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This paper aims to address in a comparative context the role of intelligence in law enforcement and in particular the significance of intelligence‐led policing.

The discussion is based on the experience of the author over the last 40 years in working in and with law enforcement authorities in a number of countries in establishing specialised agencies and units to address serious and complex criminal activity. The paper was presented as a key note address at an inter‐governmental meeting in Buenos Aires in July 2012 of prosecutor generals and senior prosecutorial officials in South America.

The role of intelligence is seen as of critical importance to the efficacy of such initiatives. Drawing on his experience, the author poses some serious questions as to whether what is normally understood by the concept of intelligence‐led policing is correct.

The personal observations of the author will hopefully contribute to the discussion of an important aspect of law enforcement upon which very little has been written from the perspective of the intelligence community.

The author looks in particular at the difficulties that have arisen as a result of the interaction of different aspects of the legal system, for the flow and reliability of financial information. In particular, he addresses a number of recent cases before the English courts on the liability of those who handle other people's wealth.

The paper, based on the author's experience over the last 40 years, should contribute to the discussion of an important aspect of law enforcement upon which very little has been written from the perspective of the intelligence community.

This chapter examines the principles behind law enforcement intelligence and identifies best practices established by other local and state law enforcement organizations. Then, it conducts a close analysis of the law enforcement intelligence process to determine, in light of best practices, how policies and procedures might be changed to better address law enforcement operations. A redefined intelligence process, as described in this chapter, will provide all participating agencies with a universal definition of law enforcement intelligence, will maintain and enhance community-policing efforts, and will establish a platform for contribution to the domestic intelligence cycle – which is essential for leveraging resources to detect and disrupt organized criminal organizations and terrorism.

The purpose of this paper is to present evaluation results of Operation Galley, an intelligence-led policing (ILP) intervention that sought to proactively address the problem of drug dealing from hotel rooms by engaging hoteliers as crime control partners with the Queensland Police Service.

Operation Galley, a randomized control field trial, rank ordered and matched 120 hotels on size, star rating, location and estimated degree of suspicious behaviour. Hotels were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: Operation Galley hotels who received a procedurally just letter, followed by a personal visit with detectives; the letter-only hotels who received the procedurally just letter; and the business as usual hotels.

Using repeated measures ANOVA and general linear models, results of the 12-month trial indicate that the Operation Galley condition led to an increase in police engagement with hoteliers, increasing the recognition, reporting and police enforcement of drug offenders.

The Operation Galley trial demonstrates that the ILP approach helped foster positive engagement between hoteliers and detectives. The approach cultivated hoteliers as crime control partners and thereby increased the flow of human source intelligence, helping police to better target and respond to drug dealing problems in hotel rooms.

Results of the Operation Galley trial demonstrate that hoteliers can be leveraged as crime control partners, providing important human source intelligence about drug dealing and facilitating the capacity of police to better respond to drug problems in hotels.

In the recent case of Jordan v. The City of New London a police applicant was denied employment because he scored too well on the cognitive ability portion of his written application test. The importance of the case stems from its potential impact on three areas. First, in a time of shrinking applications to police forces, legal decisions related to the selection process would appear significant. Second, the rejection of an applicant by a police department because he was thought too intelligent appears to create or reinforce negative stereotypes of police in the USA. Third, the case involves employment law, an area that has proven fertile ground for suits against the police. The article explores the case in detail as well as reporting the results of a survey of police mid‐level managers concerning the impact of intelligence on various police administrative concerns.

Purpose – This paper aims to provide an overview of organizational changes in the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) Investigations Branch and how the Branch has adapted to the paradigm of intelligence‐led policing. The paper also reports on interviews conducted to assess the impact on key staff affected by the change, through the medium of a drug‐gang investigation, Operation Nine Connect. Design/methodology/approach – Both semi‐structured and less formal interviews were conducted with 20 detectives, intelligence analysts and managers. Extensive quotes are employed to demonstrate key points. Furthermore, content analysis of documents related to organizational change in the NJSP and to a large drug‐gang intelligence operation was conducted. Findings – The paper identifies the key tenets of intelligence‐led policing, and describes progress made both organizationally and culturally to move the Investigations Branch to an intelligence‐led policing mindset. Organizational successes were reported, but more limited success was achieved in relation to changing police culture. Practical implications – The paper clarifies the meaning of intelligence‐led policing, and identifies potential road‐blocks to implementation for police departments wishing to move to intelligence‐led policing. Originality/value – The paper identifies the key tenets of intelligence‐led policing, outlines how these were used to determine greater geographic focus in the organizational structure of the New Jersey State Police Investigations Branch, and is a rare examination of the internal workings of a state police investigations branch in relation to a drug‐gang investigation. The paper will be of interest to police executives and managers, and intelligence professionals.

The strategic intelligence assessment (SIA) plays an important role in contemporary intelligence‐led policing by helping to identify strategic priorities for policing activity, crime reduction and improvements in community safety. Originally defined in the UK's National Intelligence Model, the SIA is produced annually by all local UK police districts as well as other agencies in the UK and internationally that have adopted intelligence‐led principles. The purpose of this paper is to critique the two most common approaches to its production, structuring its content following a “crime‐type” template or an assessment that is based on previous strategic priorities.

The paper's critique is based on reviewing one hundred SIAs from police forces and Community Safety Partnerships in the UK and through speaking to practitioners on their experiences in using these intelligence products to determine strategic priorities.

The paper identifies weaknesses in both, arguing that neither tends to generate strategic intelligence products that are fit for the purpose for effective decision making, and in particular in helping to harness support from local government partners to address persistent and causal factors. As an alternative the study introduce a problem‐oriented approach to the production of strategic intelligence, with an assessment made in relation to place (locations and temporal features), offending and offender management, and victimisation and vulnerability.

The paper illustrates that the problem‐oriented approach leads to the production of a SIA that is more cross‐cutting in its analysis of crime and community safety issues, and more naturally leads to the identification of strategic priorities that focus on addressing causal issues.