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Pay-what-you-want (PWYW) is a pricing strategy implemented in a variety of settings like supermarkets and museums, in which consumers determine the price they are willing to pay for a product or service based on their perceived utility. The authors propose an analytical model to investigate the impact of PWYW delivery pricing on the online food delivery (OFD) platforms.

Using a game-theoretic model, the authors characterize the equilibrium as a function of the platform's average delivery cost and the consumer's social preferences parameters like fairness and reciprocity. The authors derive the parametric conditions under which PWYW generates higher profits for the platform compared to the traditional pay-as-asked delivery pricing.

For the PWYW strategy to be profitable, the average delivery cost to the platform should be low. Therefore, OFD platform managers should focus on reducing delivery costs. The authors also identify the feasible region in which the platform managers need to maintain the consumer's social preferences.

Under PWYW, the authors recommend that the platform managers impose a minimum delivery fee which consumers can use as a benchmark to minimize zero delivery fee payments and consumers' free-riding tendencies simultaneously. This allows OFD platforms to extract online orders from highly price-conscious consumers.

This is one of the first studies to explore the innovative application of PWYW to a particular segment of delivery pricing in OFD platforms. The authors establish that the overall consumer surplus and social welfare are higher under the PWYW strategy, forming a solid ground for its implementation in OFD platforms.

Omnichannel sales have provided new impetus for the development of catering merchants. The authors thus focus on how catering merchants should manage capacities at the ordering, production and delivery stages to meet customers’ needs in different channels under third-party platform delivery and merchant self-delivery. This is of great significance for the development of the omnichannel catering industry.

This paper formulates the capacity decisions of omnichannel catering merchants under the third-party platform delivery and merchant self-delivery mode. The authors mainly use queuing theory to analyze the queuing behavior of online and offline customers, and the impact of waiting time on customer shopping behavior. In addition, the authors also characterize the merchant’s capacity by the rate in queuing model.

The authors find that capacities at ordering stage and food production stage are composed of base capacities and safety capacities, but the delivery capacities only have the latter. And in the self-delivery mode, merchants can develop higher safety capacities by charging delivery fees. The authors prove that regardless of the delivery mode, omnichannel sales can bring higher profits to merchants by integrating demand.

The authors focus on analyzing the capacity management of omnichannel catering merchants at the ordering, production and delivery stages. And the authors also add the delivery process into the omnichannel for analysis, so as to solve the problem of capacity decision-making under different delivery modes. The management of delivery capacity and its impact on other stages’ capacities are not covered in other literature studies, which is one of the main innovations of this paper.

Distribution network design involves a set of strategic decisions in supply chains because of their long-term impacts on the total logistics cost and environment. To incorporate a trade-off between financial and environmental aspects of these decisions, this paper aims to determine an optimal location, among candidate locations, of a new logistics center, its capacity, as well as optimal network flows for an existing distribution network, while concurrently minimizing the total logistics cost and gas emission. In addition, uncertainty in transportation and warehousing costs are considered.

The problem is formulated as a fuzzy multiobjective mathematical model. The effectiveness of this model is demonstrated using an industrial case study. The problem instance is a four-echelon distribution network with 22 products and a planning horizon of 20 periods. The model is solved by using the min–max and augmented ε-constraint methods with CPLEX as the solver. In addition to illustrating model’s applicability, the effect of choosing a new warehouse in the model is investigated through a scenario analysis.

For the applicability of the model, the results indicate that the augmented ε-constraint approach provides a set of Pareto solutions, which represents the ideal trade-off between the total logistics cost and gas emission. Through a case study problem instance, the augmented ε-constraint approach is recommended for similar network design problems. From a scenario analysis, when the operational cost of the new warehouse is within a specific fraction of the warehousing cost of third-party warehouses, the solution with the new warehouse outperforms that without the new warehouse with respective to financial and environmental objectives.

The proposed model is an effective decision support tool for management, who would like to assess the impact of network planning decisions on the performance of their supply chains with respect to both financial and environmental aspects under uncertainty.

Under the carbon tax policy, the authors examine the operational decisions of the low-carbon supply chain with the triple bottom line.

This paper uses the Stackelberg game theory to obtain the optimal wholesale prices, retail prices, sales quantities and carbon emissions in different cases, and investigates the effect of the carbon tax policy.

This study’s main results are as follows: (1) the optimal retail price of the centralized supply chain is the lowest, while that of the decentralized supply chain where the manufacturer undertakes the carbon emission reduction (CER) responsibility and the corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the highest under certain conditions. (2) The sales quantity when the retailer undertakes the CER responsibility and the CSR is the largest. (3) The supply chain obtains the highest profits when the retailer undertakes the CER responsibility and the CSR. (4) The environmental performance impact decreases with the carbon tax.

The results of this study can provide decision-making suggestions for low-carbon supply chains. Besides, this paper provides implications for the government to promote the low-carbon market.

Most of the existing studies only consider economic responsibility and social responsibility or only consider economic responsibility and environmental responsibility. This paper is the first study that examines the operational decisions of low-carbon supply chains with the triple bottom line under the carbon tax policy.

The study focuses on drug safety regulation capture, reveals the inner mechanism and evolutionary characteristics of drug safety regulation capture and provides suggestions for effective regulation by pharmacovigilance.

The article introduces prospect theory into the game strategy analysis of drug safety events, constructs a benefit perception matrix based on psychological perception and analyzes the risk selection strategies and constraints on stable outcomes for both drug companies and drug regulatory authorities. Moreover, simulation was used to analyze the choice of results of different parameters on the game strategy.

The results found that the system does not have a stable equilibrium strategy under the role of cognitive psychology. The risk transfer coefficient, penalty cost, risk loss, regulatory benefit, regulatory success probability and risk discount coefficient directly acted in the direction of system evolution toward the system stable strategy. There is a critical effect on the behavioral strategies of drug manufacturers and drug supervisors, which exceeds a certain intensity before the behavioral strategies in repeated games tend to stabilize.

In this article, the authors constructed the perceived benefit matrix through the prospect value function to analyze the behavioral evolution game strategies of drug companies and FDA in the regulatory process, and to evaluate the evolution law of each factor.

The advanced technology enables retailers to develop customer profile analysis (CPA) to implement personalized pricing. However, considering the efficiency of developing CPA, the benefit to different retailers of implementing more precise personalized pricing remains unclear. Thus, this essay aimed to investigate the impact of efficiency on participants’ strategies and profits in the supply chain.

A two-stage game model was introduced in the presence of a manufacturer who sets his wholesale price and a retailer that decides her CPA strategy. The equilibrium results were generated by backward induction.

Most retailers are willing to develop the highest CPA to implement perfect personalized pricing, but those inefficient retailers with high production costs would like to determine a middle CPA to implement bounded personalized pricing. The retailers’ profits may decrease with the efficiency of developing CPA when the efficiency is middle. In this case, as the efficiency improves, the manufacturer increases the wholesale price, resulting in lower demand and thus lower profits. Moreover, define a Pareto Improvement (PI) strategy as one that benefits both manufacturers and retailers. Therefore, uniform pricing is a PI when the unit cost is high and the efficiency is low; personalized pricing is a PI when the unit cost is low and the efficiency is low or high; otherwise, there is no PI.

This study is the first that investigates how the retailer develops CPA to implement personalized pricing on a comprehensive spectrum, which can provide practical insights for retailers with different efficiencies.

This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.

A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.

The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.

Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.