Search results

The purpose of this paper is to: first, test if information-adjusted noise model (IANM) can be applied in China; second, quantify noise trader risk, overreaction, underreaction and information pricing errors in that market; and third, explain the relationship between noise trader risk and return.

The authors use a behavioural asset pricing model (BAPM), CAPM, the information-adjusted noise model and model proposed by Ramiah and Davidson (2010).

The findings show that noise traders are active 99.7 per cent of the time on the Shenzhen A-share market. Furthermore, our results suggest that the Shenzhen market overreacts 41 per cent of the time, underreacts 18 per cent of the time and information pricing errors occur 40 per cent of the time.

Various methods have been applied to the Chinese stock market in an effort to measure noise trading activities and all of them failed to account for information arrival. Our study uses a superior and alternative model to detect noise trader risk, overreaction and underreaction in China.

The purpose of this paper is to study the US stock market and try to explain why short-term contrarian profits have largely disappeared in the past two decades.

In this work, the authors decompose the short-term contrarian profits into cross-sectional variations, firm-level overreactions and lead-lag effects to study the changes in their shares. Then, the authors study the behavior of the subgroups in the winner and loser subportfolios of contrarian investment strategies.

The authors find that short-term contrarian profits have largely vanished since 2000. Changes in the shares of the three components of contrarian profits, which are cross-sectional variations, firm-level overreactions and lead-lag effects, are not the main reason for the disappearance of contrarian profits in the past two decades. Instead, the disappearance of short-term contrarian profits is primarily due to the heterogeneous evolution of subgroups in the portfolio, which leads to a decrease in the overall level of overreactions that drive the contrarian profit.

The work explains the disappearance of short-term contrarian profits in the US stock market.

The purpose of the study is to check whether Indian high net worth individual (HNI) investors are suffering from overconfidence bias in personal life and in-stock investment approach. The study is to benchmark an ideal behaviour that an investor should exhibit under the overconfidence bias.

Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to study the Indian HNI investors with overconfidence bias. As a first step, an exploratory study was conducted to identify the variables to define overconfidence bias. An extensive literature review along with in-depth interviews was conducted amongst investors, fund managers and the subject experts to check the content validity of the variables. The survey instrument was designed based on the objective of the study and theoretical framework. Both descriptive and inferential statistical tools such as the Z proportion test, logistic regression and structural equation model were applied to test the hypotheses.

It was found that there is a moderate impact of overconfidence bias amongst the investors both in normal life and whilst making investments in stock. This study found the influence of overconfidence bias in stock investment with respect to forecasting of the stock price movements, overtrading, overanalysis and overreaction.

This paper will help in understanding the Indian HNI investors’ behaviour under the impact of overconfidence bias. There is an empirical study to understand the implication of overconfidence bias on stock investors specifically for the HNI investors.

This study gives an insight into the fund managers to understand the Indian HNI investment behaviour. It is also helpful for HNI investors to understand and correct their behavioural biases related to overconfidence.

This paper will guide investors to understand the symptoms and repercussions of overconfidence bias in stock investment. They can also realize the subtle impact of overconfidence bias in personal and professional life, thus preventing them from making losses.

This work is the extension of the works of Terrace Odean on behavioural finance in the Indian Stock Investors' context. The concept of overconfidence bias and its implications of finance were developed by Kahneman and Tversky, and later by other behavioural finance researchers such as Malmendier, Hirshleifer, DeBondt, Odean, Barber, Shefrin and others. This paper studies stock investing behaviour with specific reference to Indian HNI investors.

Are the capital markets of leading industrialized nations rational and efficient? This powerful hypothesis was badly dented by the work of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) on stock market overreaction and by subsequent research on momentum and reversals in prices and earnings.

Human psychology, at times predictably irrational, drives the markets. This paper investigates this issue.

The author reviews the origins of the idea of overreaction, how behavioral insights modify standard asset pricing theory and how they contribute to our understanding of the world of finance.

The paper reveals the origins of the idea of overreaction, how behavioral insights modify standard asset pricing theory and how they contribute to our understanding of the world of finance.

Several Asia-Pacific financial markets impose price limits to reduce excessive fluctuations. We examine stock price behavior following daily limit moves on the Shanghai Stock Exchange for 200 firms in the period 1997–2004. We find weak evidence for the occurrence of overreaction on the Shanghai stock market on the basis of price limits. We conclude that investors do not exhibit overreaction to the event of limit activation except in the case of 1-day up limit moves. We also conclude that the Shanghai Stock Exchange can be regarded as a (semistrong) efficient market.

This chapter aims to expand the overreaction literature by examining whether the price reversals occur in the short-term period (i.e., 3 days) and long-term period (i.e., up to 20 days), following large 1-day price changes in Asia-Pacific markets over the period 2001–2005. Our results based on firm data in three Asia-Pacific markets, namely, Australia, Japan, and Vietnam, and static and dynamic measures of large price changes indicate the followings. First, stock prices tend to reverse over the short-term period after large price changes. Second, in the case of large price declines defined by arbitrary trigger values, investors may earn profit from exploiting the phenomena of price reversals; however, the profit is not large enough to exploit since it is less than the profit from passive funds. This result is supportive of the weak form of efficient market hypothesis. Third, we find mixed evidence of long run price reversal across markets. Forth, market conditions (i.e., bear or bull) may not explain the magnitude of price reversals. Finally, the dynamic measures of large price changes based on individual firms provide more consistent evidence across markets, which is supportive of short-term price reversals and overreaction hypothesis. This evidence exists in the emerging market of Vietnam as well as developed Australian and Japanese markets.

In this chapter, we argue that under- and over-reaction are both parts of the price dynamics caused by investor's naïve judgmental extrapolation. We propose to use the Holt–Winters model, a parsimonious model with two parameters, to represent investor's conservatism (anchoring) and representativeness (trending). The complexity of earning information, which is broken down into a drift, a transitory shock, and an autocorrelated permanent shock, add further volatility to the price. We explain the price dynamics caused by the interplay of the earning model and investor's naïve belief. It is further argued that empirical “underreaction” and “overreaction” differ from true under- and overreaction. The simulated results with the proposed model confirm with empirical findings on under- and overreaction.

We investigate institutional investors’ trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities for the period 1992–2001. We label investment companies and independent investment advisors as active institutions and banks, nonbank trusts, and insurance companies as passive institutions. We analyze the trading behavior of active and passive institutions surrounding merger announcements and their eventual resolution. Our results indicate that active institutions significantly increase their holdings of acquiring firm stocks for mergers with higher announcement period abnormal return and this increase is more pronounced for stock mergers than cash mergers. Active institutions display preference for stock proposals at the merger announcement on the basis of their prior beliefs and this is explained by the “overreaction phenomenon.” However, they update their beliefs between announcement and final resolution as more information arrives into the market. Finally, active institutions appear to correct their overreaction behavior by displaying their greater preference for cash proposals as compared to stock proposals at the quarter of eventual outcome. The trading behavior of passive institutions suggests that these institutions disregard the market response of merger announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks at the announcement quarter. The passive institutions gradually update their beliefs and utilize the information released at the announcement in rebalancing their portfolios at the final resolution.

What explains patterns in stock prices is an important question. One such pattern, price momentum, is a well-known capital markets anomaly where recent stock price performance appears to continue into the future. This momentum is frequently thought to reflect delayed reaction by investors to unspecified information (i.e. underreaction). This study aims to provide a useful insight regarding momentum: potential mispricing related to accounting fundamentals appears to conceal longer-term reversals in price momentum. Controlling for these fundamentals reveals that price momentum reverses, indicating that investor overreaction is a potentially important source of stock price momentum. The evidence presented in this study emphasizes the importance of decoupling momentum and accounting fundamentals to achieve a more complete understanding of what explains stock price momentum.

This study explores this question by examining the longer-term performance of momentum stocks in the US market after decoupling it from performance related to accounting fundamentals using returns to fundamentals-based factors as controls in time series regressions.

This study finds evidence of clear reversals in the remaining price momentum. These reversals provide a new insight into the momentum effect because they imply that the component of price momentum not traceable to accounting fundamentals reflects investor overreaction rather than underreaction.

The findings indicate that the underlying nature of the information driving price movements is important to achieving a complete understanding of what explains price momentum. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no other study has examined the behavior of stock price momentum while controlling for accounting fundamentals.

The purpose of this paper is to examine semi-strong market efficiency by observing the behavioral finance implications of Jim Cramer’s recommendations in bull vs bear markets. The authors extend the literature by analyzing investor reaction through the lenses of prospect theory, overreaction, and herding.

The authors test for abnormal returns in response to Mad Money buy and sell recommendations. The authors use a sample of buy and sell recommendations from MadMoneyRecap.com from July 28, 2005 through February 9, 2009. The 3.5-year time period is the most recent and comprehensive set of Mad Money recommendations that has been tested to date.

The results indicate market inefficiency at the semi-strong level. Furthermore, the findings highlight the loss aversion tendencies of investors in regards to prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as well as the disposition effect of Shefrin and Statman (1985). Evidence also exists consistent with the herding and overreaction hypotheses.

The evidence suggests contrarian behavior in which investors respond positively to good news in bad times – perhaps, in effort to stay the course and at least break even. This behavior may suggest that losers tend to hold on to losses in hopes of recouping them. Thus, positive information in bad times could further persuade market participants to hang on to or buy more of losers, while also persuading non-shareholders to buy in as well.

Though other studies including Kenny and Johnson (2010) have estimated abnormal returns in response to analyst recommendations, to the knowledge, none has examined behavioral implications of investor reaction to buy and sell recommendations in both bull and bear markets. Furthermore, the study captures a longer bull and bear market and covers two definitions of such markets.