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This paper aims to increase the current understanding of the connection between operational level information and communication technology (ICT) projects and national level digital transformation by researching how project governance structures and practices are applied in an e-government context.

An elaborative qualitative study through public documentary analysis and empirical multi-case research on Finnish central government is used.

The study constructs a multi-level governance structure with three main functions and applies this in an empirical setting. The results also describe how different governance practices and processes, focusing on project portfolio management, are applied vertically across different organizational levels to connect the ICT projects with the national digitalization strategy.

This study integrates project governance and portfolio management knowledge into public sector digitalization, thus contributing to project management, e-government and ICT research streams by improving the current understanding on the governance of ICT projects as part of a larger-scale digitalization. This study also highlights perceived gaps between current governance practices and provides implications to managers and practitioners working in the field to address these gaps.

In this study, we develop further understanding of how institutional change is created within a mature and local industry. In this pursuit, we examine how a collaborative large project governance model was institutionalized at an industrial sector-level through both industry-level activities and “institutional projects”.

This study builds on the foundations of institutional fields and institutional change, suggesting that projects are not only shaped by their contexts but also produce institutional change themselves. We conducted extensive fieldwork on the institutionalization of a collaborative project governance model in Finland.

The findings illustrate how institutional change in governance of large and complex inter-organizational projects is created at the institutional field level. The institutionalized collaborative project governance model includes aspects of both relational and contractual governance. The change was facilitated by temporal links between the institutional projects as well as vertical links between the institutional projects and the field-level development programs.

This is one of the first studies to address how a collaborative large project governance model becomes the norm at the institutional field level beyond the boundaries of an individual project or organization.

The purpose of this paper is to study public project governance frameworks in various ministries and agencies in Norway, following the introduction of such a framework on the topmost level (i.e. the cabinet) which applies to the very largest projects.

The study is methodologically designed as a qualitative assessment of project governance frameworks that apply to state-funded investment projects in selected sectors, based on data gathered through document reviews and interviews.

The study finds that all of the agencies have introduced their own project governance frameworks, which are basically consistent with the recommendations from the project management literature and with the cabinet’s overall requirements in Norway. By contrast, only one ministry has taken a formalized role as a project owner. Governance tasks thus seem to be extensively delegated to the subordinate agencies. This even includes strategic tasks such as project selection and portfolio management, and implies there is a risk that public project governance has a narrow and internal focus.

The paper is a first step toward a better understanding of public project governance as a hierarchical system and the relationship between project owners on three levels, the cabinet, the sectoral ministry, and the government agency.

There is growing recognition that effective project control systems (PCS) are critical to the success of projects. The relationship between the individual elements of PCS and successfully achieving project objectives has yet to be explored. This research investigates the enablers and barriers that influence the elements of PCS success and drive project objectives.

This study adopts a mixed approach of descriptive analysis and regression models to explore the impact of six PCS elements on project outcomes. Petroleum and chemical projects in Saudi Arabia were selected as a case study to validate the research model.

Data from a survey of 400 project managers in Saudi’s petroleum and chemical industry reveal that successful PCS are the key to achieving all project outcomes, but they are particularly critical for meeting project cost objectives. Project Governance was identified as the most important of the six PCS elements for meeting project objectives. A lack of standard processes emerged as the most significant barrier to achieving effective project governance, while having skilled and experienced project team members was the most significant enabler for implementing earned value.

The study offers a direction for implementing and developing PCS as a strategic tool and focuses on the PCS elements that can improve project outcomes.

This research contributes to project management knowledge and differs from previous attempts in two ways. Firstly, it investigates the elements of PCS that are critical to achieving project scope, schedule and cost objectives; secondly, enablers and barriers of PCS success are examined to see how they influence each element independently.

The study aims to explore the role of procurement of good governance (PGG) on value for money (VfM) achievement in public construction projects. By investigating various dimensions of PGG, including transparency, accountability, competition and integrity, this study provides insights into how these factors contribute to the successful achievement of VfM outcomes in public construction projects.

The data were sourced from 203 construction project practitioners from 24 selected procuring entities in Tanzania using a census approach and a cross-sectional questionnaire survey. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation modelling (SEM) were used for data analysis.

The findings of the study revealed a positive and significant impact of various dimensions of PGG on VfM. Specifically, transparency, accountability, competition and integrity were positively and significantly related to VfM, with p-values <0.001. Based on the study findings, we conclude that PGG is an important predictor of VfM achievement in public construction projects.

The study offers policy implications for streamlined PGG and VfM achievement in public construction projects. It is suggested that procuring entities can enhance VfM by enforcing compliance with the principles of PGG throughout the entirety of construction projects. In this case, streamlined legislative frameworks and control mechanisms are crucial components that could enhance PGG and the achievement of VfM.

This study contributes to the academic literature on the strategic role of PGG in enhancing VfM achievement. This is one of the research domains, which has not been adequately researched, particularly in Tanzania’s context. In addition, the study provides valuable insights to policymakers, practitioners and stakeholders involved in public construction projects to improve project outcomes and resource allocation.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the adverse incentives at the front end of government-funded projects with concentrated benefits and no liabilities for the privileged groups. In particular, the author discusses the risk of perverse incentives of the types typically found in the development aid sector that results in counterproductive outcomes.

The paper uses a simple conceptual framework based on agency theory. A qualitative, case-based approach with purposive sampling was chosen for the empirical part of the study. Eight Norwegian projects were selected because incentive problems were to be expected, and one development aid project served as a reference case.

The paper finds that low strategic project success corresponded well with the terms of financing. There were clear indications of agency problems, in three cases to the extent that the incentives turned perverse. The paper concludes with a discussion of relevant measures to prevent the emergence of perverse incentives.

The paper contributes to an improved understanding of the incentives related to public project initiation and selection, which is an under-researched topic and generally not included in formal project governance schemes. The research should therefore be useful to scholars as well as practitioners within the field of project governance.