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The chapter deals with the interface between the law of succession and corporate law and explains the completely different objects of these two fields of law. Succession law tries to shift and contribute assets to the successors, whereas corporate law focuses on the well-being of the company. However, in a family business, it is necessary to find legal, social, and psychological techniques to combine these two areas and to establish strong and binding relations. This is the function of shareholder agreements and family constitutions.

The development of Research Management and Administration (RMA) in Europe is strongly connected with the development of the Science and Technology (S&T) policy of the European Union (EU). These policies were the result of a continuous debate between the member states and the European Commission and European Parliament.

Although there is no data on the early development of RMA, there are some publications on the history of the development of the S&T policy in Europe: the excellent publication ‘A History of European Union Research Policy’ by Luca Guzzetti (Guzzetti, 1995). Guzzetti’s book investigates the history of EU research policies from 1948 up to the preparation of the Fourth Framework Programme (FP) (1994–1998).

The RMA aspects are constructed mainly by oral history complemented with some written sources. The history shows a gradual development of the profession unevenly spread in time and European geography. This has mainly with the EU enlargement in the same period, when new member states were connected to the FP. The profession started with a few colleagues’ way back in the eighties of the last century as financial people were dealing with the first European financial reporting up to the present day where RMA is becoming a field of work attracting many new colleagues.

Collegiality is often discussed and analyzed as a challenged form of governance, a form of working that used to function well in universities prior to the emergence of contemporary and modern forms of governance. This seems to suggest that collegiality used to dominate, while other forms of governance are now taking over. The papers in volume 86 of this special issue support the notion of challenged collegiality, but also show that for the most part, nostalgic notions of “the good old days” are neither true nor helpful if we are to revitalize academic collegiality. After examining whether a golden age of collegiality ever existed, we discuss why collegiality matters. Exploring what are often described as limitations or “dark sides” of collegiality, we address four such “dark sides” related to slow decision-making, conflicts, parochialism, and diversity. This is followed by a discussion of how these limitations may be handled and what measures must be taken to maintain and develop collegiality. With a brief summary of the remaining papers under two headings, “Maintaining collegiality” and “Revitalizing collegiality,” we preview the rest of this volume.

This chapter demonstrates that social business models do not meaningfully prioritize or impose accountability to “social good” over other purposes in ways that (a) best protect against owners changing their minds or entry of new owners with different priorities and (b) enable reliable accountability over time and across circumstances. This chapter further suggests a model – a “social primacy company” – that actually prioritizes “social good” and meaningful accountability to it. This chapter thus clarifies circumstances under which existing models might be most useful and are not particularly useful, especially as investors, entrepreneurs, employees, regulators, and others pursue shared, common understandings about purposes, priorities, and accountability.