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1 – 10 of over 11000This study aims to examine whether and how the experience of specialized external governance mechanisms mandated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 – the…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to examine whether and how the experience of specialized external governance mechanisms mandated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 – the actuary and auditor – affect pension plan funding.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses data from annual pension plan regulatory reports (Form 5500), Form 10-K filings, Form DEF 14A filings (company proxy statements) and publicly available data sources. The hand-collected data include information related to the pension plan’s actuary and auditor and various pension plan data disclosed in the company’s financial statement footnotes.
Findings
The author finds that more experienced actuaries and auditors are associated with better funded pension plans, especially when the company has higher financial risk or lower board independence. Additional analyses indicate that companies with more experienced actuaries and pension plan auditors are more likely to make higher annual pension plan contributions and hold fewer Level 3 fair value assets.
Originality/value
The dearth of pension plan governance research generally focuses on whether and how internal governance mechanisms affect pension plan funding. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first empirical study of the relationship between external pension plan governance mechanisms and pension plan funding.
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Yong H. Kim, Bochen Li, Miyoun Paek and Tong Yu
We study the potential effects of pension underfunding on corporate investment, financial constraints and improved employee bonding using 10 Pacific-Basin countries (including the…
Abstract
We study the potential effects of pension underfunding on corporate investment, financial constraints and improved employee bonding using 10 Pacific-Basin countries (including the United States, Australia, and eight Asian countries) at heterogeneous economic development stages and different regulatory environments. We document that corporate pensions are significantly underfunded in most countries of our sample in the period of 2001–2017, when interest rates were ultralow in most countries. In addition, firms from countries with stronger employee protection and more generous retirement benefits tend to show higher levels of underfunding in their defined benefit (DB) pension plans. To the extent of pension underfunding imposing constraints on corporate investment, we find that firms in these countries can face more constraints on investment when their pension is underfunded.
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The surging stock market in the late nineties lifted the funding level of most pension plans and led to plan management decisions that left them vulnerable to the stock market…
Abstract
The surging stock market in the late nineties lifted the funding level of most pension plans and led to plan management decisions that left them vulnerable to the stock market decline of 2000-2002. In this study, an analysis was conducted on the descriptive data of 51 state pension plans for the period 1998-2003 and it was found that overfunded plans were more likely to substantially increase benefits while simultaneously reduce contributions. This led to widespread underfunding and a need for sudden increase in contributions as market conditions grew worse and funding levels dropped sharply. This investment cycle emphasizes the need for more prudent surplus management strategies to protect pension plans from the consequences of stock market volatility.
Yin Yu-Thompson, Seong Yeon Cho and Liang Fu
The purpose of this study is to examine how pension risk shifting can be explained and constrained by debt component in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and to explore…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine how pension risk shifting can be explained and constrained by debt component in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and to explore whether a CEO’s relatively large holdings of inside debt to equity compensation would result in a well-funded pension status.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use two-stage least-squares model to control the potential unobserved and uncontrolled firm characteristics that could drive both CEO inside debt determinants and firm pension funding status.
Findings
This paper finds a positive relationship between the CEO inside debt ratio and firm funding status. Additional tests show a positive association between the CEO inside debt ratio and financial slack measures and a negative association between this ratio and financial constraint measure. Additional evidence also shows that the CEO inside debt ratio is negatively associated with other contemporaneous investment activities. Overall, the findings suggest that CEO inside debt creates managerial incentives that can affect pension funding decisions and decrease pension risk shifting.
Research limitations/implications
One of the difficulties facing the compensation literature is the unobservable nature of the entire compensation negotiation and design process. Pension funding status is another challenging topic given that management has discretion over the pension assumptions and the calculations themselves are complicated. Therefore, the determinants of pension status used in this paper are not all-inclusive. Although a two-stage least-squares methodology is applied to mitigate endogeneity, it is still possible that an omitted variable problem exists in both cases.
Originality/value
This study provides direct evidence of the executive debt-like compensation’s effect on pension risk-shifting behavior and pension funding decisions and also contributes to the literature that investigates the association between CEO inside debt and firm risk by examining the trade-off between pension funding and other contemporaneous investment activities.
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Jeffrey A. Manzi and Richard J. Curcio
Pension theory suggests and empirical tests indicate that optimal funding levels for defined benefit plans are determined on the basis of risk, taxes, and capital availability…
Abstract
Pension theory suggests and empirical tests indicate that optimal funding levels for defined benefit plans are determined on the basis of risk, taxes, and capital availability. This study examines whether federal pension and tax legislation enacted in 1986 and 1987 significantly altered the role of risk, taxes, and capital availability as determinants of corporate pension funding policy. Regression tests relating funding levels to these variables were conducted on a sample of pension plans, separately, for each of the reporting years, 1985 (before enactment of the legislation) and 1989 (after enactment of the legislation). Pension risk and tax exposure variables, significant in explaining funding levels in 1985, were not significant in 1989. Pension risk and tax factors under this new regime play a significantly diminished role, if any, in determining funding level policy for defined benefit plans. Evidence is provided that current pension funding is dependent upon the variability of common equity returns, and thus indicate that the pension funding decision is made in the same context as any other capital allocation decision.
Gang Chen, Kenneth Kriz and Carol Ebdon
Public pension plans in the U.S. are seriously underfunded, especially following the financial market crisis of 2008-2009 which resulted in large investment losses. However…
Abstract
Public pension plans in the U.S. are seriously underfunded, especially following the financial market crisis of 2008-2009 which resulted in large investment losses. However, funding levels vary widely across plans. Pension boards of trustees make key management decisions in pension systems and these decisions have significant effects on funded levels, yet our empirical knowledge of board management is limited. This study explores the effect of board composition on pension funding levels. Existing theoretical debates lead to differing expectations, and previous studies have mixed results. Our research uses a panel data set of large public pension plans from 2001-2009. We also collect data for pension board composition from this time period. We find that increasing political appointees and employee members on the board increases the funding performance of the pension system.
Julia Y. Davidyan and Tammy R. Waymire
The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) indicated by Governmental Accounting Standards…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) indicated by Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 34 presentation and pension underfunding in Illinois.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors used a fixed effects regression and employed a sample of Illinois municipalities (n=2,565 municipal-year observations) over the period 2009–2014.
Findings
The findings show that GAAP is inversely associated with pension underfunding, but only among the subsample of municipalities that are within the healthy pension funding range, i.e., above 80 percent funded. These municipalities may be in a better position to increase pension funding in response to the disciplining effect of broad GAAP conformity.
Research limitations/implications
The paper focuses solely on one state and one multi-employer plan. Future studies should consider assessing the applicability of the results to other states and plan settings.
Social implications
The results inform the standard-setting process, particularly as the implementation of the new GASB standards is evaluated and as GASB 34 is reexamined.
Originality/value
Despite concerns associated with state and local pension underfunding, academic studies examining its determinants are few. The sample setting is representative of municipal pension plans in the USA (with a comparable average pension funding ratio of 74.2 percent) and provides variability in GAAP conformity (the state encourages, but does not require, financial statement presentation consistent with GASB 34), as well as homogeneity in actuarial assumptions across observations (all sample municipalities participate in a large multi-employer municipal pension plan). The sample period immediately precedes the implementation of GASB Statements Nos 67 and 68, which increase the scope of pension reporting, providing the opportunity to consider the effects of broad GAAP conformity and a baseline for subsequent consideration of the effects of the new standards.
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Kathryn E. Easterday and Tim V. Eaton
We examine and compare funding status, actuarial assumptions and asset investment allocations of defined benefit pension plans in the public and private sectors across time, using…
Abstract
We examine and compare funding status, actuarial assumptions and asset investment allocations of defined benefit pension plans in the public and private sectors across time, using information as reported under GASB and FASB. We find that pension plans in both sectors are underfunded and that inferences about pension funding in the public sector would be different if pension assets' fair values were required in the computation of funding status. Actuarial assumptions of public employee plans appear to be both more optimistic and less variable than those of private sector plans. Finally, we document that public sector plans allocate invested assets somewhat differently than in the private sector, although our findings do not confirm anecdotal reports of riskier pension investment strategies relative to the private sector.
Kozo Omori and Tomoki Kitamura
This study theoretically investigates the impacts of tax benefits on funding level and risk-taking of a corporate defined benefit (DB) pension plan.
Abstract
Purpose
This study theoretically investigates the impacts of tax benefits on funding level and risk-taking of a corporate defined benefit (DB) pension plan.
Design/methodology/approach
The present value of the future tax benefits is maximized while the stockholders determine the funding level and investment risk-taking in DB plans. As a feature of DB plans, this study considers pension benefits to be pre-determined. Further, the pension beneficiary has a priority over the sponsor company's creditors for the pension reserve fund. These are seldom considered in previous studies.
Findings
It is desirable to decrease the funding level of DB plans to increase tax benefits. This is because the effect of tax exemption for the pension fund's investment income is eliminated by the change in the contribution arising from the investment's result. The optimal investment risk-taking depends on the funding level.
Originality/value
The impact of tax benefits on decision-making for DB plans is significantly different from that stated by previous studies, that is, an increase in pension funds will reduce the corporate debt. To explain corporate behavior, this study's results—derived from the essential feature of DB plans, which could not have been included in previous studies—should be considered.
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Gale E. Newell, Jerry G. Kreuze and David Hurtt
With the bankruptcy of Enron and the accompanying loss of pension benefits of its employees, pensions have recently received significant press. Accounting for pension plan…
Abstract
With the bankruptcy of Enron and the accompanying loss of pension benefits of its employees, pensions have recently received significant press. Accounting for pension plan obligations, for defined benefit plans in particular, requires companies to make assumptions regarding discount rates, projected salary increases, and expected long‐term return on plan assets. Such assumptions, in turn, determine the funding status of the pension plan and the annual pension expense. Higher assumed discount rates reduce the pension obligation, enhance the funding status of the plan, and reduce any lump‐sum payments. Higher expected return on assets reduces the current pension expense. This study investigates the relationship between pension plan assumptions and the funding status of a pension plan. The results reveal that companies with pension plans that are more fully funded assume higher discount rates and expected long‐term return on assets than do companies with less funded plans. The effect of these assumptions is that higher discount rate assumptions lead to better funding status, and higher expected long‐term rates of return on assets partially offset the pension expense impacts of these higher discount rate assumptions. We are doubtful that more funded plans collectively should be assuming higher discount rates and expected long‐term return on plan assets, especially since the actual return on plan assets investigated did not correlate with these assumptions.
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