Search results

The purpose of this paper is to explore the adverse incentives at the front end of government-funded projects with concentrated benefits and no liabilities for the privileged groups. In particular, the author discusses the risk of perverse incentives of the types typically found in the development aid sector that results in counterproductive outcomes.

The paper uses a simple conceptual framework based on agency theory. A qualitative, case-based approach with purposive sampling was chosen for the empirical part of the study. Eight Norwegian projects were selected because incentive problems were to be expected, and one development aid project served as a reference case.

The paper finds that low strategic project success corresponded well with the terms of financing. There were clear indications of agency problems, in three cases to the extent that the incentives turned perverse. The paper concludes with a discussion of relevant measures to prevent the emergence of perverse incentives.

The paper contributes to an improved understanding of the incentives related to public project initiation and selection, which is an under-researched topic and generally not included in formal project governance schemes. The research should therefore be useful to scholars as well as practitioners within the field of project governance.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate and clarify “irrationality” problem through the maritime industry practices and leading incentives behind common investors.

This paper includes a review of broader business and economics literature; review of shipping business practices and detection of institutional pathways and misleading mechanisms behind the irrational preferences; investigation of data (for some arguments); and introduction of a theoretical approach.

There are several industry practices and norms well established and followed by decision makers, which may cause and initiate illogical and irrational (long-run) preferences. Short-termism is an erroneous habit of common shipping investors, which is embedded and forced through traditional financial math (i.e. discounted cash flow), financial system (e.g. initial public offerings with high-frequency transactions, interest rate governance and asset valuation mechanism) or flawed contracting tradition (i.e. commission bias).

Both shipping business and financial institutions need to redesign their working mechanisms, evaluation systems, risk detection and assessment procedures. As discussed in Section 4.7, commission-based (float) services must be converted to regular flat rate payments with long-term contracts to protect investors from rational choices of intermediaries in the short-run which encourages investor’s irrationality. Having a long-term service contract will also improve sustainability of intermediaries and lower their business risk (win-win).

The impact of this paper is two-fold. First, it raises critical questions about professional decay and drawbacks of some traditional instruments in the shipping business. For the first time, this paper emphasises on various challenges which deteriorate credibility of the industry and causes ill-defined investments. Some arguments have extreme priority for strengthening the foundations of the industry. Second, this paper establishes a new stream of scholarly research highlighting weaknesses of conventional economic approach and demand for outsourcing other schools of economics (e.g. institutional and behavioural) into the shipping business.

This study aimed to identify barriers impeding circular economy (CE) uptake in the construction industry in literature, categorize them for the development of a framework and to seek the interrelationships among the categorized barriers. This allowed for identifying integrated solutions to holistically address the barriers. The study also sought to identify the “hot” themes, the knowledge gaps and future research directions on barriers impeding CE.

Forty-eight relevant articles were desk reviewed from different construction peer-reviewed journals and published conference papers. A scientometric analysis allowed for co-occurrence of keywords relating to CE. A content analysis enabled the identification of 79 barriers impeding the uptake of CE in the construction industry which were further categorized into six distinct categories for the development of a framework showing the interrelationships among the categorized barriers.

The identified barriers include construction sector inertia, lack of design standards, lack of knowledge, awareness and understanding, design cost, and perception of second-hand materials as substandard among others. The study categorized the identified barriers for better understanding into six different groups: cultural barriers, social barriers, environmental barriers, economic barriers, technical barriers and technological barriers. Strategies to address the barriers were also proposed. The interrelationships among the various barriers were also shown in a proposed framework to educate professionals on the interconnectivity of the barriers.

Categorization of the various barriers impeding CE uptake contributes to the body of knowledge. Also, the interrelationships among the various categorized barriers in the framework will enable construction professionals make informed decisions regarding the successful integration of CE in the industry, better appreciate the barriers that impede CE uptake and apply strategies to holistically address the barriers. This will expand current knowledge outside the narrow scope of isolated barriers.

To the global construction industry, the review presents a list of barriers and their interrelationships that could provide implementation strategies for the uptake of CE in the industry.

The geographical scope of this study is not limited, and therefore encourages wide applicability of the findings to the global construction industry.

This paper investigates how outcomes-based performance management (PM) regimes operate in the partnerships known as social impact bonds (SIBs), which bring together partners from the public, private and third sectors. The findings are analysed in the light of the different cultural world views of the partners.

Published evaluations of 25 UK SIBs were analysed by a qualitative multiple case study approach. This study of secondary sources permitted the analysis of a wide range of SIB partnerships from near contemporary accounts.

Outcomes frameworks led to rigorous PM regimes that brought the cultural differences between partners into focus. While partnerships benefitted from the variety of viewpoints and expertise, the differences in outlook simultaneously led to strains and tensions. In order to mitigate such tensions, some stakeholders conformed to the outlooks of others.

The need to achieve a predefined set of payable outcomes embeds a “linear” view of intervention and effect on the SIB partners and a performance regime in which some partners dominate. In designing accountability systems for partnerships such as SIBs, commissioners should consider how the performance regime will affect the interests of all stakeholders.

This study adds to the cultural theory literature which has rarely considered three-way partnerships embodying hierarchical, individualist and egalitarian world views and how performance regimes operate in such partnerships. Three-way partnerships are thought to be rare and short-lived, but this empirical study shows that they can be successful albeit over a predefined lifespan.

This final chapter of this book highlights and critically discusses some specific issues concerning talent management in the context of higher education raised in the chapters of this book. It recapitulates the transition higher education is going through. This transition started decades ago but was boosted by the movements of Open Science and Recognition and Rewards. It leads to a reorientation on the conceptualization of academic performance and subsequently also on the meaning of talent and talent management in academia. It points to a shift from an exclusive and performance orientation on talent, to an inclusive, developmental approach to talent management or a hybrid form. Yet, Thunnissen and Boselie state that there is a talent crisis in academia, and this crisis urges the need for more innovative ways of developing and implementing talent management practices. This chapter ends with some recommendations for further talent management research and practice.

This chapter demonstrates that social business models do not meaningfully prioritize or impose accountability to “social good” over other purposes in ways that (a) best protect against owners changing their minds or entry of new owners with different priorities and (b) enable reliable accountability over time and across circumstances. This chapter further suggests a model – a “social primacy company” – that actually prioritizes “social good” and meaningful accountability to it. This chapter thus clarifies circumstances under which existing models might be most useful and are not particularly useful, especially as investors, entrepreneurs, employees, regulators, and others pursue shared, common understandings about purposes, priorities, and accountability.