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The 2007–2009 financial crisis initially appeared to have destroyed a huge amount of wealth in the United States. Housing prices dropped about 21% across the country and as much as 50% in some places, and the stock market dropped by nearly 50% as well. This chapter examines how the financial crisis differentially affected households at different parts of the income and wealth distributions. Our results show that all households lost about the same percentage of their wealth in that period. But because households in the top 10% of the wealth distribution owned many different kinds of assets, their wealth soon recovered. The bottom 80% of the wealth distribution had more of their wealth tied up in housing. We show that financial distress, indexed by foreclosures, being behind in mortgage payments, and changes in house prices were particularly concentrated in households in the bottom 80% of the wealth distribution. These households lost a large part of their wealth and have not yet recovered. Households that were most deeply affected were those who entered the housing market late and took out subprime loans. African American and Hispanic households were particularly susceptible as they bought houses late in the price bubble often with subprime loans.

We show why investors may prefer not to be a firm’s unique lender, even if they are in a strong bargaining position. Some firms need additional funds after a first investment: providing additional funds is rational after the first investment is sunk, but together the two investments are unprofitable. A unique lender will always provide additional funds and make losses. Two creditors can commit not always to provide funds: inefficient negotiations over debt forgiveness may end with a project’s liquidation, which is harmful ex post, but helpful ex ante, if it keeps entrepreneurs with nonpromising projects from initially requesting funds.

This chapter proposes a comparative analysis of the monetary policies undertaken by the Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank after the 2008 subprime crisis. We point out the twin nature of the financial crises in Europe in comparison with the US crises: in addition to the role of bank funding, the euro area countries have also experienced a structural problem of balance of payment disequilibria. This explains why in the early stages of the subprime crisis, the Fed has succeeded in tackling the illiquidity problems facing the banking sector, while the ECB did not. The Fed could then focus on tackling the recession in the real sector by adopting quantitative easing policies to exert downward pressure on the long-term interest-rate. In the euro area quantitative easing policies came later, in 2013. Even the forward guidance policies have been different between the two central banks. Unlike the ECB, the Fed has gone through diverse forward guidance policies: qualitative, calendar-based, and state-contingent. The chapter proposes a new survey of the monetary policies after the subprime crisis by comparing two strategies in different contexts: the United States and the euro area.

This paper is about how a command system allocated resources under profound uncertainty. The command system was the Soviet economy, the period was Stalin's dictatorship, and the resources were designated for military research & development. The context was formed by the limits of the existing aviation propulsion technology, the need to replace it with another, and uncertainty as to how to do so. We observe the formation of a quasi-market in which rival agents proposed projects and competed for funding to carry them out. We find rivalry and rent seeking, imperfectly regulated by principals. As rent seeking spread and uncertainty was reduced, the quasi-market was closed down and replaced by strict hierarchical allocation and monitoring. In theory, a dictator cannot commit to refrain from taxing the returns from today's effort tomorrow; therefore, we expect agents in a command system to seek only short-term returns from quasi-market activity. Agents’ willingness to invest in the Soviet quasi-market for inventions is ascribed to a reputation mechanism that enforced long-run returns.

Studies of Depression-era financial remediation have generally focused on federal deposit insurance and the provision of equity to banks by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). This paper broadens the concept of financial remediation to include other programs – RFC lending, federal guarantees of farm and home mortgages, and the elimination of interest on demand deposits – and other intermediaries – savings and loans, mutual savings banks, and life insurance companies. The benefits of remediation or the amounts potentially at risk to the government in these programs are calculated annually and allocated to the various intermediaries. The slow remediation of real estate loans (two-thirds of these intermediaries' loans) needs further study with respect to the slow economic recovery. The paper compares Depression-era remediation with efforts during the 2008–2009 crisis. Today's remediation contrasts with the 1930s in its speed, magnitude relative to GDP or private sector nonfinancial debt, the share of remediation going to nonbanks, and emphasis on securities markets.

This chapter provides a case study on a Sharīʿah-compliant home facility contract based on the Bai Bithaman Ājil (BBA) contract, generally used by Islamic banks in Malaysia. The study emphasises on the need to comply with the existing legal framework and execute relevant contracts in line with the Sharīʿah resolutions of the Sharīʿah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia without causing harm (ḍarar) to the customers or introducing uncertain elements or procedures (gharar) in the execution of the agreements. This chapter is based on doctrinal analysis of the relevant issues as well as a qualitative legal research through content analysis of relevant BBA agreements, case law as well as statutory provisions. The case study used in this chapter is completely anonymised. The study finds that the execution of BBA agreements in Malaysia leaves much to be desired. Even though the regulatory framework for Sharīʿah-compliant home financing in Malaysia is robust, there are some legal and Sharīʿah considerations which the stakeholders need to look into in order to project Malaysia as the main global hub of Islamic finance. This study demonstrates the need for proper Sharīʿah auditing of the practical execution of BBA agreements to avoid an incorporated element of gharar at the time of execution of the agreements, which might ultimately lead to unforeseen reputation risks for the bank. Though there are several studies on the Sharīʿah, financing and accounting aspects of the BBA home facility agreement, this study focusses on both Sharīʿah and legal issues, using the case study approach. The recommendations are expected to provide a good policy framework for the stakeholders in the Islamic financial services industry in Malaysia.

The role of money and monetary policy of the central bank in pursuing macroeconomic stability has significantly changed over the period since the end of World War II. Globalization, liberalization, integration, and transition processes generally shaped the crucial milestones of the macroeconomic development and substantial features of economic policy and its framework in Europe. Policy-driven changes together with variety of exogenous shocks significantly affected the key features of macroeconomic environment on the European continent that fashioned the framework and design of monetary policies.

This chapter examines the key basis of the central bank’s monetary policy on its way to pursue and preserve the internal and external stability of the purchasing power of money. Substantial elements of the monetary policy like objectives and strategies are not only generally introduced but also critically discussed according to their accuracy, suitability, and reliability in the changing macroeconomic conditions. Brief overview of the Eurozone common monetary policy milestones and the past Eastern bloc countries’ experience with a variety of exchange rate regimes provides interesting empirical evidence on origins and implications of vital changes in the monetary policy conduction in Europe and the Eurozone.

This chapter examines how deregulatory fiscal policies undermined federal legislation intended to reduce racial and economic inequality through measures that included wider access to home loans among minority populations. We focus specifically on structural tensions that existed between fostering the goals of economic and racial equality within a political structure that also serves the needs of finance capitalism. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), typically considered a triggering point for the financial meltdown by conservative commentators, was passed to address racial and economic inequalities, yet financial deregulation and the growth of the subprime mortgage industry ended up completely subverting these goals. The unprecedented growth and evolution of the subprime mortgage industry that occurred largely outside of the law's reach helped minorities and other economically disadvantaged groups enter into the housing market. However, a crime-facilitative environment brought on by inadequate regulation resulted in a significant degree of fraud by lenders. While this expanded homeownership among minorities, it eventually pushed them into default and brought chaos to the entire U.S. economy. This chapter details how the collapse of the subprime industry disproportionately impacted minority populations, and exposes how deregulatory policies subverted the effectiveness and reach of the FHA and CRA. The history of the CRA provides a clear example of the contradictory tensions within the U.S. legal system that espouses equality yet ultimately fails those it was designed to help as a consequence of unfettered capitalism.

I contribute to the ongoing policy discourse on the challenges of monetary policy transmission in environments with consolidated financial sectors and high credit rates. I empirically investigate the lending rate pass-through in Azerbaijan – a small resource-rich economy in transition – by taking advantage of a unique set of high-frequency bank-level data. My bottom-line policy message is the following. First, lending rates are considerably irresponsive to monetary policy shocks, and the interest rate channel ought to be somehow improved. Second, macroeconomic fundamentals and the concentrated bank sector are surprisingly not among the reasons behind the policy-market disconnect. Third, domestic commercial banks are able to exert substantial monopolistic pricing capacities and keep credit rates high, particularly when the central bank loosens its policy stance. Fourth, the underlying cause of both monetary policy inefficacy and high interest rate stickiness appears to be structural excess liquidity. In fact, empirical results show that pass-through is substantially higher for less liquid banks. Extraction of excess liquidity from the system should mitigate the banks’ monopolistic pricing powers, improve the efficiency of the interest rate channel, and ultimately bring the credit rates down.