare organisations may be successful in certain contexts for certain staff groups and fail within others.

The purpose of this paper is to explore whether official inquiries are an effective method for holding the medical profession to account for failings in the quality and safety of care.

Through a review of the theoretical literature on professions and documentary analysis of key public inquiry documents and reports in the UK National Health Service (NHS) the authors examine how the misconduct of doctors can be understood using the metaphor of professional wrongdoing as a product of bad apples, bad barrels or bad cellars.

The wrongdoing literature tends to present an uncritical assumption of increasing sophistication in analysis, as the focus moves from bad apples (individuals) to bad barrels (organisations) and more latterly to bad cellars (the wider system). This evolution in thinking about wrongdoing is also visible in public inquiries, as analysis and recommendations increasingly tend to emphasise cultural and systematic issues. Yet, while organisational and systemic factors are undoubtedly important, there is a need to keep in sight the role of individuals, for two key reasons. First, there is growing evidence that a small number of doctors may be disproportionately responsible for large numbers of complaints and concerns. Second, there is a risk that the role of individual professionals in drawing attention to wrongdoing is being neglected.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge this is the first theoretical and empirical study specifically exploring the role of NHS inquiries in holding the medical profession to account for failings in professional practice.

Previous research has demonstrated that social-relational factors are instrumental to employee voice. An essential aspect of this relates to notions of respect or disrespect. Although nurses commonly report experiencing professional disrespect in their interaction with doctors, earlier studies have focused on how the professional status hierarchy and power imbalance between doctors and nurses hinder speaking up without considering the role of professional disrespect. Addressing this gap, we explore how professional disrespect in the doctor–nurse relationship in surgical teams influences the willingness of nurses to voice legitimate concerns about threats to patient safety.

Fifty-seven semi-structured interviews with nurses drawn from a range of specialities, ranks and surgical teams in three hospitals in a West African Country. In addition, two interviews with senior representatives from the National Registered Nurses and Midwifery Association (NRNMA) of the country were undertaken and analysed thematically with the aid of NVivo.

Disrespect is expressed in doctors’ condescending attitude towards nurses and under-valuing their contribution to care. This leads to safety concerns raised by nurses being ignored, downplayed or dismissed, with deleterious consequences for patient safety. Feeling disrespected further motivates nurses to consciously disguise silence amidst speech and engage in punitive silence aimed at making clinical practice difficult for doctors.

We draw attention to the detrimental effect of professional disrespect on patient safety in surgical environments. We contribute to employee voice and silence by showing how professional disrespect affects voice independently of hierarchy and conceptualise the notion of punitive silence.

Healthcare systems are under pressure to improve their performance, while at the same time facing severe resource constraints, particularly workforce shortages. By applying resource-dependency-theory (RDT), we explore how healthcare organizations in different settings perceive pressure arising from uncertain access to resources and examine organizational strategies they deploy to secure resources.

A cross-sectional survey of key decision-makers in different healthcare settings in the metropolitan area of Cologne, Germany, on perceptions of pressure arising from the environment and respective strategies was conducted. For comparisons between settings radar charts, Kruskal–Wallis test and Fisher–Yates test were applied. Additionally, correlation analyses were conducted.

A sample of n = 237(13%) key informants participated and reported high pressure caused by bureaucracy, time constraints and recruiting qualified staff. Hospitals, inpatient and outpatient nursing care organizations felt most pressurized. As suggested by RDT, organizations in highly pressurized settings deployed the most vociferous strategies to secure resources, particularly in relation to personnel development.

This study is one of the few studies that focuses on the environment's impact on healthcare organizations across a variety of settings. RDT is a helpful theoretical foundation for understanding the environment's impact on organizational strategies. The substantial variations found between healthcare settings indicate that those settings potentially require specific strategies when seeking to address scarce resources and high demands. The results draw attention to the high level of pressure on healthcare organizations which presumably is passed down to managers, healthcare professionals, patients and relatives.

Neo-liberal “reform” has in many countries shifted services across the boundary between the public and private sector. This policy re-opens the question of what structural and managerial differences, if any, differences of ownership make to healthcare providers. The purpose of this paper is to examine the connections between ownership, organisational structure and managerial regime within an elaboration of Donabedian’s reasoning about organisational structures. Using new data from England, it considers: how do the internal managerial regimes of differently owned healthcare providers differ, or not? In what respects did any such differences arise from differences in ownership or for other reasons?

An observational systematic qualitative comparison of differently owned providers was the strongest feasible research design. The authors systematically compared a maximum variety (by ownership) sample of community health services; out-of-hours primary care; and hospital planned orthopaedics and ophthalmology providers (n=12 cases). The framework of comparison was the ownership theory mentioned above.

The connection between ownership (on the one hand) and organisation structures and managerial regimes (on the other) differed at different organisational levels. Top-level governance structures diverged by organisational ownership and objectives among the case-study organisations. All the case-study organisations irrespective of ownership had hierarchical, bureaucratic structures and managerial regimes for coordinating everyday service production, but to differing extents. In doctor-owned organisations, the doctors’, but not other occupations’, work was controlled and coordinated in a more-or-less democratic, self-governing ways.

This study was empirically limited to just one sector in one country, although within that sector the case-study organisations were typical of their kinds. It focussed on formal structures, omitting to varying extents other technologies of power and the differences in care processes and patient experiences within differently owned organisations.

Type of ownership does appear, overall, to make a difference to at least some important aspects of an organisation’s governance structures and managerial regime. For the broader field of health organisational research, these findings highlight the importance of the owners’ agency in explaining organisational change. The findings also call into question the practice of copying managerial techniques (and “fads”) across the public–private boundary.

Ownership does make important differences to healthcare providers’ top-level governance structures and accountabilities and to work coordination activity, but with different patterns at different organisational levels. These findings have implications for understanding the legitimacy, governance and accountability of healthcare organisations, the distribution and use power within them, and system-wide policy interventions, for instance to improve care coordination and for the correspondingly required foci of healthcare organisational research.

Attempts to transform health systems have in many countries involved starting to pay healthcare providers through a DRG system, but that has involved managerial workarounds. Managerial workarounds have seldom been analysed. This paper does so by extending and modifying existing knowledge of the causes and character of clinical and IT workarounds, to produce a conceptualisation of the managerial workaround. It further develops and revises this conceptualisation by comparing the practical management, at both provider and purchaser levels, of hospital DRG payment systems in England, Germany and Italy.

We make a qualitative test of our initial assumptions about the antecedents, character and consequences of managerial workarounds by comparing them with a systematic comparison of case studies of the DRG hospital payment systems in England, Germany and Italy. The data collection through key informant interviews (N = 154), analysis of policy documents (N = 111) and an action learning set, began in 2010–12, with additional data collection from key informants and administrative documents continuing in 2018–19 to supplement and update our findings.

Managers in all three countries developed very similar workarounds to contain healthcare costs to payers. To weaken DRG incentives to increase hospital activity, managers agreed to lower DRG payments for episodes of care above an agreed case-load ‘ceiling' and reduced payments by less than the full DRG amounts when activity fell below an agreed ‘floor' volume.

Empirically this study is limited to three OECD health systems, but since our findings come from both Bismarckian (social-insurance) and Beveridge (tax-financed) systems, they are likely to be more widely applicable. In many countries, DRGs coexist with non-DRG or pre-DRG systems, so these findings may also reflect a specific, perhaps transient, stage in DRG-system development. Probably there are also other kinds of managerial workaround, yet to be researched. Doing so would doubtlessly refine and nuance the conceptualisation of the ‘managerial workaround’ still further.

In the case of DRGs, the managerial workarounds were instances of ‘constructive deviance' which enabled payers to reduce the adverse financial consequences, for them, arising from DRG incentives. The understanding of apparent failures or part-failures to transform a health system can be made more nuanced, balanced and diagnostic by using the concept of the ‘managerial workaround'.

Managerial workarounds also appear outside the health sector, so the present analysis of managerial workarounds may also have application to understanding attempts to transform such sectors as education, social care and environmental protection.

So far as we are aware, no other study presents and tests the concept of a ‘managerial workaround'. Pervasive, non-trivial managerial workarounds may be symptoms of mismatched policy objectives, or that existing health system structures cannot realise current policy objectives; but the workarounds themselves may also contain solutions to these problems.

The purpose of this paper is to reflect on research evidence and practice experience of transforming primary care to a more integrated and holistic model.

It is based on a scoping review which has been guided by primary care stakeholders and synthesises research evidence and practice experience from ten international case studies.

Adopting an inter-professional, community-orientated and population-based primary care model requires a fundamental transformation of thinking about professional roles, relationships and responsibilities. Team-based approaches can replicate existing power dynamics unless medical clinicians are willing to embrace less authoritarian leadership styles. Engagement of patients and communities is often limited due to a lack of capacity and belief that will make an impact. Internal (relationships, cultures, experience of improvement) and external (incentives, policy intentions, community pressure) contexts can encourage or derail transformation efforts.

Transformation requires a co-ordinated programme that incorporates the following elements – external facilitation of change; developing clinical and non-clinical leaders; learning through training and reflection; engaging community and professional stakeholders; transitional funding; and formative and summative evaluation.

This paper combines research evidence and international practice experience to guide future programmes to transform primary care.

Co-production has received increasing attention from managers and researchers in public services. In the health care sector, co-production has become a by-word for the meaningful engagement of patients yet there is still a lack of knowledge around what works when co-producing services. The paper sets out a set of pragmatic principles which may guide anyone embarking on co-producing health care services, and provides an illustration of a co-produced Young People’s Health Research Group in England. We conclude by outlining some learning points which are useful when establishing co-production projects.

In this viewpoint article, the authors consider the challenges in implementing restrictive policies, with a particular focus on how these policies are experienced, in practice, from alternative standpoints.

The authors draw on social science studies of decommissioning work to highlight how patient and official versions of value often vary, creating difficulties and distrust as restrictive policies are implemented. Patients and the public are well aware that financial calculations are somehow embedded in concepts of “evidence” and “value” but are usually unfamiliar with the social infrastructures that produce and utilise such concepts. The authors discuss with reference to a contemporary restrictive programme in England.

While policymakers and researchers frequently present restrictive policies as “win-win” scenarios (achieving both cost-savings for healthcare services and improved patient care), social science analyses highlight the potential for tensions and controversies between stakeholders. The authors recognise that cost containment is a necessary component of policymaking work but argue that policymakers and researchers should seek to map (and make visible) the socially organised reasoning, systems and processes that are involved in enacting restrictive policies. Although transparency may pose challenges, it is important for informed democratic engagement, allowing legitimate scrutiny of whose voices are being heard and interests served (the “winners” and “losers”).

The authors argue for social science analyses that explore overuse, value and restrictive practices from alternative (e.g. patient) standpoints. These can provide important insights to help identify priorities for intervention and support better communication.