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Alternative enterprises – organizations that operate as a business while still also being driven by a social purpose – are sometimes owned by workers or other stakeholders, rather than shareholders. What role does ownership play in enabling alternative enterprises to prioritize substantively rational organizational values, like environmental sustainability and social equity, over instrumentally rational ones, like profit maximization? We situate this question at the intersection of research on: (1) stakeholder governance and mission drift in both hybrid and collectivist-democratic organizations; and (2) varieties of ownership of enterprise. Though these literatures suggest that ownership affects the ability of alternative enterprises to maintain their social missions, the precise nature of this relationship remains under-theorized. Using the case of a global, social, and environmental values-based banking network, we suggest that alternative ownership is likely a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to combat mission drift in enterprises that have a legal owner. A supermajority of this network’s banks deploy alternative ownership structures; those operating with these structures are disproportionately associated with social movements, which imprint their values onto the banks. We show how alternative ownership acts through specific mechanisms to sustain enterprises’ missions, and we also trace how many of these mechanisms are endogenous to alternative ownership models. Finally, we find that ownership models vary in how well they enable the expression and maintenance of these social values. A ladder of mission-sustaining ownership models exists, whereby the dominance of substantive, non-instrumental values over operations and investment becomes increasingly robust as one moves up the rungs from mission-driven investor ownership to special shareholder and member-ownership models.

The purpose of this paper is to compare three models of employee ownership and to identify pros and cons in relation to how the models can overcome the barriers. Which choices are important when defining the overall rules around the models and the specific possibilities for variations and combinations and what are the pros and cons for these choices?

The comparison is based on the three main models of employee ownership identified from the country descriptions in this special issue.

The models do not exclude each other. The models can all be promoted in a specific country, leaving the choice of specific model to the stakeholders involved in the establishment of the employee-owned company. The article also shows the possibility of combining different models and in this way to adjust to specific preferences and conditions – e.g. whether employees and other stakeholders want collective or individual ownership and whether it concerns a start-up or a succession company.

This paper identified the key differences and similarities of different models for employee ownership including pros and cons of worker cooperative vs the Employee Ownership Trust (EOT) and the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) models.

The field of broad-based employee ownership within corporations is a specific application of the foundational topic of property ownership. It is situated at the intersection of a broad range of scholarly disciplines including economics, law, finance and management. Each discipline contributes vocabulary and distinctions describing this field. That broad spectrum of disciplinary inquiry is a strength but it also lends a “ships passing in the night” quality to discussions of employee ownership. This paper attempts to unravel the narrative diversity surrounding this topic. Four meanings of ownership are introduced. Those meanings are in turn embedded within two abstract models of the corporation; the corporation as property and the corporation as social institution.

There is no experimental design The paper presents a conceptual overview and introduces a taxonomy of four meanings and two models of ownership.

Four meanings of ownership are introduced. The meanings are ownership as compensation, investment, retirement and membership. Those meanings are in turn embedded within two abstract models of the corporation; the corporation as property and the corporation as social institution.

No hypotheses are advanced. This is not a research paper. A conceptual overview that makes use of taxonomy of meanings and models is introduced to help clarify confusions abundant in the field of employee ownership. Readers may differ with the categories of meanings and models introduced in this conceptual overview.

The ambition of the paper is to describe the various meanings and models of employee ownership presently in use in both academic and applied settings. It is not necessary or desirable to assert the primacy of a single meaning or model in order to achieve progress. The analysis provided here surfaces a range of assumptions about ownership that have heretofore been implicit in both scholarship and in practice. Making those assumptions explicit should prove useful to both scholars and practitioners of employee ownership.

The concept of employee ownership enjoys a relatively broad appeal with the public. Among the academic disciplines that have trained their lights upon it, a more mixed reception prevails. Much of the academic and policy controversy derives from confusion about the nature and structure of employee ownership. This paper attempts to address that confusion by presenting a taxonomy of meanings and models that may prove useful for future research.

This study is one of the first efforts to comprehinsively map the various meanings and models of broad-based employee ownership.

The purpose of this paper is to examine bank performance using the different performance measures, namely, return on assets, return on equity and bank margins (MAR).

Unbalanced panel data were constructed to test the related hypotheses and provide evidence on the relationship between ownership types, banking models and performance indicators adopting the random effects techniques.

The findings of the paper substantiate that the banking models are significant performance indicators. However, the results are contingent on the GDP growth of the country. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the impact of ownership types is inconclusive in all measures of performance. However, the GDP is significant when it interacts with the types of ownership, particularly for foreign and government banks, although the evidence is mixed and unfavourable for government banks.

The results of the study provide insights for bankers and policymakers to enhancement Yemen’s banking sector.

This study is considered as the first attempt in examining the role of banking model and ownership type and their link to banking model.

The purpose of this paper is three‐fold. First, to explore the relationship between the financial and sporting performance of clubs competing in the English Premier League (EPL). Second, to investigate the effect of different models of EPL club ownership on financial and league performance. Third, to review the finances of EPL clubs in the context of UEFA's Financial Fair Play regulations.

Financial data from annual reports for the period 2001‐2010 was collected for 20 EPL clubs. Correlation analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between the finances of EPL clubs and their league position. One‐way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests were then used to examine the effect of ownership type on clubs’ financial and league performances. Where the results of ANOVA testing revealed statistically significant differences between groups, these were investigated further using appropriate post hoc procedures.

The stock market model of ownership returned better financial health relative to privately owned (domestic and foreign) clubs. However, clubs owned privately by foreign investors or on the stock market performed better in the league in comparison with domestically owned clubs. The stock market model was more likely to comply with Financial Fair Play regulations.

The paper confirms empirically that football clubs that float on the stock market are in better financial health and that clubs in pursuit of short‐term sporting excellence are reliant on substantial investment, in this case from foreign investors.

The purpose of this paper is to give an updated overview over the development of employee-ownership in Italy, France, Spain including Mondragon, the UK and the US with relatively many employee-owned firms. How have the barriers for employee-ownership been overcome in these countries?

The overview is based on updated descriptions of the development of employee-ownership included in this special issue. The analysis follows the structure of overcoming five barriers: the organization problem; the problem of entry and exit of employee-owners; the startup and takeover problem; the capital- and the risk problem.

Italy, France and Spain have overcome the barriers by specific legislation for worker cooperatives, this includes rules for entry and exit of employee members. Cooperative support organizations play an important role for monitoring and managing the startup problem and for access to capital. The Mondragon model includes individual ownership elements and a group structure of cooperatives. The EOT and ESOP models are well suited for employee takeovers, financing are eased by tax advantages and they are all-employee schemes. While the EOT has no individual risks, the ESOP model has the possibility for capital gains for employees but also the risk of losing these gains.

Comprehensive and updated overview of the development in employee-ownership in the five countries to identify successful formats of employee-ownership for implementation in countries with few employee-owned firms.

Owners of the US-based sport teams are seeing consistent gains on their financial investments, no matter the success of their teams on the playing field or their impact on the surrounding community. Sports teams are a part of an ecosystem comprised of primary and secondary stakeholders. The authors explore this phenomenon using a stakeholder perspective to understand how different business models and ownership structures optimize stakeholder value.

The authors employ an evaluative conceptual approach to examine the dominant model in the US, European ownership structures and public-private partnerships (PPPs). T finalize these comparisons by exploring a fourth business model and ownership structure – a relatively unique option in the US deployed by the Green Bay Packers – which we refer to as the maximized value partnership (MVP). These comparisons are followed by practical advice for owners in regard to these governance mechanisms.

The MVP ownership model has the potential to level the playing field between public and private actors. This potential is realized by fusing some of the best practices from European football clubs, in particular aspects of the stock market and supporter trust models.

By evaluating the most common ownership structures for sports teams, t provide an alternative model as well as practical advice for owners.

The article aims to investigate the effects of ownership and capital structure on postacquisition operating performance.

The article extends the ongoing literature from an operating loss perspective and provides empirical evidence on the probability of acquirers’ operating loss in relation to ownership and capital structure. The operating performance of publicly listed manufacturing firms in China was tracked up to five years since the completion of the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) during 2003–2014.

The empirical results show that, in a five-year postacquisition period, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more likely to experience operating loss than non-SOEs. The likelihood of the operating loss is negatively associated with ownership concentration, implying that concentrated ownership may serve as an effective corporate governance mechanism in the emerging economy and improve postacquisition performance. The rise in leverage increases the likelihood of postacquisition operating loss, indicating that the costs of debt may outweigh the benefits.

The findings contribute to the literature on ownership, debt governance and post-M&A performance from an emerging economy perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that the nationality of ownership affects investment through its interaction with return expectations and cash flow and to answer the question whether this is due to asymmetric information or managerial discretion problems.

Asymmetric information and managerial discretion hypothesis are being tested in a fully extended model, which provides for a variety of effects from the explanatory variables. The paper also uses firm and industry variables to account for the investment opportunities or marginal q instead of using the average Q. Using industrial variables instead of stock market data enables the possibility to extend the sample to cover a more representative sample of firms and especially a group of firms where financial constraints are expected to be more profound. Another aspect of the paper is that the ownership variable varies with the nationality of the shareholders of the firm and not with the shareholdings of the managers. This means that the paper restricts its search in two sub‐samples, those of domestic firms and of foreign (multinational) ones.

In total, 2,700 domestic and foreign (multinational) manufacturing firms located in Greece in the 1992‐1997 period were examined, providing consistent evidence supporting the asymmetric information hypothesis against the managerial discretion hypothesis. These results also support the significance of ownership effects, at least with respect to the national origin of the firm's shareholders.

This paper provides evidence that the nationality of ownership affects the investment behavior and is related with the specific information problems of the firms.