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A case study to establish the reasons why management at a South Wales electronics company introduced employee participation at the plant upon the advent of Japanese ownership.

Challenges the assumption that performance‐related pay for academic staff in higher education will play an important part in the creation of better quality public services. Argues that PRP will lead to the non‐pay benefits of appraisal being dissipated; the undermining of academic staff′s professionalism; collegiality being threatened; the hindrance of innovation and change; and the alienation of women and staff from ethnic minorities. Using the simple definition of quality that emphasizes that service providers get “close to the customer”, the combined effect of these dysfunctional outcomes of PRP is that, far from improving quality, PRP is likely to harm it.

The Citizen′s Charter contains a statement about the introduction of performance‐related pay in the public sector, suggesting that this will lead to the provision of better quality public services. Two of the assumptions underpinning this policy are challenged in this, the first of two articles on the subject. These are that PRP will motivate academic staff and that it will lead to greater perceived pay system fairness. Recent research evidence in the UK and America is used to substantiate this challenge.

The impact of developments in information technology upon the range of products which can be profitably marketed by financial services firms is here considered. Underlying the analysis is a conception of financial institutions such as banks as marketing inter‐mediaries, providing information and distributive services along with the financial products. Two routes are compared which are used by financial institutions to provide an expanded range of financial services: joint ventures and the financial supermarket. The strengths and weaknesses of both are examined.

Examines the impending introduction of performance‐related pay to academic staff in higher education. Draws on research in both public and private sectors both in the UK and USA to suggest that there are nine lessons that those with the responsibility for introducing and operating performance‐related pay in higher education may heed. The lessons are that performance‐related pay: may not motivate academic staff; may demotivate academic staff; may alienate academic staff; objective PRP assessment of academic staff is problematic; may lead to other benefits of appraisal being dissipated; is likely to be driven by budget considerations; gives differential achievement opportunities to staff; threatens collegiality and finally affronts professionalism. Concludes that performance‐related pay is unlikely to be successful in causing academic staff to work more effectively; its impact may at best be neutral and at worst harmful.

Performance‐related pay (PRP) has grown in importance in the 1980s and is likely to continue growing. The reasons for this growth are examined: labour market factors, changes in organisational objectives, fairness in payment initiatives, weakening of collectivisation, and “fashion”. Problems associated with PRP are also explored. It is argued that PRP has a capacity to subvert the purposes for which it is intended by distorting pay structures, creating unfairness in reward systems and harming team spirit. PRP also detracts from the value of other performance appraisal objectives. Some of the problems inherent in measuring individual job performance are also considered.

This article examines the process of setting up a contract between the training manager and the training consultant. It argues that the potential for the training event, that is the subject of the contract, to be ineffective, is great. Consequently the process has to be well managed by the training manager. It lays out eight steps in the contracting process that the training manager should observe to have a greater chance of success. These are: check the consultant′s credentials; clearly specify your needs; ensure a fit with your organisation; arrange for written programme details; make clear evaluation arrangements; monitor newly appointed consultants; give clear feedback to the consultant; be prepared to answer awkward questions.

In recent years it has become clear that joint consultation has not withered away in British industry but has managed to maintain a considerable institutional presence. The precise character of consultation in these companies is rather more difficult to determine. Drawing on research in a Japanese‐owned electronics factory, with elaborate machinery for participation as well as a single union, no‐strike deal, it is concluded that consultation is little more than a symbol of unitarism. Moreover, other unitarist symbols are also used to convey the “family” message to the workforce.

Training interviewers in questioning techniques is not just a matter of coaching them in the use of the appropriate type of questions. It is suggested that most of us are inept at the skill of questioning because of reluctance to intrude, which is cultural in origin, because questioners are too egoistic and simply not interested in any information that might be forthcoming, and because asking questions is sometimes too difficult. It is further suggested that trainers should pay attention to attitude change training as an important part of interpersonal skills development that involves questioning techniques, to which end a set of training aims is listed.

Analyses the introduction and first three years of the operation of a new reward system in a financial services organisation. The purpose of the study was to develop an explanatory theory associated with reward system change effectiveness. Following a description of the organisation and its operational context, analyses the new reward system, together with an examination of the specific objectives the organisation's managers hoped it would achieve. Provides an explanation of the methods employed to collect and analyse the data. The main part of the paper comprises an analysis of these data, which provides evidence that the system was not meeting its objectives. Subsequently uses the literature on reward theory and organisational behaviour to help explain the reasons for such apparent ineffectiveness. Concludes by suggesting a tentative theory of reward system change effectiveness.