Search results

In this work, the author explores the specific structural conditions that render multilateral arms control agreements problematic by situating their dynamic in a three-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The addition of even a third state to an arms race compounds many times over the structural difficulties that face two racing states. Nevertheless, even in multilateral arms races, conditions exist that make it rational for all participating states to pause. The most salient of these conditions is the existence of a coalition that is collectively rational for a subset of the racing states. It was suggested that if such a coalition exists naturally, or if one forms as a result of a exogenous shock to the system, then it is possible for it to offer incentives to all states not in the coalition to join it and, at the same time, increase the payoffs to the original members of the coalition. Thus, if such a coalition exists, then the possibility also exists that all the participating states could be induced to stop arming. Nonetheless, the major lesson that should be drawn from this chapter is the realisation that the conditions under which multilateral arms races might rationally be terminated are generally quite restrictive.

In this article, we survey experiments that are directly related to monetary policy and central banking. We argue that experiments can also be used as a tool for central bankers for bench testing policy measures or rules. We distinguish experiments that analyze the reasons for non-neutrality of monetary policy, experiments in which subjects play the role of central bankers, experiments that analyze the role of central bank communication and its implications, experiments on the optimal implementation of monetary policy, and experiments relevant for monetary policy responses to financial crises. Finally, we mention open issues and raise new avenues for future research.

The current paper aims to present a formal model illustrating how payoff imbalances among the members of a team of decision makers (DMs) who must undertake a project condition the final outcome obtained. This result builds on the fact that payoffs imbalances would lead to different performance levels among the employees and managers who compose a team. The analysis is applied to a strategic environment, where a project requiring coordination among the DMs within the team must be developed.

The intuition behind the strategic framework on which the results are based is twofold. The authors build on the literature on social comparisons and assume that employees and managers acquire information on the payoffs received by other members of the team while being affected by the resulting comparisons, and they follow the economic literature on firm boundaries determined via incomplete contracts. In this case, employees and managers may underperform if they feel aggrieved by the outcome of the contract giving place to deadweight losses when developing the project.

The authors illustrate how a team-based performance reward structure may lead to a coordinated equilibrium even when team managers and employees receive different payoffs and exhibit shading incentives based on the payoff differentials between them. The authors will also illustrate how identical shading intensities by both groups of DMs imply that shading by the managers imposes a lower cost on the profit structure of the firm because it leads to a lower decrease in the cooperation incentives of the other members of the team. Finally, the authors show how differences in shading intensity between both types of DMs trigger a strategic defect mechanism within the team that determines the outcome of the project.

The novel environment of team cooperation and defection through shading introduced in this paper is designed to deal with the strategic decisions taken by DMs when undertaking a project within a group. In particular, the intensity of shading applied by the DMs will be endogenously determined by the relative payoffs received, which allows to account for different scenarios, where relative payoff differentials among DMs determine the outcome of the project.

This paper aims to extend the Shapley value (SV) into a discussion of Zakat, a Pillar of Islam. Lloyd Shapley was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2012. This study shows that their relationship is significant for all nations, that of levelling up. An important but neglected paper by Datta (1939) showed insights provided by the Power Law, or as it is sometimes called, the Pareto distribution, into the role of Zakat in raising the income of all above the subsistence level. The Pareto distribution describes the prevailing tendency. The SV illustrates the interdependence perspective of Zakat with the Pareto distribution, wealth, income and poverty. Payoffs apply equally to both givers and receivers. For this study’s purposes, payoffs are considered as transferable utilities. They are formed by individuals who willingly cooperate in society rather than atomistic individuals who act independently. Zakat represents the recognition that society needs to be cooperative rather than individualistic; people cooperate in groups or societies to create value. SV implications and axioms are evaluated with an illustration.

This study extends Datta’s approach by introducing distribution weights into the SV. The authors set out the concept of weighted Shapley values that retain the elements of randomness and marginal contribution to a coalition contained in pure/true SVs and weights that follow a ley-Pareto distribution. This paper is a viewpoint work that relies primarily on the author’s qualitative interpretation.

The findings indicate that individual members of a coalition make multiple contributions that are often unrewarded. The contribution of one member of a coalition is dependent upon the contribution of others. The measure of contributions is payoffs, which have both monetary and non-monetary aspects; transferable payoffs or utilities are usually assumed. Furthermore, the significant agents in society or an organisation are stakeholders rather than the usual categories: managers, staff, shareholders, etc.

Contextualising these concepts within the Islamic values and principles that guide Zakat administration is crucial to ensure that the distribution of Zakat funds is fair, equitable and meets the needs of all eligible recipients. By applying these concepts appropriately, Zakat administrators can ensure that the Zakat system functions effectively and fulfils its religious obligation.

The novelty of this paper is that it blends the SV and the idea behind Zakat by introducing the idea of alternatives of Shapley weights. The link between the institution of Zakat and SV in terms of equality, poverty elimination and wealth distribution should be at the top of the research agenda.

This paper replicates four highly cited, classic lab experimental studies in the provision of public goods. The studies consider the impact of marginal per capita return and group size; framing (as donating to or taking from the public good); the role of confusion in the public goods game; and the effectiveness of peer punishment. Considerable attention has focused recently on the problem of publication bias, selective reporting, and the importance of research transparency in social sciences. Replication is at the core of any scientific process and replication studies offer an opportunity to reevaluate, confirm or falsify previous findings. This paper illustrates the value of replication in experimental economics. The experiments were conducted as class projects for a PhD course in experimental economics, and follow exact instructions from the original studies and current standard protocols for lab experiments in economics. Most results show the same pattern as the original studies, but in all cases with smaller treatment effects and lower statistical significance, sometimes falling below accepted levels of significance. In addition, we document a “Texas effect,” with subjects consistently exhibiting higher levels of contributions and lower free-riding than in the original studies. This research offers new evidence on the attenuation effect in replications, well documented in other disciplines and from which experimental economics is not immune. It also opens the discussion over the influence of unobserved heterogeneity in institutional environments and subject pools that can affect lab results.

Examines the dynamics of knowledge sharing using the multi‐person game‐theoretic framework. Proposes that an individual’s knowledge sharing tendency is driven by a set of contextualised concerns and interests not unlike the notion of payoff in game theory. Furthermore, the decision to share or withhold knowledge depends on that which yields a higher payoff. With this premise, submits two objectives. One is to investigate if an individual’s perceived payoff of sharing knowledge is contingent on the knowledge sharing behaviour of others. The other is to analyse the perceived payoff of knowledge sharing and determine if it can be characterised by an archetypical game in the game‐theoretic model. An empirical study was conducted among nearly 100 students in a local institute of higher education. The scope was confined to the students’ willingness to post asynchronous entries to an electronic discussion forum. Finds that the individual student’s perceived payoff of sharing knowledge was contingent on the knowledge sharing behaviour of others. Furthermore, the perceived payoff of knowledge sharing among them could be characterised by a multi‐person assurance game. In conclusion, discusses three implications for managers who aim to sustain asynchronous knowledge sharing in their organisations.

We introduce a multi-level model of the dependence of interfirm network topologies on the distribution and commonality of information in a network and the information strategies pursued by its member firms. Network topology, information properties of the network, and firm-level action within the network form dynamic, recursive, cross-level relationships – information properties in the network determine firm-level action, which in turn impacts the network topology and information properties. We derive predictions about the kinds of information strategies that firms are likely to adopt and succeed with in different information regimes, and about the kinds and short- and long-run dynamics of network topologies expected under different information regimes. Our model sheds new light on network topologies as a dependent variable that can be explained by network-level information regimes and firm-level information strategies.

Purpose and approach – We examine theoretically and experimentally how unequal abilities to contribute affect incentives and efficiency when players compete for membership in stratified groups based on the contributions they make. Players have either a low or a high endowment. Once assigned to a group based on their group contribution, players share equally in their group’s collective output. Depending on the parameters, the mechanism has several distinct equilibria that differ in efficiency.

Findings – Somewhat counter to conventional expectation our theoretical analysis indicates that as long as certain assumptions are satisfied, efficiency increases rather than decreases the more abilities to contribute differ. The analysis also suggests various follow-up experiments about equilibrium selection, tacit coordination, and the effect of unequal abilities in systems with endogenous grouping. We conduct an experiment that shows that subjects tacitly coordinate the mechanism’s asymmetric payoff-dominant equilibrium with precision; this precision is robust to a change in the structure and complexity of the game.

Implications – The results suggest that people respond to merit-based grouping in a natural way and that competitive contribution-based grouping encourages public contributions even when abilities to contribute differ, which is the case in all communities and societies.

This conceptual paper examines the need for viable theoretical models of international learning alliances in the light of cooperative games and complexity in two distinguished educational settings. Game theory is used to demonstrate the need for the top managerial executives to acquire a detailed understanding of decision makers' behaviours and trigger the deployment of complex analytical methods. The paper scrutinizes Russia's pursued aggressive approach using shock therapy, also suggest the critical need to reform policy.

Combining the critical analysis of (1) cooperative games and (2) adaptive systems structures, a dependable model is derived, which sets the baseline for determining the role of costs and gains. The analysis is supported using a real-world example of an alliance between British University (the X and Y alliance) and Russian University. It also emphasizes the importance of both internal and external pressure variables closely connected with the cooperative games, adaptive system and shock therapy.

Two features of alliances have been emphasized. The first is the importance of informal relationships in the evolution of partnerships and of cooperation. This is a well-known factor in the success of any relationship. Especially in international partnerships, empathy at the individual level is perhaps necessary to bypass the influence of historical and cultural differences that are barriers at the macro level, preconditions rather than consequences of successful policies and contractual arrangements at the level of organizations and governments. The second feature is interdependence at the cost–benefit level and in the domain of decisions. The cooperation of both partners is required to realize payoffs.

The implication of this paper is a guideline for regulators and policymakers designing worldwide alliances in higher education. In addition, this paper covers an interesting domain that could be of interest to organizations involved in forming strategic alliances, developing and re-engineering policies for strategic coalitions and setting future profitable payoff relationships within the contextual limitations of X and Y.

This paper creates new knowledge by concisely examining the meaning of strategic alliances in the context of the global education industry.