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This paper aims to focus on capital-related macroprudential policies in the context of recent policy discussions on the removal of barriers to the mobility of capital and liquidity of cross-border banks in the European Union (EU).

This study first discusses the link between financial stability and internal resource mobility of cross-border banks. Then, it examines past heterogeneity in structural capital buffers as key macroprudential capital instruments applied in the EU and relate them to costs of policy action, degree of foreign penetration and membership in the Banking Union.

Observed phase-in patterns of structural capital buffers in the EU are broadly consistent with costs of policy action, degree of foreign penetration and membership in the Banking Union as potential factors. The process of financial integration could be further enhanced through reduced uncertainty in the application of macroprudential policies that constrain capital mobility of cross-border banks.

This paper anchors macroprudential policies into a wider discussion on the mechanism and implications of ring-fencing in the EU over time. It discusses two policy areas, macroprudential policies and proposals for deeper financial integration, that share the same financial stability objective but tend to emphasize different implications of the mobility of capital and liquidity of cross-border banks in the EU. The study provides a discussion of potential implications of the recent adoption of the CRRII/CRDV legislation for future heterogeneity of macroprudential policies in the EU.

The purpose of this paper is to examine from a comparative perspective, the impact of structural banking reforms on the legal frameworks for the corporate governance of credit institutions.

This facilitates a functional analysis of the resulting corporate governance structures, which in turn provides the basis for an analysis of conceptual concerns with regard to the independence of the separate entity.

The paper points out that structural banking reforms come with significant implications for existing corporate governance structures of credit institutions. The resulting corporate governance structures rise conceptual concerns with regard to both the effectiveness of the independence of the separate entity and the objectives of structural banking reforms generally.

The paper shows that the implementation of structural banking reforms is a complex operational issue and process for the banking groups and the regulators. The challenge will be to establish and upheld the ring fence in a way to lower the risk of intra-group contagion. There is a great need for regulatory and supervisory policies that reinforce the settled ring fence obligations.

This paper’s value lies in providing analysis of the implications of structural banking reforms for the corporate governance of credit institutions. The relevant statutory frameworks as such set only the core components of the new structure. Defining and implementing the design is left to the discretion of the regulators.

The Independent Banking Commission (Vickers) Report is not only one of the most significant developments in the banking regulatory and supervisory context in the UK in recent times but is also one that would considerably impact banking and capital markets functions and trends in this decade. The purposes of this paper are two‐fold: to analyse the interim Vickers Report within the larger paradigm of the prudential banking regulatory approach in the UK, particularly in the context of the debate of bailing out banks that are too‐big‐to‐fail; and to critically examine the recommendation of the Report in the context of the failure of Northern Rock in 2007. The central focus of the paper is to analyse the probable impact and shortcomings of the key recommendation of the Vickers Report, i.e. requirement to hold an additional capital buffer in order to separately ring‐fence retail functions and retail deposits of universal banks and financial institutions operating in the UK.

The method used is a combination of legal examination and case‐study based analysis. This paper sees the failure of Northern Rock as essentially a consequence of supervisory lapses by the FSA and raises relevant critical questions as to the efficacy of the recommendation of the Vickers Report in the context of such supervisory lapses and failures. While relying primarily on official publications in the public domain, journal articles, academic writings, and, newspaper articles, this paper explores the related regulatory and financial implications of the Vickers Report recommendation in the backdrop of the banking crisis in the UK.

The paper concludes that the key recommendation of the Vickers Report, to ring‐fence retail functions universal banks operating in the UK, goes only mid‐way in securing the twin objectives of stability and safety that the Report has set out to achieve.

The present Report is an interim one and the final version of the Report is expected in September. Further, various oversight reports and recommendations by the FSA and other bodies are expected as a follow‐up to the final Report. The key recommendation of the requirement for universal banks operating in the UK to hold additional capital for ring‐fencing their retail functions and deposits is not expected to undergo any substantial modification or revision in the final Report.

This paper is of immense significance to bankers, supervisors, lawyers, auditors, consultants, researchers, jurists, and, those engaged in or with various issues and sectors in financial and banking regulation.

Presents a model designed to explore the stochastic nature of non‐elective admissions. Using historic data taken from the patient administration system of a large district general hospital situated in Plymouth, England, the model shows the importance of understanding the profile of risk behind non‐elective planning. This understanding may lead to more robust waiting times planning, promoting open dialogue between the trust and its commissioners on how such risk is managed. It also allows for the setting of clear goals for admission avoidance and early discharge schemes. At a strategic level, an understanding of the stochastic nature of non‐elective admissions raises questions about the potential cost of entirely ring‐fencing elective workload, disallowing the sharing of beds in times of peak demand. As a specific policy manifestation of this proposed ring‐fencing, the development of “diagnostic and treatment centres” may need to be more pragmatic than the “purist” view being expressed in the NHS Plan if overall efficiency is not to be significantly reduced.

Purpose: This chapter examines some policy ideas on how to achieve high levels of financial inclusion. It explores policy options that can be used to achieve greater levels of financial inclusion.

Methodology: The chapter uses a discursive approach to analyse the steps to achieving full financial inclusion.

Findings: The chapter offers some suggestions on how to achieve full financial inclusion. They include reducing interest rates, introducing conditional low-interest rates, supporting monetary policies with social security payments, reducing taxes, using targeted government spending, supporting fiscal policies with conditional tax rebate and tax exemptions, financial inclusion–environment decoupling, de-risking the financial system, and ring-fencing banking for the poor.

Originality: This study contributes to the financial inclusion literature by exploring additional ways to achieve high levels of financial inclusion.

This paper describes how one specialist learning disability health service has attempted to increase its focus on meeting the complex needs of people with profound learning disability (PLD) both with and without additional physical, sensory and medical impairment. Through individual assessment and intervention, carer consultation, training and supervision, research, and audit and advice to management, a multi‐disciplinary group has influenced the development of more proactive community teams for people with learning disability. This is in the context of both the publication of Signposts for Success (NHSE, 1998) and of a changing organisational culture which has embraced essential lifestyle planning, person‐centred teams, supported living and direct payments. The challenge remains of ring‐fencing sufficient resources (of time, skill and equipment), given the high‐profile and competing demands of people with milder learning disabilities but with complex mental health needs and/or challenging behaviour.

An offshore sector makes reference to financial services and non‐financial services frameworks in a country/territory. Clientele who make use of these services are non‐residents of the given jurisdiction. In these service frameworks assets can be diverted to, and business/financial affairs conducted in, an environment where a package of favourable regulatory incentives are in place to benefit clients who would ordinarily not be privy to such regulatory regimes in onshore jurisdictions. These regulatory incentives typically comprise incorporation mechanisms as regards commercial holding companies or overseas subsidiaries in client‐friendly fiscal and exchange control environments.

This article describes the origin of the UK's Sure Start programme, an innovative early years' programme launched in 1998. The programme owed its beginnings to support from the UK Treasury that saw it as a vehicle for combating intergenerational deprivation. The programme has expanded rapidly in the past few years. This paper analyses how the programme has changed and in particular how some of its basic characteristics, such as the integrated working across disciplines, the involvement of parents and the stress on family support, seem likely to change. The dilemmas posed by spreading the funding more thinly are also examined. There is some danger that the features of the programme that made it so attractive to participants and workers will be lost in the rush to mainstream the programme, so that it may become a victim of its own success.