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The risks and uncertainties of public–private partnership (PPP) projects threaten their sustainability. Contract flexibility, which is based on the theory of incomplete contract and transaction cost, may be a viable solution to this issue. The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between contract flexibility and the sustainability performance of PPP projects. The multiple mediating roles of justice perception and cooperation efficiency are assessed, thereby allowing the pathways and conditions to be understood more comprehensively for improving the sustainability performance of PPP projects.

Nine hypotheses in the proposed research model are tested via structural equation modeling using data acquired from 218 Chinese PPP professionals.

Results show that contract flexibility positively affects PPP project sustainability performance. Justice perception and cooperation efficiency play direct and sequential mediating roles in this effect.

This study validates that contract flexibility positively impacts the sustainability performance of PPP projects, where justice perception and cooperation efficiency serve direct and sequential mediating roles. The findings of this study contribute to an improved understanding of the effect of contract flexibility on the sustainability performance of PPP projects. Furthermore, they provide important theoretical and practical insights into contract management as well as beneficial information and valuable initiatives for improving the sustainability of PPP projects.

This study aims to empirically test the effects of key characteristics of performance-based contracting (PBC) (i.e. reward/payment scheme, increased supplier autonomy and transfer of responsibilities) on supplier goal commitment.

This study developed a conceptual model applying goal-setting theory (GST), expectancy theory (ET) and job characteristics theory (JCT). Survey data were collected and analyzed using structural equation modeling (SEM) to establish a validated measurement instrument for testing the hypotheses.

The findings revealed that PBC positively affects supplier goal commitment due to its unique characteristics, which translates into improved supplier performance. Furthermore, this study validated the mediating role of goal alignment and felt accountability operating between PBC characteristics and supplier goal commitment.

This study explored the buyer–supplier relationship from the supplier's standpoint. Using a more inclusive data set, future research may involve a dyadic analysis and focus on the effects of the following factors on the supplier goal commitment: relational aspects (e.g. trust and collaboration), the risk transfer from the buyer to the supplier, different incentive schemes and successful PBC implementation factors.

This study presents new, validated insights for contract selection, design and management. It underlines the importance of choosing the proper contract, having the appropriate contract design based on the desired outcomes and effective contract management by exhibiting the psychological/behavioral effect of fundamental PBC characteristics.

PBC represents an active research stream, but its psychological/behavioral implications are understudied. Therefore, this research puts forth a conceptual framework with multiple testable hypotheses illustrating the relationship between PBC and supplier goal commitment.

This study aims to provide new understanding on operational and dynamic capabilities supportive to the implementation of performance-based public procurement by focusing on dyadic capabilities of a supplier and a buyer.

The study is based on the qualitative analysis of 20 interviews with informants representing Finnish public organizations and their private sector suppliers. The analysis is aligned with a theoretical framework connecting the phases of procurement and the capability types studied.

The findings of the study present the role of operational and dynamic capabilities of a buyer and a supplier in the implementation of performance-based procurement at public procurement phases. Preprocurement phase is found to greatly benefit from all three dynamic capabilities, while operational capabilities suffice in the contracting phase.

Increased understanding on capabilities needed in performance-based procurement can increase the chances of success in reaching better value for money of public services and developing supplier markets.

The study contributes to the literature on performance-based public procurement and value-based selling by taking a dyadic approach to the operational and dynamic capabilities needed in business with an emphasis on performance. As the focus in public procurement shifts increasingly from resources to performance, involving a joint effort between buyer and supplier, the study provides insights into role of dyadic capabilities and explains how dynamic and operational capabilities together support the phases of performance-based procurement implementation in the public sector.

The increasing prevalence of a wide range of infectious diseases, as well as the underwhelming results of vaccination rates that may be traced back to problems with vaccine procurement and distribution, have brought to the fore the importance of vaccine supply chain (VSC) management in recent years. VSC is the cornerstone of effective vaccination; hence, it is crucial to enhance its performance, particularly in low- and middle-income countries where immunization rates are not satisfactory.

In this paper, the authors focus on VSC performance improvement of India by proposing supply contracts under demand uncertainty. The authors propose three contracts – wholesale price (WSP), cost sharing (CS) and incentive mechanism (IM) for the government-operated immunization program of India.

The authors' findings indicate that IM is capable of coordinating the supply chain, whereas the other two contracts are inefficient for the government. To validate the model, it is applied to a real-world scenario of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in India, and the findings show that an IM contract improves the overall efficiency of the system by 23.72%.

Previous studies focused mainly on the influenza VSC industry within developed nations. Nonetheless, there exists a dearth of literature pertaining to the examination of supply contracts and their feasibility for immunization programs that are administered by the government and aimed at optimizing societal benefits. The authors' findings can be beneficial to the immunization program of India to optimize their VSC cost.

While much of the literature testing for shirking by professional athletes have used performance metrics, some works have quantified shirking in dollar terms by comparing salary to estimated marginal revenue product (MRP). However, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approaches to measuring shirking by comparing salary to MRP have an endogeneity problem, as salary and contract length are determined simultaneously. We test for shirking in Major League Baseball (MLB) using an MRP approach, addressing this potential endogeneity.

This paper uses instrumental variables regression to address potential endogeneity using MLB season-level player and team data from 2010 to 2017.

Using OLS regression, the impact of an additional year of guaranteed contract on shirking is estimated at approximately $1m in 2010 US dollars, and the impact of having a long-term contract is estimated at $5m, estimates comparable to those in the literature. Using instrumental variables regression, these impacts increase to $1.6m and over $9m in 2010 dollars.

Given large, causal shirking estimates, profit maximizing sports organizations should take caution when negotiating long-term contracts. These findings also have important implications for other labor market settings where workers feel job security.

To our knowledge, this is the first work testing for shirking in sports using an MRP approach which uses instrumental variables regression to address potential endogeneity.

Relationship conflict between the owners and contractors is inevitable, which could induce negative consequences. Yet, the existing literature mostly focused on its direct effects on project performance and ignored the process by which relationship conflict gradually deteriorates cooperation as well as corresponding managerial approaches. Given the fact that relationship conflict originates from interdependent tasks, the proposed theoretical model is intended to measure relational behavior as an instant outcome of relationship conflict, and explore the buffering role of contract enforcement approach.

This paper develops the conceptual model based on the literature review. Then the questionnaire survey was conducted. The dyadic data obtained from 168 Chinese construction project professionals were analyzed by the Partial Least squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) technique.

The results show that relational behavior partially mediates the link between relationship conflict and project performance. Besides, three types of contract enforcement approaches are found to differentially change the negative link between relationship conflict and relational behavior. Rigid contract enforcement can worsen the adverse effects of relationship conflict on relational behavior, whereas flexible contract enforcement can alleviate these negative effects. The level of mitigation hinges on whether compromising behaviors or obliging behaviors are chosen.

The study extends the knowledge of conflict theory and contract theory in the construction field. Based on the proposed conceptual model and PLS-SEM results, this study contributes to the understanding of relationship conflict’s consequences between the owners and contractors and enriches conflict management approaches in the construction field.

This paper aims to propose an accurate and efficient decision-making process adapted to the specific context of Claim Management situations, implying partners engaged in a high-involvement relationship.

We used a three-step approach: first, an inductive phase based on 12 past case studies. Second, a theory-building phase. Third, a theory-testing phase based on an ongoing case study to observe and test our propositions.

Proposal 1: Partner’s Strategic Value is an influential decision parameter that must be incorporated into Claim Management-related decision-making processes in high-involvement relationships. Proposal 2: The Fast-and-Frugal Heuristic is adapted to the intense, interactive and iterative nature of the Claim Management context. Our final proposal combines these two findings, i.e. a Fast-and-Frugal Heuristic incorporating the Partner’s Strategic Value and based on using decision criteria as a sequence, not simultaneously.

In the context of high-involvement business relationships and Claim Management, this study introduces the importance of selecting an appropriate decision methodology and integrating a strategic decision parameter (Partner’s Strategic Value) into an operational decision-making context. Furthermore, the principle of considering decision parameters in a specific sequence corresponds to the iterative and interactive nature of the Claim Management processes.

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are notoriously prone to disputes among stakeholders, some of which may unduly jeopardize contract performance. Contract disputes arising in Iran are often due to inefficiency of PPP concession agreements and practice. This study presents a causal-predictive model of the root causes and preventive measures for inter-organization disputes to enhance the likelihood of achieving desirable performance in PPP projects.

A theoretical “causal-predictive” model was developed with fourteen hypotheses based on extant literature and contractual agency theory, which resulted in the creation of a pool of 110 published items. Data were obtained from a questionnaire survey with 75 valid responses, completed by 4 stratified groups of Iranian PPP experts. Partial least square structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) was used for validating the proposed model via a case study.

Results reveal that the main three factors of PPP desirable performance are as follows: on-time project completion, high quality of activities/products and services for public satisfaction. Further, the most influential factors of the lifecycle problems, construction stage, and preferred risk allocation included risk misallocation, improper payment mechanism and failure to facilitate a timely approval process.

For researchers, the findings contribute to the theory of contractual agency; specifically, how different influences among the model's elements lead to better PPP performance. In practical terms, proposed outcome-based strategies will inform PPP stakeholders to avoid dispute occurrence and thus improve the time, quality and services of projects.

Performance-based contracting (PBC) has been gaining popularity over the years. However, empirical studies investigating the impact of PBC features have been limited. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of PBC features leading to quality investment that fosters financial benefits.

After examining the validity and reliability of scale items through confirmatory factor analysis, this study tested hypotheses using covariance-based structural equation modeling of survey data from 381 supply, logistics and operations managers.

The findings reveal the impact of PBC features (joint knowledge generation, goal congruence and incentive alignment) on financial benefits and the mediation impact of quality investment between these features and financial benefits. The upfront investment for quality enhancement was found facilitator of PBC features to achieve financial benefits. The findings also reveal the importance of collaborative communication and information sharing for knowledge generation that leads financial benefits through quality investment. This study shows that PBC governance strengthens the theory of relational view by empowering collaborative efforts and aligning goals and incentives within downstream suppliers for knowledge generation and quality enhancement.

An analysis of PBC features by industry would be very beneficial in differentiating between and more thoroughly understanding the commonalities and differences across various sectors. Investigating how these change across industries would also help identify any bias in PBC implementation.

This study illustrates that it will be practical and beneficial for suppliers to understand the major drivers of quality investment and the relationship between quality investment and the financial benefits of selecting PBC.

Unlike most previous studies, this research contributes to the literature in that it is one of the relatively few examples of empirical research on PBC features. Overall, the findings of this study will improve our understanding of how PBC features enhance upfront investment in quality and improve financial benefits.

There is growing scholarly interest in the use of penalty in employment contracts which reduce employees' pay if the employee's performance does not meet a pre-specified performance threshold. Prior accounting research has focused exclusively on the effect of penalty on employee performance. In this study, the authors extend earlier research by examining how penalty affects the employers' wage offers. Prior research suggests that employers' generous wage offers in employment contracts are normally translated as trust by employees who in turn reciprocate with higher effort. The authors present a theory that predicts penalty reduces employers' wage offers. Then, the authors propose unrestricted communication between employers and employees as a potential moderator for the negative effect of penalty on trust and reciprocity.

The authors implement a controlled lab experiment with a 2 × 3 experimental design (Penalty: Present and Absent; and Communication: None, One-Way and Two-Way).

The authors develop their predictions by utilizing insights from motivational-crowding and organizational communication theories. The authors hypothesize and find evidence that employers' ability to penalize employees can reduce employers' motivation to offer generous wages. As a result, reduced trust demotivates employees to provide high effort. However, the authors find that a two-way communication moderates the negative effect of penalties by restoring trust, thereby, increasing reciprocity. Finally, the authors find evidence that relationship-oriented messages explain the moderating effect of communication.

This study is subject to limitations inherent in all experimental studies. The decisions in the study experiment are less complex than those found in practice. Moreover, there are significantly higher costs and potential benefits to shirk on effort in practice. The authors encourage future research on other organizational features that would influence the generalizability of their theory and results. Nonetheless, this study makes an important contribution to the literature on trust, reciprocity, gift-exchange contracts, managerial controls and communication.

This paper has several important implications for theory and practice. The authors show that the presence of penalty may not automatically result in increasing employees' effort level, contrary to traditional economic theory predictions. This effect is driven mainly by the crowding out effect of a penalty on employers' desire to signal trust. Therefore, the presence of an open communication channel may become an important tool to reverse the psychological effect of reduced trust when penalty is present. Therefore, the study's findings contribute to the trust–reciprocity literature on how management control system influences employers' and employees' behavior. These findings are especially germane given the trend in the workplace toward establishing open communication at different levels within the firm hierarchy. The study also contributes to the literature on trust–reciprocity as critical informal controls and social norms in accounting practices (Bicchieri, 2006; Stevens, 2019), shedding light on how firms may influence employees' reciprocity in management control practices and induce them to act in line with the firm's objectives by opening communication channels.

Prior accounting research document that penalty in employment contracts increases employee performance due to loss aversion. The study, however, demonstrates that the positive effect of penalty is not sustained in a gift-exchange contract. Specifically, the study's experimental results provide evidence that the availability of penalties can psychologically change the way employers perceive their decisions on offering generous wages (i.e. trust) and consequently reduce employees' reciprocation of high effort levels. Yet, the authors propose a two-way communication as a restorative mechanism for the lost trust. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.