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The purpose of this paper is to establish the effectiveness of self-management training as an intervention for people using secondary mental health services.

A self-management and peer support intervention was developed and delivered by secondary mental health service users to 262 people with psychiatric diagnoses living in the community. Data on wellbeing and health-promoting behaviour were collected at three time points (baseline, six, and 12 months).

Participants reported significant improvements in wellbeing and health-promoting lifestyle six and 12 months after self-management training. Peer-led self-management shows potential to improve long-term health outcomes for people with psychiatric diagnoses.

Due to the lack of a control group, the positive changes cannot definitively be attributed to the intervention. Other limitations were reliance on self-report measures, and the varying numbers of completers at three time points. These issues will be addressed in future studies.

The evaluation demonstrated the effectiveness of self-management training for people with psychiatric diagnoses, suggesting self-management training may bring significant wellbeing gains for this group.

This study represents a first step in the implementation of self-management approaches into mental health services. It demonstrates the feasibility of people with psychiatric diagnoses developing and delivering an effective intervention that complements existing services.

This is the first study to investigate the effectiveness of a self-management training programme developed and delivered by mental health service users in the UK.

The article considers the utility of a pluralist perspective in the context of current debates around UK corporate governance reform. Oxford School pluralism advanced both a description of how industrial relations (IR) operated in practice plus a prescription for how it should operate. Whilst economic conditions are different today, a pluralist framing provides not only a useful way of understanding interests in firm governance (description) but also a solid grounding for a pragmatic reform agenda (prescription).

Drawing from key texts in the field, the article considers core concepts within pluralist discourse and discusses their relevance to contemporary policy debates.

The article provides a short outline of recent economic and political developments and considers how a pluralist framing helps explain firm-level interests, challenging the dominant narrative of shareholder primacy. It then asks what policy interventions might flow from this analysis of capital and labour investments, and how feasible they are in the current UK context. This allows a discussion of levels of analysis (evident in materialist theories such as “radical pluralism” and the “disconnected capitalism thesis”). Finally, it reflects briefly on the links between corporate governance and wider patterns of inequality, suggesting the pluralist position is consistent with a Durkheimian sociology focusing on the potential in state-led regulatory interventions to tackle anomie and strengthen social solidarity.

The article brings together literature from what are often treated as relatively discrete areas of enquiry (employment relations and corporate governance) and also considers the public policy implications of these connections.

The need for independent audit goes back to the agency theory, the theory of delegation of power and the issue of trust. Stakeholders delegate power to management to manage the business on their behalf, yet they face the risk of information asymmetry and management motivations to commit fraud. The main aim of having an independent auditor was therefore to reduce the risk of information asymmetry and fraudulent behaviour by management. Auditors are required by the International Auditing Standards to detect material fraud and error, and they are expected to have a duty of care for stakeholders. However, recently independent auditors, whether conducting private or public audit, have been scrutinised for failing to detect material fraud. There have been a lot of discussions in the literature about the role of private auditors in detecting fraud, but very little discussions about the role of public auditors in detecting fraud. This chapter will outline the difference between private audit and public audit; explain the legal liability of public auditors in relation to fraud detection; the role of public auditors in detecting fraud; and will critically review the root causes for auditors’ failure to detect fraud.