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To motivate the supplier to exert more corporate social responsibility (CSR) effort, the manufacturer offers it either a revenue sharing contract or a cost sharing contract. We study the contract choice of the manufacturer.

We develop game theoretic models to investigate the manufacturer’s optimal contract choice and examine whether there is a conflict of contract preference between the manufacturer and the supplier.

First, the revenue sharing contract has more strict conditions regarding the unit cost of the supplier’s CSR effort and the manufacturer’s retail price. Second, the cost sharing contract enables the manufacturer to achieve a “win-win” performance in terms of both profitability and CSR effort. Finally, the supplier prefers the cost sharing contract when the manufacturer’s price is low, otherwise, it prefers the revenue sharing contract.

Differing from the papers on CSR, our paper focuses on the supplier CSR management problem, and analyzes the optimal contract to motivate the supplier to exert more CSR effort.

Knowledge sharing is critical to creating value in platform ecosystems. However, participants refrain from sharing knowledge and even engage in free-riding behavior, thereby causing the value co-destruction of the platform ecosystems. To encourage knowledge sharing among participants, it is essential to analyze the influencing factors and decision-making mechanisms of knowledge sharing in the platform ecosystems.

The study investigated the issue of knowledge sharing among participants in platform ecosystems, based on the stochastic differential game model. Considering the uncertain factors, the Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg leader-follower game, and cooperative game models were proposed. By utilizing system dynamics and numerical simulations, the key influencing factors and mechanisms of knowledge sharing were deeply explored, consequently providing game solutions to achieve the Pareto optimality of the ecosystem.

Participants' innovation capability and the marginal benefits of knowledge-sharing positively impact knowledge-sharing decisions, while the environmental knowledge decay rate has a negative influence. The platform subsidy mode enhances the knowledge-sharing effect, and the collaborative cooperation mode can realize the Pareto optimization of the system.

The research findings will provide theoretical support for fostering knowledge innovation and sustainable development of platform ecosystems. Managers should cultivate an innovative environment, establish fair reward mechanisms, and utilize subsidies to promote knowledge sharing, leading to higher value creation.

Utilizing the stochastic differential game model, the study proposed various game-theoretic frameworks to analyze participants' knowledge-sharing strategies. The integration of system dynamics and numerical simulations provides a practical approach to understanding the key influencing factors and decision-making processes.

This paper aims to study how the timing of these decisions affects the total profit and the individual profits of the two agents.

This paper study a supply chain for a network good where there is a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer determines its wholesale price and its share in the retailer’s advertising cost while the retailer decides the retail price and the advertising cost.

This paper finds that a stronger network externality leads to higher prices and higher advertising efforts. This increases the profits of both manufacturer and retailer, but the manufacturer’s share of advertising costs depends on the order in which the supply chain enterprise make their decisions, the strength of network externality and the effect of advertising determines which decision timeline results in a higher price and greater advertising effort. The manufacturer prefers the price decision to be made before the advertising decision, while the retailer prefers these decisions to be made simultaneously.

Although this paper studies the price and advertising decision-making order preferences of channel members based on network externalities, this research can also be expanded from the following aspects based on network effects. First, network externality affects advertising cooperation between both parties in the situation such that the pricing power of retail prices is transferred from the retailer to the manufacturer and the retailer relies on revenue sharing (revenue sharing contract, nonwholesale price contract. Second, the manufacturer dominates the issues in the supply chain, but in reality, a retailer can also be the dominator or there are no dominators (Nash equilibrium). Finally, it is possible to consider pricing and advertising decisions in situations where two manufacturers or retailers compete.

When the price is reasonable, advertising investment is the main determinant of product sales. The greater the intensity of network externalities the more retailers will be willing to invest in advertising. An increase in the intensity of network externalities may not necessarily enhance manufacturers’ motivation or cooperative advertising, but it depends on the decision-making sequence. The strength of network externalities determines the decision-making sequence preferences of supply chain channel members whose preferences vary leading to conflicts of interest.

The impact of cooperative advertising or decision sequence on corporate decision-making has not been considered. To fill this gap, the paper integrates network externality and supply chain cooperative advertising models, focusing on the impact of network externality on pricing and advertising decisions, as well as on the sequence of decisions.

Marketing is a hot topic, and the purpose of this study is to investigate how shareholding strategies can be applied to achieve strategic synergy between firms in vertical supply chains to improve retailers’ marketing efforts from a long-term perspective.

This study constructs Stackelberg models to analyze the operating mechanisms of shareholding supply chains under forward, backward and cross-shareholding strategies. The authors analyze the effects of shareholding on prices, marketing efforts and profits, and explore the strategic preferences and outcomes of different supply chain members.

Forward/backward shareholding plays the same role as cross/nonshareholding in supply chains because the effect of the retailer’s shareholding is offset by the power status of the manufacturer, and the retailer can still profit when wholesale prices are higher than selling prices in certain cases. A manufacturer’s shareholding in a retailer can benefit consumers and improve marketing efforts by reducing retailers’ marketing costs, while a retailer’s shareholding in a manufacturer has no such effect. None of all shareholding strategies can coordinate the interests of all members; however, an effective rebate policy can resolve this problem.

The results reveal the operational mechanism of shareholding supply chains and provide reference values for managers who want to improve marketing efforts and economic performance using a shareholding strategy.

This paper aims to explore the promotion decisions of heterogeneous sellers on a decentralized platform under competitive conditions and analyze how seller behaviors impact platform profit, seller revenue, buyer surplus and social welfare.

This paper considers a Cournot model consisting of a platform charging a commission rate and two sellers with different conversion rates and browsing costs. Promotion efforts by sellers can increase traffic, but they also incur promotion costs for sellers. The sellers decide on promotion effort by weighing these two effects. The authors also explore the equilibrium when the platform charges a fixed usage fee.

The seller’s profit improves as its conversion rate increases and worsens as browsing costs increase. Also, increasing the commission rate charged by the platform makes the seller invest less in promotional efforts. Therefore, the platform must consider this trade-off to determine an optimal rate. The analysis shows that the seller with a high conversion rate and high browsing cost plays a greater role in generating more overall revenue. When the market favors such a seller, the platform tends to charge less in order not to impair its profitability.

This paper incorporates conversion rate, buyer’s browsing cost, unit promotion cost and the fee charged by the platform into the model to study sellers’ promotion decisions on decentralized platforms.

The paper attempts to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a two-part tariff coordination mechanism.

To deal with this pricing conflict problems of dual-channel supply chain consisting of dominant manufacturer and a retailer, considering the fact that online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions, the authors establish some basic models and exploit them to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a profit-sharing coordination mechanism.

The results show that the optimal online direct selling price is positively correlated with product perceived quality obtained from online reviews and negatively correlated with the in-sale service. The traditional retail price is positively correlated with the in-sale service and weakly correlated with online reviews. For the manufacturer and retailer, whether decentralized decision or coordination contract, their profits increase with the increase of the in-sale service in a certain range and quality perceived from spontaneous online reviews. Online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions. Positive in-sale services and online reviews can provide consumers with a better shopping experience, thereby promoting their enthusiasm for shopping and improving their quality of life. The two-part tariff coordination mechanism improves the profits of the manufacturer and the traditional retailer, respectively, through the transfer fee.

The proposed approach can well analyze the channel conflicts and pricing problems between retailers and manufacturers with respect to product offline price and online price. The analysis and results can inform decision-making for manufacturers and retailers.

The purpose of this study is developing a new buy-back coordination contract in the symbiotic supply chain. In this new contract, the goal of the supply chain members (profit maximization) is realized.

This paper encourages the manufacturer to order products optimally by presenting a new buy-back coordination contract, and in return, the supplier undertakes to buy the unsold products from the manufacturer at the buy-back price. By using data-driven decision-making and multiobjective decision-making and considering the existing conditions in the symbiosis industry, a contract has been presented that guarantees the profits of supply chain members.

In this paper, it was found out how the authors can determine the order quantity, buy-back price and wholesale price in a symbiotic supply chain in such a way that it makes a profit for both the supplier and the manufacturer. In other words, how to determine these variables to encourage the manufacturer to order more quantity to the supplier so that both will benefit.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper that defines a new buy-back coordination contract in the symbiotic supply chain by considering uncertain demand and a multiobjective model. Due to the importance of environmental issues, the sharing of resources by companies and organizations with each other, and the necessity of their cooperation, industries are moving toward a symbiosis industry.

This paper identifies the critical success factors (CSFs) of virtual hotel operator (VHO) in using hotel management system partnerships with small- and medium-sized hotels (SMSHs).

This study uses a qualitative approach, with 25 semi-structured interviews with hotel owners and VHO management. Thematic analysis is used to determine themes to evaluate hotel owners and operators' perceptions.

CSFs for VHO partnership with SMSHs include marketing and promotion strategies, client relationships, training and human resources development, hotel operation management, innovation strategies, capital expenditures and property management systems (PMSs). VHOs also have a symbolic impact on the mutualistic relationship with SMSHs by increasing service and enhancing product competitiveness and profitability.

Findings are beneficial for VHO in determining the most significant CSFs, thereby establishing additional metrics in business performance and increasing resilience in the accommodation sector. Further studies can measure the digital technology factors from VHO, including PMSs and mobile applications.

This study first identifies CSFs for VHO companies from the perspectives of hotel owners and management. This contribution adds to the literature on CSFs in the context of digital technology implementation in SMSHs. Moreover, implications are beneficial for VHO management in determining the most significant CSFs for companies to measure the business performance of the companies and increase resilience in the accommodation sector.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of quality loss in transit on e-commerce supply chain pricing, production and financing decisions.

The authors consider a Stackelberg game model with a supplier, logistics firm and e-commerce platform. The logistics firm is capital-constrained and obtains funding from the e-commerce platform by debt financing or equity financing. Through backward induction, this paper first solves the equilibrium results under the two financing schemes and then reveals the financing preferences of all parties.

The results demonstrate that equity financing reduces financing costs and promotes production significantly. However, it may also lead to overproduction, particularly in markets with poor profitability and high cost factors. When the percentage of product quality loss is large, equity financing is preferable. With the increasing of transportation level, the benefits of debt finance are steadily growing. In addition, equity financing is the Pareto dominant scheme for all firms under certain circumstances. The extensions consider hybrid financing and another quality loss type.

The paper derives the equilibrium solutions and financing preferences, then specifies the threshold for applying financing schemes. Provide guidance for logistics firms’ finance model innovation and core enterprise involvement in the logistics industry.

The paper investigates how logistics firms’ financing strategies are impacted by product quality loss.