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This is the second part of a long investigation under the title of, Principia Oeconomica; the first having appeared in this journal in 1986. The substance of the argument in this contribution is in the form of a dialogue with Henri Guitton, member of l'Institut de France and author of a book in French, De l'Imperfection en Economie (1979). Guitton is leading a new French Economic School critical of a modern economy characterised by ‘Econosm” or “Economy of Counter‐sense”. Economism refers to the practice of conceiving problems of a modern society in strictly economic‐accounting terms and neglecting a host of social and human aspects. The second term means that the sole attention given to growth in production did not increase the happiness of man but on the contrary it created for him new problems (pollution, noise, atomic radiation and other hazards). To cope with these problems, the French school recommends wise policies which Guitton called “creative imperfection”. Guitton's presentation is followed step by step, with an interpretation in terms of stable equilibrium. The recommendation stresses structural reforms to solve the same problems but following a road of “creative perfection” leading to the same goal sought by Guitton: a better world of tomorrow.

Investigates the economic methodologies of Carl Menger, William Stanley Jevons and Gustav Schmoller with respect to the issue of whether mathematics is or is not an adequate language to express economic relationships. First, Menger’s and Jevons’s respective methodologies are identified as Aristotelian which means, inter alia, that economic properties are real, are naturally related to each other, exist as part of the observable world and can be separated (in thought or otherwise) from other properties. Second, it is shown how this general Aristotelian outlook has very different implications for Menger’s and Jevons’s thinking about mathematics. Third, these two “monogenetic” views are contrasted with Gustav Schmoller’s “polygenetic” approach which holds that a purely deductive economics, based on a small number of self‐evident principles, is inadequate for social purposes.

In the years following the publication of A Theory of Consumption (1923), Hazel Kyrk’s book became the flagship of the field that would later be known as the economics of consumption. It stimulated theoretical and empirical work on consumption. Some of the existing literature on Kyrk (e.g., Kiss & Beller, 2000; Le Tollec, 2020; Tadajewski, 2013) depicted her theory as the starting point of the economics of consumption. Nevertheless, how and why it emerged the way it did remain largely unexplored. This chapter examines Kyrk’s intellectual background, which, we argue, can be traced back to two main movements in the United States: the home economics and the institutionalist. Both movements conveyed specific endeavors as responses to the US material and social transformations that occurred at the turn of the 20th century, notably the perceived changing role of consumption and that of women in US society. On the one hand, Kyrk pursued first-generation home economists’ efforts to make sense of and put into action the shifting of women’s role from domestic producer to consumer. On the other hand, she reinterpreted Veblen’s (1899) account of consumption in order to reveal its operational value for a normative agenda focused on “wise” and “rational” consumption. This chapter studies how Kyrk carried on first-generation home economists’ progressive agenda and how she adapted Veblen’s fin-de-siècle critical account of consumption to the context of the household goods developed in 1900–1920. Our account of Kyrk’s intellectual roots offers a novel narrative to better understand the role of gender and epistemological questions in her theory.

This chapter provides a comprehensive survey of the contributions of the Austrian school of economics, with specific emphasis on post-WWII developments. We provide a brief history and overview of the original theorists of the Austrian school in order to set the stage for the subsequent development of their ideas by Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek. In discussing the main ideas of Mises and Hayek, we focus on how their work provided the foundations for the modern Austrian school, which included Ludwig Lachmann, Murray Rothbard and Israel Kirzner. These scholars contributed to the Austrian revival in the 1960s and 1970s, which, in turn, set the stage for the emergence of the contemporary Austrian school in the 1980s. We review the contemporary development of the Austrian school and, in doing so, discuss the tensions, alternative paths, and the promising future of Austrian economics.

Science and technology diplomacy (STD) is an emerging area in the field of public policy and technology management. The purpose of this study is to overview the concept of STD based on the two approaches “Science and Technology” and “Diplomacy” to explain its necessity for Non-Aligned Movement member countries.

To design the work, principal domains and sub-domains of STD are identified based on the thematic analysis. By using MAXQDA software, the initial codes are analyzed and validated for the case study. Then, six areas and 29 sub-areas are identified based on the fuzzy Delphi and the framework is designed.

STD is defined from six scopes, including political, economics, law and legal issues, social sciences, philosophy and science and technology. Each scope has its own mechanism that is discussed in the article.

This work is one of the first in the literature of science and technology policy making.

The purpose of this paper is to critique the philosophical underpinnings of the growing field of Islamic economics.

A critical and comparative review of Islamic economics texts written by key proponents during the last eight decades is undertaken. The origins of this nascent science are traced and factors that gave impetus to its development examined. The different characterisations of the discipline as it has developed within the broader socio‐political context are contrasted.

The proponents of Islamic economics have had little success in shaping a distinctive paradigm for their discipline, beyond arguing that it is underpinned by a strong moral ethic. By and large, its epistemological roots have remained firmly within the framework of rationalism/empiricism and methodological individualism. Consequently, Islamic economics has not been able to shed its neoclassical moorings, the very paradigm it originally set out to replace. Several of the contradictions apparent in the discipline are discussed. Islamic economists, recognising that their mission has remained unfulfilled, have variously suggested different approaches to regenerate the process and chart the way forward. These propositions are examined and evaluated.

If Islamic economics is to fulfil its raison d'être, that is, articulate a coherent theoretical paradigm and demonstrate its relevance to the real economy, its proponents must resolve its theoretical and practical difficulties by clarifying its Weltanschauung and developing an appropriate content and form.

This study evaluates how the discipline has developed and exposes its inherent contradictions. These inconsistencies are identified and explained at the foundational level, highlighting where and why they have occurred.

Praxeology is defined by Rothbard (1962, p. 64) as “The formal implication of the fact that men use means to attain various chosen ends.” While men use means to attain ends in areas other than economics (e.g., war, voting), the dismal science is the only deeply elaborated subdivision of praxeology. Rothbard (1962, p. 63) defines praxeological economics in contrast withpsychology [and]…the philosophy of ethics. Since all these [three] disciplines deal with the subjective decisions of individual human minds, many observers have believed that they are fundamentally identical. This is not the case at all. Psychology and ethics deal with the content of human ends; they ask, why does the man choose such and such ends, or what ends should man value? Praxeology and economics deal with any given ends and with the formal implications of the fact that men have ends and employ means to attain them.¹

Iowa City is located on banks of the Iowa River in a gently rolling region in the eastern half of Iowa, about 250 miles west of Chicago. It was the state capital until 1858, when the government was moved to a more central location in Des Moines. In 1919, the year the Frank H. Knight family moved to Iowa City, it was a small university community of about 15,000. No doubt Knight and his wife Minerva found it a pleasant enough place to live and raise their young family. To Frank, the town and surrounding area must have seemed much like that of Bloomington, IL, near where he was born and raised. For the first few years in Iowa City the Knight family lived in an 1890s vintage house close to the campus, and just around the corner from a public elementary school.³

The origin of “social solidarism” as a doctrine seems to be in France. Pierre Leroux (1797–1871) is credited with being the first who attached an ethical significance to the otherwise juridical expression of solidarism. Charles Gide, who himself belonged to the French solidarist movement, in his book (co‐authored with C. Rist), Histoire des Doctrines Economiques (1909), described the solidarist school as being influenced by the works of Leon Bourgeois, Pierre J. Proudhon, Charles Secretan and others.

Undertakes an epistemological formulation of ethico‐economics. This formulation challenges the neo‐classical and macroeconomic foundations of mainstream economics and then presents the rigorously analytical depths of ethico‐economics. Traces the developments, the praxis of the rational precept of economic science from its Hellenic roots as this found inroads into the thinking of the classical, Austrian institutionalists and political economists. Shows to be logically flawed several areas of general equilibrium and market equilibrium relations that we face without question in a pedagogical presentation of economic theory. Even the microeconomic and macroeconomic dichotomy is a kind of duality in economic reasoning that has the traces of Kantian dualism in it. Hence, in none of the received economic doctrines the circular cause and effect of the epistemic and the ontic roots of human reasoning are unified together to give a truly interactive view of economic activities embedded within the larger ecological complex. To this complex belong the inter‐relationships that comprehend life, experience, praxis and the totality of the socio‐scientific order. Presents such a unified epistemic‐ontic circular causation as the praxis of the ethico‐economic world view. It is substantially different to, and more revolutionizing than, the ethically neutral, ethically exogenous, and interaction‐benign constraint of mainstream economics.