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There exists a tremendous number of studies in strategy and management journals concerning contracting issues between private firms. Those studies are usually grounded in competing theoretical frameworks such as transaction cost economics, the resource-based view of the firm, incentive and agency theories and few others. However, very few studies, especially in those reviews (this is also true to a lesser extent in economic journals), are concerned with the issue of contracting between private firm and government. This is particularly surprising since existing theoretical frameworks qualified to tackle contracting strategies between private firms can also provide insights into issues related to contracting with government.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine public apology as a socially acceptable means of institutional communication and the renegotiation of social relations that seeks to redress the power imbalance between the parties to this interaction. After presenting a basic definition of an apology as a communicative act and discussing the social relational implication of the public form of such an act, the paper examines one particular grouping of public apologies – those coming from Canadian Christian church denominations or communities seeking a renewed relationship with Canadian Aboriginal communities. A comparative analysis of the text and context of several of these apology interactions can provide some fascinating hints about the role of public apology in creating a new joint social narrative, affirming common moral norms, clarifying accountability for past relations and empowering the marginalized community through some form of compensation.

There is a tension between the literatures on incomplete contracting and transactions cost economics regarding the importance of ex post governance and the extent to which formal theories of incomplete contracting capture salient aspects of exchange relations. In this paper, we empirically examine how firms structure joint R&D agreements to illuminate how contracts can be incomplete and how governance can matter. We employ a dataset of 96 contracts to construct a taxonomy of the types of mechanisms firms use in organizing collaborative R&D, and indicate how groups of mechanisms line up with various types of contracting hazards. The results suggest that the allocation of property rights over innovations at the time of contracting between R&D partners is an important aspect of contract design. But they also suggest that weak property rights admit scope for other dimensions of contract. In particular, the research indicates that while knowledge spillovers may give rise to appropriability hazards, efforts to contain or channel knowledge spillovers may enable joint venture members to strategically block other members’ follow-on commercialization or research. Firms design joint R&D governance mechanisms to balance spillover hazards and strategic blocking.

Prior research suggests that given the legal environment in the U.S., smaller syndicates with fewer lead banks should represent “best practices” to promote efficient monitoring and ease of renegotiation. Such syndicates should be associated with lower loan spreads. Controlling for other influences on loan pricing, we conduct tests of this proposition drawing on data from DealScan, Compustat and Federal Reserve Call Reports for U.S. loans between 1988 and 1999. Consistent with our hypothesis, the number of lead lenders is shown to have a significant positive influence on loan yield spreads.

We show why investors may prefer not to be a firm’s unique lender, even if they are in a strong bargaining position. Some firms need additional funds after a first investment: providing additional funds is rational after the first investment is sunk, but together the two investments are unprofitable. A unique lender will always provide additional funds and make losses. Two creditors can commit not always to provide funds: inefficient negotiations over debt forgiveness may end with a project’s liquidation, which is harmful ex post, but helpful ex ante, if it keeps entrepreneurs with nonpromising projects from initially requesting funds.

This chapter is a case study on Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Colombia. The choice is justified by the significant progress of the country in this field and its ambitious plans to provide infrastructure and services through PPPs in the coming years. The infrastructure deficit and the evolution and current status of PPPs in Latin America frame the theme of the chapter. The case study itself explains the adoption of the PPP model in Colombia, describes the new legal and institutional framework and presents the most relevant PPP programmes and projects. The review carried out allows us to conclude that, despite the developments in recent years, PPP schemes continue to be very concentrated in the transport sector. For the effective development of the PPP model in the country, Colombia should extend such schemes to other fields, including the provision of social infrastructure and services. It should also improve some institutional aspects and project attractiveness to investors in order to increase the private capital required to finance PPP projects that currently are in the government portfolio. This chapter offers a general perspective on Colombian PPP, gathering and analyzing information for a better understanding of the current situation and the prospects for the future.

Political risk should be seen as arising from renegotiation of implicit or explicit contract under which foreign investors enter a host country. Governments will legitimately enter into renegotiation to increase the share of rents earned by the society. Corrupt political leaders, however, will use their powers to extract rents from foreign investors for personal gains rather than for the good of the society. Political risk assessment, therefore, should assess the intentions of government as well as the strengths of political and social institutions that keep leaders under control. Firms should also understand that their own actions may contribute to creating political risk.