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The relationship between religious belief and spousal choice in Nepal is examined, looking at how the importance that individuals place on their own religious faith influences their decision either to allow their parents and other relatives to arrange a marriage for them or to initiate their own love marriage. How the importance attached to religious faith within the individual’s family and neighborhood affects this decision, and how education modifies the relationship between religion and spousal choice are also looked at.

Ordinary least squares regression models are used to examine the relationship between spousal choice and key independent variables. Interaction terms are used to examine how education may moderate the relationship between personal, family, and neighborhood religious salience and spousal choice.

It is found that the effect of one’s neighbors’ faith operates differently based on one’s own level of education. The “moral communities” thesis is used to theorize that in neighborhoods where religion is regarded as very important, individuals need to expend more effort to maintain respectability, adhering to tradition by having arranged marriages. In neighborhoods where religion is less important, the weaker demands made by the “moral community” render individuals more free to choose their own spouses. For highly educated individuals, the effect of their neighbors’ religious belief is considerably reduced.

As Nepalis become more educated, they not only move out of the sphere of family influence, as discussed in previous research, but also away from being influenced by their neighbors.

Public health programs facilitate access to resources that not only provide individuals’ options but also often foreclose individual preference through prescriptive requirements. This chapter takes two disparate cases from public health – vaccines and family planning –that reveal patterns of inequality in who has access to individual choice and who requires state support to exercise choice. Looking specifically at dynamics of funding and compulsion, this chapter elucidates how reliance on the rhetoric of individual choice as an expression of freedom rewards those with the greatest access to resources and fails to make sure that all members of the community have the resources to shape their own outcomes or to make sure collective health is protected.

In the work of von Mises and Rothbard one can find a case for a strong presumption against traditional coercive paternalist policies. Coercion is generally undesirable, and legislators and bureaucrats cannot know what is best for each agent. Not all of the traditional case against paternalism applies to the new libertarian paternalism espoused by behavioral economists and popularized in Sunstein’s and Thaler’s Nudge. There is no way to rule out the possibility that legislators sometimes know better than agents what generally benefits them, and that they can impose feasible regulations that do not limit important freedom and whose costs and risks do not outweigh their benefits. Paternalism is not a bugbear to be avoided at all costs. There’s good reason for skepticism about its virtue and feasibility but no justification for its blanket condemnation.

I begin my historical analysis of the co-evolution of reproductive norms and desires, approaches to fertility control, and the meaning assigned to contraceptives with an examination of the Grafenberg Ring, the first modern IUD. The Grafenberg ring, developed in the late 1920s by a German doctor, Ernst Gräfenberg, was a small ring made of silkworm gut and coiled silver that can be compressed to be inserted into the uterus. The Grafenberg ring appeared at a time when changes in social attitude towards sexuality had formed a favorable climate for a new contraceptive method. The device was greeted with much interest from the European birth control movement, and Gräfenberg was invited to speak at the Third Congress of the World League for Sexual Reform held in London in 1929 and at the Seventh International Birth Control Conference in Zurich in 1930 (Davis, 1971).

The current literature on the educational progress of immigrant students within the host system is encapsulated in the thesis that these students will face difficulties, and that these difficulties will more often than not lead to a failure to meet the demands of the system for the majority of the immigrant students. An apposite comment by Portes (1996), queried whether the children of immigrants would be able to work their way upwards into “…the middle-class mainstream” or whether they would be blocked in this ascent based on their migrant status, and become part of an “multiethnic underclass or join an expanded multiethnic underclass.” Súarez-Orozco and Súarez-Orozco (1995, 2000) completed this perception by uncovering the implicit viewpoint within which this query was nested. He foregrounded the domination of sensationalism and myth in discussions of the “natural process” of assimilation of minorities. Finally, current discussion on the issue of these so-called at-risk students centres on how they can be made successful at school.

Gay men in the New York City metropolitan area were interviewed from 1990 to 1991, during the period of the AIDS epidemic. Using an interview schedule, they were asked questions about “coming out of the closet” and other identity issues: their experiences of “difference,” beliefs about monogamous or “open” relationships, and their views about sex and commitment. The study's focus was on the men's “moral discourse” or their relationship to the “good,” including ideas of the self, other(s), friendship, love, sex, and commitment. The study yielded a consistency in the men's responses: they did not wish to impose on other gay men their own convictions about being gay, sex, and intimate relationships. Their talk was tentative, localized, highly personal, and “nonjudgmental” on a range of identity and moral issues. These findings are discussed by relating the men's life experiences to the gay culture they shared: their unwillingness to judge others reflects their own formative experiences of “coming out” in a society that judged gay men harshly and who, in later years, lived at the time of the AIDS crisis.

One explanation for why people wear masks to prevent the spread of COVID-19 focuses on political party affiliation. This study explores the role of values in attempts by five South Dakota cities to pass local mask mandates.

A nonrandom convenience sample used search engines to find documents on mask mandates in South Dakota. The working hypotheses are: (1) the debate over mask mandates is a form of value conflict over freedom of choice and the role of government that reflect those held by Emerson, Thoreau, and Spencer and (2) the mandates themselves prescribe Value-Rational rather than Instrumental-Rational action to control the pandemic.

Antimaskers valued freedom of choice, and were willing to defy authority while promasker health professionals valued science and were willing to sacrifice themselves for the health of their patients. South Dakota cities encouraged mask wearing but did not include penalties for noncompliance. The vociferous opposition to the mask mandates resembles the opposition cities encountered when deciding to fluoridate drinking water in the 1950s and 1960s.

A case study cannot be generalized and may reflect sampling and researcher bias. Future research could include a content analysis of documents and videos presenting both sides of the debate.

This case study may provide the first in-depth analysis of values in the masking debate.