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Milkerie¹ worker cooperative was created after a yearlong labor fight against a factory closure announcement. By creating the coop, Milkerie’s workers set out to prove that if workers were given more decision-making power in the economy, it would be possible to create a more inclusive economy that values worker labor and provides them wage-based livelihoods. This chapter describes the historical conditions that the cooperative emerge, shaped its business model and governance structure. If cooperatives are believed to propose an alternative to capitalist enterprises, the case of Milkerie shows how the market pressure turns activism, that is, various types of unpaid voluntary labor, into simple jobs, that is, activities codified by task description and time frame, limiting the possibility to re-imagine the economy collectively.

When radical new approaches to entrepreneurship are sought, they almost invariably return to the origin point of conventional firms. This chapter, however, will show that radical entrepreneurship, far from being the purview of capitalist enterprises, can be found in abundance in the cooperative sector. Cooperatives, which are democratic economic enterprises owned by members on a one person, one-vote basis, are a hotbed of new economic thinking. The ways in which cooperatives use advances in technology to create more democratic, decentralized, and egalitarian economic relationships stands in stark contrast to the monopolizing and centralizing tendencies of conventional firms. This chapter will show that cooperatives are both a worthy adversary, and potential ally of, conventional capitalist businesses in moving the field of entrepreneurship into areas that will be of greatest benefit to humanity.

Italian worker cooperatives display a high proportion of profits reinvested into asset locks: there is some literature investigating their function, but little has been said about workers' attitude toward them. In this chapter we therefore investigate what workers' motivations are regarding reinvesting profits into asset locks. We propose to interpret them as a common good and we inquire which factors may increase workers' willingness to contribute to it. We test two arguments that are provided in the literature on collective action: the effect of having a long-time perspective within the cooperative and the effect of displaying “collective” motivations and preferences other than self-regarding. We perform this test by means of a survey among workers of cooperatives affiliated to Legacoop Ravenna in Italy.

We identify a positive effect of both factors, although with some distinction. At a first glance, we find a positive correlation between a longer time horizon and a greater concern for profit reinvestment; when looking closer at the data, we nevertheless see a more complex relationship as two other aspects come into the game: the employment insurance role of worker cooperatives and the “feeling of belonging” that links workers to the firm. The positive effect of this second aspect on the willingness to reinvest into locked assets is strong, although it only appears among worker-members. Moreover, its effect seem to become greater as workers' involvement in decision making increases.

This study compares dispute resolution strategies of workers in hierarchical, conventional businesses with those of members of worker cooperatives – organizations in which all workers co-own and co-manage the business. Drawing on data from three industries (coal mining, taxicab driving, and food distribution), this study finds some support for predictions in the literature that assert that the cooperative's flattened structure and egalitarian ideology will affect workers’ grievance resolution. Although the data do not indicate a single pattern in dispute resolution strategies (i.e., with all members of the cooperatives resolving their disputes one way and all non-cooperative employees using a different strategy), the data do demonstrate that, when comparing matched cooperative and conventional businesses within each industry, the worker cooperative members possess more dispute resolution strategies than their conventionally employed counterparts.

Developing an alternative and more realistic modeling of the firm, the key point of this paper is that workers cooperatives represent a form of corporate governance, which is a subset of the participatory organizational form, that constitutes a competitive alternative to the typical relatively hierarchical and narrowly controlled firms. An important component of the cooperative advantage lies in its capacity to increase the quantity and quality of effort inputs into the ‘production process.’ However, to do so incurs economic costs. Thus, cooperatives can yield competitive outcomes without driving out of the market non-cooperative organizational forms. To some extent, whether cooperative or other participatory solutions are adopted depends upon the preferences of economic agents since cooperatives are shown to be competitive even in an extremely competitive environment. However, dominant or not, the cooperative solution can yield higher social–economic welfare levels to members.

This chapter examines the labor-empowerment potential of emerging taxi driver cooperative-union partnerships. Cooperative-union partnerships can adopt differing stances toward the virtue of waging broad-based, class-conscious conflict against economic elites to win economic change, as opposed to the virtue of small-scale and practical steps to improve the immediate conditions of individual “job-conscious” workers. This case study utilizes a “class consciousness” versus “job consciousness” framework to examine a recent immigrant taxi driver union-cooperative partnership.

Case study of taxi driver organizing in Denver (CO), utilizing narrative inquiry, and survey and interviews with 69 drivers.

The US tradition of accommodational job consciousness continues to influence union and cooperative leaders. Among Denver’s taxi cooperatives, an emphasis on accommodational job consciousness, bereft of class perspectives, has undermined a narrative promoting worker solidarity or encouraging workers to engage in social justice campaigns for immigrant workers. The consequence has been to weaken the transformational potential of taxi driver activism.

Findings based on a single case study need to be confirmed through additional research.

Cooperative-union partnerships that adopt a class-conscious political approach, including leadership development opportunities, a “labor empowerment curriculum, and partnerships with broader social movements, are a promising alternative to narrowly tailored “job conscious” organizing strategies.

Immigrants are increasingly forming worker cooperatives, and the recent Denver taxi driver union-cooperative is one of the largest taxi cooperatives in the country. Current research on the labor empowerment consequences of these emerging immigrant cooperatives is sparse.

The purpose of this paper is to give an updated overview over the development of employee-ownership in Italy, France, Spain including Mondragon, the UK and the US with relatively many employee-owned firms. How have the barriers for employee-ownership been overcome in these countries?

The overview is based on updated descriptions of the development of employee-ownership included in this special issue. The analysis follows the structure of overcoming five barriers: the organization problem; the problem of entry and exit of employee-owners; the startup and takeover problem; the capital- and the risk problem.

Italy, France and Spain have overcome the barriers by specific legislation for worker cooperatives, this includes rules for entry and exit of employee members. Cooperative support organizations play an important role for monitoring and managing the startup problem and for access to capital. The Mondragon model includes individual ownership elements and a group structure of cooperatives. The EOT and ESOP models are well suited for employee takeovers, financing are eased by tax advantages and they are all-employee schemes. While the EOT has no individual risks, the ESOP model has the possibility for capital gains for employees but also the risk of losing these gains.

Comprehensive and updated overview of the development in employee-ownership in the five countries to identify successful formats of employee-ownership for implementation in countries with few employee-owned firms.

The aim of this paper is to describe the main characteristics of het two most recognised models in Spain: worker cooperatives and worker-owned companies (Sociedades Laborales).

To this end, a review will be carried out of the main factors from the regulatory and financial framework and the support structures of these organisations model.

The main findings are the constant decrease in the number of SSLL over the past ten years and a certain decrease in the number of worker cooperatives. Some of the reasons put forward for this decline are the lack of effective favourable tax treatment; the establishment of more favourable measures for capitalist companies; the change of the single payment of unemployment benefits; the lack of knowledge and training professionals and politicians.

The main contribution of this paper is to provide a recent analysis of the regulatory changes and developments in the field of worker cooperatives and worker-owned companies in Spain.

Worker cooperative practitioners and developers often claim that democratic worker ownership advances egalitarianism within and beyond the workplace, but most of the empirical evidence in the USA is based on ethnographic case studies or small-scale surveys. This study aims to leverage the first national survey about individuals' experiences in these unique firms to test for the presence of inequalities by gender, race and immigration status in the broader sector.

The study uses a 2017 survey comprising a sample of 1,147 workers from 82 firms. This study focuses on measures of workplace benefits that capture material and psychological ownership, wealth accumulation, wages, workplace autonomy and participation in governance. This study uses ordinary least squares regression models with fixed effects alongside pooled models to determine the effects of gender, race, immigration status and the intersection of gender and race on these outcomes, both within and between firms.

This study finds no evidence of wage gaps by gender, race or immigration status within worker cooperatives, with job type, tenure and worker ownership status instead explaining within-firm variation in pay. Still, this study documents sector-wide disparities in material and non-material outcomes by gender, race and immigration status, reflecting differences in individual-level human capital and job characteristics as well as widespread occupational segregation and homophily.

The paper offers a novel contribution to the literature on workplace empowerment and inequality in participatory firms by analyzing race, gender and immigration status in the most robust dataset that has been collected on worker cooperatives in the USA.