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The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of privatized initial public offerings (IPOs) on flipping activity in the Pakistan IPO market.

This study sampled 95 IPOs listed on the Pakistan stock exchange over the period of 2000 to 2019. The ordinary least square technique and quantile regression were used to examine the impact of privatized IPO on flipping activity.

The present study finds that privatization affects flipping activity and creates a quality signal in Pakistan’s IPO market. The findings of this study also show that privatized IPOs were subjected to high levels of flipping activity compared to non-privatized IPOs. Additionally, investors’ demand has been found to moderate the relationship between privatized IPOs and flipping activity in Pakistan’s IPO market.

Based on the fact that the sample consists of a combination of privatized and non-privatized IPOs, the results provide valuable insight into factors that may lead to unusual trading behavior/flipping during the first day of listing.

Despite several studies on events (e.g. short- and long-term price performance) around IPO, there is little evidence on how privatized IPOs affect flipping activity, which is a high volume of trading immediately after listing.

This study aims to examine how evolutionary and ecological forces shape the market strategy and performance of firms after their organizational form was changed by exogenous shock.

Hypotheses are developed based on both evolutionary and ecological perspectives and tested using fixed effect logistics models and a sample of 3,110 firms that were privatized during 1998–2007.

I find that once the organizational form of firms is changed, the market strategy of organizations is shaped by the population density of their old and new organizational forms in their existing market. Moreover, such a market strategy enhances the survival chance of firms.

This study contributes to organizational evolution literature by unpacking the evolution process when exogeneous shock to organizational form takes place. It advances both evolutionary economics and organization ecology theory through integrating them to understand the evolution process of organizations. This study also contributes to the privatization literature through examining the ecological forces that shape the restructuring strategy of firms after privatization and the performance implications of such restructuring.

The partial privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a dynamic process. The main feature of this process lies in not only gradual and sequential privatizations but also privatized shares transfer. For partially privatized SOEs, the introduction of private sector ownership is not the end of the story because the previously introduced private owners may choose to leave the SOEs by transferring the privatized shares after privatization, a process that is called “privatized shares transfer”. This paper aims to investigate the determinants of privatized shares transfer (PST) from the perspective of large shareholders’ control rights.

Considering the pyramidal structure of Chinese listed companies, this paper extends existing analyses to study the impact of the ultimate controller’s control rights on privatized shares transfer. This paper also investigates the relationship between excessive control rights of the largest controlling shareholder and PST in view of the principle of equity of rights and obligations. In addition to a perspective on the holding of key positions by large shareholders, this paper further explores the impacts of the ownership of the largest controlling shareholder on privatized shares transfer.

The results capture the fact that the higher control rights of large shareholders lead to more privatized shares transfer. After exploring the impacts of excessive control rights, the results provide evidence supporting the idea that firms with excessive numbers of directors, senior managers or supervisors who also have positions in the largest controlling shareholder’s entity are more likely to transfer privatized shares owned by private owners. In addition, the largest shareholders’ ownership also plays a role in privatized shares transfer.

This evidence suggests that the large shareholders’ control rights should be limited to an appropriate range during the process of privatization, thereby giving private shareholders more opportunity to participate in the operation of firms, strengthen the state and enhance the competitiveness of state capital.

The paper aims to investigate the long‐run performance of privatised initial public offerings (IPOs) and their effects on the New Zealand share market (NZSE) and the Australian share market (ASX).

The paper examines the relationship between privatisation and share market capitalisation, liquidity and share ownership. The research also evaluates long‐run risk‐return performance of the privatised companies' portfolios.

The analysis reveals that privatisations have significantly increased share market capitalisation and have impacted on the market liquidity. In general, anyone investing in privatised companies' portfolios could have received significantly higher returns than investing in an aggregate market portfolio.

The findings have significant practical implications for individual and institutional investors.

Despite the vast literature on privatization, the relationship between change of ownership and performance is not clear. The purpose of this paper is to understand why divergences are found between the empirical results of papers analyzed.

The author applies a meta-analysis to a sample of 60 empirical studies that analyze the performance of privatized companies. The author checks whether different results on performance can be explained by the method of privatization and the level of development of the country of privatized companies.

The findings indicate that companies privatized by public offerings obtain a better performance than companies privatized using other methods, such as private sale or voucher privatization, and do not support the common-place assumption that privatization in developing countries does not improve financial performance.

The study contributes to the literature on privatization because it adds new empirical evidence about the privatization programs and it first applies a meta-analysis to a sample about privatization on state-owned companies. The author discusses theoretical and managerial implications and offers suggestions for future research on privatization.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between privatization of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), organizational change and performance. It explores the processes by which privatization affects corporate performance through the internal changes within organizations in a developing country context.

The methodology involved the use of a survey questionnaire. Responses were obtained from 86 managers in 86 organizations, comprised of SOEs, privatized firms and private enterprises in Indonesia.

Cross‐sectional analysis shows that there had been a statistical significant difference across the types of ownership pertaining to organizational elements that were expected to change. The evidence suggested that privatization brought about important alignments among the organization's goals, design elements and resources and between the organization and its competitive environment.

The implications of the study are discussed in relation to the organizational changes that take place in the transition from public to private sector ownership. The study contributes to our understanding about the relationship between ownership‐performance by providing an organizational change perspective on the examination of privatization‐performance effect.

The paper provides insights into how privatization processes alter the behavior, incentives and performance of formerly SOEs in Indonesia.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the perceived Bangladesh privatized healthcare sector accountability gap.

Data were collected from 533 patients using services in 45 Dhaka city privatized hospitals. A questionnaire was designed based on 60 patient focus study group and the literature.

Structural equation modeling provides a comprehensive picture that allows healthcare constructs and accountability to be tested. The goodness‐of‐fit statistics supported the four factors of professionals, administration and management, legal enforcement, ethics and government, which were significantly associated with accountability. Despite Bangladeshi privatized healthcare growth, the study revealed that accountability mainly depends on government initiatives and effectively implementing existing laws.

The study covered one Bangladesh city (Dhaka) owing to resource constraints. Qualitative methods may have enriched the findings.

The accountability dimensions may be applicable to other countries to examine the perceived accountability gap. The study looked at the current Bangladesh privatized healthcare sector. Major issues of Bangladesh privatized healthcare accountability are discussed and recommendations for policymakers are suggested to improve the current circumstances.

The study is the first of its kind to examine accountability among privatized healthcare providers in developing countries. Patients’ accountability views require urgent attention from policy makers.

This chapter analyzes the early post-transition privatization and enterprise reform efforts of three major countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia (subsequently the Czech Republic), and the Soviet Union (subsequently Russia). For each, it discusses the prevailing ideologies of key decision makers and their external advisors prior to and during the transition process, the initial conditions faced by reformers and advisors, the policy frameworks that evolved, the results achieved, the mistakes made, and the opportunities missed. The ultimate conclusion is that while privatization could have and probably should have been done better, it nonetheless had to be done. The Czech Republic and Russia, and others in the region, are better off after the flawed privatizations they carried out than they would have been had they avoided or delayed divestiture. Poland, which did quite well at first in the absence of mass and rapid privatization, now finds itself burdened with a number of expensive and unproductive state firms. This chapter shows how and why these outcomes came about, and discusses the role of external advisors in the process.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether partially privatised state‐owned‐enterprises (SOEs) perform significantly better than fully SOEs in the developing country of Indonesia.

This study uses a data set of 157 SOEs in Indonesia for the year 2006 to examine the issue of ownership structure and its performance.

Statistical analysis supports the hypothesis that SOEs with private sector ownership have higher levels of performance than those fully owned by the government. There are also significant differences in financial leverage, firm size, assets‐in‐place, financial statement reliability, and industry variances between fully privatised and partially privatised SOEs.

These findings support the Indonesian Government move towards further privatisation in that SOEs with at least some private sector ownership have greater performance levels.

This paper analyzes the cash flow and corporate finance structure of large‐size Russian enterprises required by law to privatize. The legal framework and governmental regulatory structure of Russia's mass privatization program are presented, and particular emphasis is placed on tracing the flow of cash (versus Russian privatization vouchers) between enterprises, investors and the government. Most Russian firms raise no cash during the initial privatization process and, accordingly, have substantial difficulties in obtaining funds to continue operations and to finance their growth and expansion. The authors believe that undue emphasis on the use of privatization vouchers has placed many newly privatized firms in conditions of extreme financial distress. Examples of the initial financial structure of three Western corporate finance transactions — spin‐offs, leveraged buy‐outs (LBOs) and Chapter 11 reorganizations — are compared to the initial endowment of liquid resources in Russian firms undergoing privatization.