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The purpose of the paper is to examine whether reported food habits (vegan, vegetarian, or carnivore diet) are associated with right-wing authoritarianism, prejudices against minorities and acceptance of social dominance.

In total, 1,381 individuals completed validated questionnaires on dietary habits and attitudes. Associations were analysed using analyses of covariance on attitudes, adjusted for age with gender and diet as factors.

Of the respondents, 35 per cent reported eating mixed food (including meat and fish), 31 per cent vegetarian food (excluding meat and fish) and 34 per cent vegan food (excluding animal products entirely). Authoritarianism was more frequent in carnivores compared to vegetarians and vegans; this difference was more distinctive in men (mean 2.4 vs 1.9 vs 1.7) than in women (2.2 vs 1.9 vs 1.8). Women with a mixed diet were more inclined to social dominance than vegetarians and vegans (1.8 vs 1.6 vs 1.6). Men with a mixed diet had a stronger tendency to dominance (2.0 vs 1.7 vs 1.5) and prejudices (2.5 vs 2.3 vs 2.1); this difference was less distinct among women (2.2 vs 2.1 vs 2.1).

This research is of academic value and of value to policy makers and practitioners in the food supply chain. The results show that individuals with vegetarian or vegan diets less frequently report having prejudices against minorities, supporting social dominance and accepting authoritarian structures than individuals with a mixed diet.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether chief executive officer (CEOs) are paid for the systematic and/or unsystematic risks and whether there is any optimum risk premium level in the executive pay.

Firm and year fixed effect panel data regression was used to estimate the relationship between total CEO compensation and systematic (market) and unsystematic (firm) risks.

There is no nexus between CEO pay and unsystematic (diversifiable) risk; however, the association between CEO compensation and systematic (undiversifiable) risk is positively significant in line with agency theory. Moreover, it is revealed that this positive relationship has an optimum point (curvilinear).

This paper contributes to the controversial argument in the literature by investigating the situation in the Swiss market. Switzerland is an exemplary country because of its direct democracy (consensus) structure for executive pay. This study is limited by the fact that only total CEO compensation is analyzed.

As a practical implication, it is shown that after the optimal point, the higher compensation does not motivate the CEOs to take higher risks and does not provide the organizations with any additional benefit.

The finding of this study supports agency theory’s risk premium assumption and provides additional evidence to the contradictory results in the literature with a new country setting that has paramount importance in executive compensation phenomena. It is a comparative finding with prior literature also outlines the future research area in the risk and compensation literature.