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The Federal Reserve regulates U.S. commercial banks using a system of risk-based capital (RBC) regulations based on the Basel Accords. Unfortunately, the Fed’s mis-rating of several assets such as mortgage-backed securities encouraged the build-up of these assets in the banking system and was a major contributing factor to the 2008 financial crisis. The Basel system of RBC regulation is a prime example of a Hayekian knowledge problem. The contextual, tacit, and subjective knowledge required to properly assess asset risk cannot be aggregated and utilized by regulators. An effective system of banking regulation must acknowledge man’s limited knowledge and place greater value on individual decisions than on top-down planning.

This chapter makes two modest contributions by shedding light on the shock propagating role of endogenous firm entry in a more transparent way through the lens of frictionless, flexible-price real business cycle (RBC) model. We find that entry moderates rather than amplifies the shock, as production no longer occurs in a frictionless way but through business formation that consumes time and resources. We also resurrect the ability of the standard RBC model in resolving “productivity-hours worked puzzle” should credit barrier facing entry be formalized in the model.

A state space representation of a linearized DSGE model implies a VAR in terms of observable variables. The model is said be non-invertible if there exists no linear rotation of the VAR innovations which can recover the economic shocks. Non-invertibility arises when the observed variables fail to perfectly reveal the state variables of the model. The imperfect observation of the state drives a wedge between the VAR innovations and the deep shocks, potentially invalidating conclusions drawn from structural impulse response analysis in the VAR. The principal contribution of this chapter is to show that non-invertibility should not be thought of as an “either/or” proposition – even when a model has a non-invertibility, the wedge between VAR innovations and economic shocks may be small, and structural VARs may nonetheless perform reliably. As an increasingly popular example, so-called “news shocks” generate foresight about changes in future fundamentals – such as productivity, taxes, or government spending – and lead to an unassailable missing state variable problem and hence non-invertible VAR representations. Simulation evidence from a medium scale DSGE model augmented with news shocks about future productivity reveals that structural VAR methods often perform well in practice, in spite of a known non-invertibility. Impulse responses obtained from VARs closely correspond to the theoretical responses from the model, and the estimated VAR responses are successful in discriminating between alternative, nested specifications of the underlying DSGE model. Since the non-invertibility problem is, at its core, one of missing information, conditioning on more information, for example through factor augmented VARs, is shown to either ameliorate or eliminate invertibility problems altogether.

This paper surveys the treatment of expectations in estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) macroeconomic models.

A recent notable development in the empirical macroeconomics literature has been the rapid growth of papers that build structural models, which include a number of frictions and shocks, and which are confronted with the data using sophisticated full-information econometric approaches, often using Bayesian methods.

A widespread assumption in these estimated models, as in most of the macroeconomic literature in general, is that economic agents' expectations are formed according to the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH). Various alternative ways to model the formation of expectations have, however, emerged: some are simple refinements that maintain the REH, but change the information structure along different dimensions, while others imply more significant departures from rational expectations.

I review here the modeling of the expectation formation process and discuss related econometric issues in current structural macroeconomic models. The discussion includes benchmark models assuming rational expectations, extensions based on allowing for sunspots, news, sticky information, as well as models that abandon the REH to use learning, heuristics, or subjective expectations.

This chapter investigates the impact of policy interest rate news from the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) and the European Central Bank (ECB) on stock returns and volatilities of U.S. NYSE and German DAX listed commercial banks. We find that Fed news has the most influence on both U.S. and German listed bank stocks and an unexpected policy rate increase (decrease) lowers (raises) returns and raises volatility in the majority of cases. On the other hand, ECB news generally increases bank stock volatility in the United States but has little impact within its own domestic banking industry. While our results for the U.S. listed banks confirm that their stock prices are more responsive in bad economic times and also during periods of monetary tightening, we find disparities for German banks suggesting that U.S. and European banking industries respond heterogeneously to monetary policy news but the Global Financial Crisis increased the sensitivity of all banks to monetary policy news.

The globalization of the world, in addition to obvious advantages, also brings potential problems. According to the authors, the problem is that the crisis phenomena occur simultaneously and in a very similar way in different countries. The emphasis on comparing the economic crises of the early twentieth and twenty-first centuries was caused by common features such as political instability, declining living standards, severe pandemics that swept the world and their consequences (twentieth-century coronavirus and Spanish flu of the twenty-first century). Comparative analysis allows assessing the causes of crises and their consequences. The importance of studying the 2020s crisis is that this crisis has become the most painful since the Global Great Depression in the 1930s.

The novelty is determined in the analysis of the situation of the economic crisis of the 2020s. The materials of the article are of the theoretical value for researchers studying crisis phenomena and anti-crisis measures, government bodies and business representatives.

This chapter provides basic knowledge on the principles used in modern signalling systems to ensure safe train separation and to establish safe routes through point zones. For train control, lineside signals are compared with cab signalling. For block protection, fixed block and moving block systems are covered. The described interlocking principles for routes leading through point zones include route locking and release, conflicting routes, flank protection, and overlaps. A section on automatic train protection explains the principles of how trains can be prevented from violating speed and authority limits. For this, an overview on the levels of the European Train Control System is provided. Some information is also given on train describers and automatic route setting systems to support traffic management in signalling centres.