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Press reports have indicated that firms frequently underprice restricted stock and employee stock options. I test for underpricing of stock and options.

I examined a sample of 5,333 private firm stock and option issuances between 1985 and 2017. I tested for underpricing using two approaches: assuming investors have no special market-timing ability and assuming instead they have perfect market-timing ability.

I find evidence of widespread stock and option underpricing by private firms before they go public reflecting large discounts that exceed reasonable compensation for lack of marketability. Unreported underpricing is more frequent in the last pre-IPO private equity transactions that offer the last opportunity to give such discounts before the stock is publicly traded, but the discounts are greater in the earlier pre-IPO transactions where unreported discounts are presumably tougher for the SEC to detect. Underpricing is still detected even when the actual DLOMs are tested against a benchmark that assumes investors have perfect market-timing ability.

Firms frequently underprice restricted stock and employee stock options. Firms tend to underprice stock options more frequently than restricted stock, but restricted stock tends to be priced at deeper discounts when recipients are assumed not to have any special market-timing ability.

Private firms issue restricted stock and options as incentive compensation. Lowballing the valuation transfers wealth from outside stockholders to employees/insiders. Wealth transfers take place through the issuance of equity claims to employees/insiders before firms go public. I found that more than a quarter of the DLOMs exceed the theoretical maximum by, on average, between 16% (median) and 20% (mean). This finding raises two questions worthy of investigation. First, to what extent do the frequency and magnitude of DLOMs above the theoretical maximum depend on whether a board of directors obtains an independent appraisal of a stock’s fair market value? Second, if DLOMs above the theoretical maximum are observed even when the stock is independently appraised, how do appraisers justify such large DLOMs?

The wealth transfers that take place through the issuance of equity claims to employees/insiders before firms go public benefit employees/insiders at the expense of outside shareholders.

My paper is the first to furnish evidence of widespread stock and option underpricing by private firms before they go public; demonstrate that the unreported underpricing is more frequent in the last pre-IPO private equity transactions that offer the last opportunity to give such discounts before the stock is publicly traded and show that the discounts are greater in the earlier pre-IPO transactions where unreported discounts are presumably tougher for the SEC to detect.

This article discusses static hedges for installment options, which are finding broad application in cases where the option‐buyer may reduce up‐front premium costs via early termination of an option. An installment option is a European option in which the premium, instead of being paid up front, is paid in a series of installments. If all installments are paid, the holder receives the exercise value, but the holder has the right terminate payments on any payment date, in which case the option lapses with no further payments on either side. The authors summarize pricing and risk management concepts for these options, in particular, using static hedges to obtain both no‐arbitrage pricing bounds and very effective hedging strategies with almost no vega risk.

The paper's aim is to investigate the stock option disclosures of directors and the five most highly remunerated officers in the directors' report of Australian companies for the years 2000 and 2002 and the choice to position these disclosures in the notes to the financial statements as opposed to the directors' report.

The study examines the compliance with mandatory disclosures for stock options for companies in the top 400 and also ascertains if there is consistent compliance across all required categories, including sensitive disclosures.

Although compliance is high for most of the required stock option disclosures, 43 of the 153 firms in the sample did not disclose the amount (value) of the options issued. Another 27 of the companies disclosed a “Nil” value for the value of options issued. Most of the companies disclosed the information in the directors' report, with larger companies and companies in the finance industry more likely to disclose in the notes to the financial statements, where the information is less visible.

The results indicate that companies were secretive about the most sensitive of the required disclosures, the amount (value) of the options issued. Regulators and researchers need to be cautious in conducting compliance studies as although companies appear to be transparent in their disclosures about stock options for directors, closer examination reveals secrecy about sensitive components of the required disclosures.

The executive stock option (ESO) valuation model developed in this research amends the popular exchange traded option pricing models such as Black and Scholes (1973), Whaley (1981), and Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) to include economic features of the ESO contract that previously have been ignored. One of these features is the non‐transferability of the ESO, which creates a situation where the ESO might be exercised when an otherwise identical exchange traded option would not. Another feature is the hybrid nature of the ESO; it is not solely either an American option or a European option. The results of the comparative statics indicate that the impact of the non‐transferability of the ESO value is significant, whereas the hybrid feature of the ESO results in values that are very similar to American option values. The economic implication is that if an American or European option model is used to value ESO's, the probability is very high that a wealth transfer between management and shareholders will occur.

The 2008-2009 subprime mortgage crisis in the USA caused bankruptcies and closures of many financial institutions. Yet many CEOs of US financial institutions were awarded huge bonuses and pay packages despite the economic collapse, suggesting that their incomes were not in conjunction with those of the shareholders, indicating a serious agency problem. This issue raises the question as to whether stock option backdating, another example of an agency problem, was as prevalent as slack lending policies among these financial institutions. This paper aims to compare the relative magnitude of executive option backdating in financial and nonfinancial firms.

Using a sample of CEO stock option grants from 1995 to 2006, obtained from ExecuComp, the authors employ an event study around the grant dates of executive options. The authors compare the abnormal price movements between financial and nonfinancial firms.

The abnormal negative stock returns were found before the award dates for both groups of firms. The after-event abnormal returns of both groups of firms, however, show different trends. For nonfinancial firms, there is an immediate turnaround of the abnormal return movement right after the grants; that is, the price increases, indicating the occurrence of significant backdating events. For financial firms, however, there is no significant price rebound after the grant date. In fact, the price continued to decline throughout the after-event period.

The result shows that nonfinancial firms demonstrate significantly more option backdating behavior than financial firms.

The findings suggest that previous findings on prevalent backdating among all public listed firms are only partially correct. This paper shows that backdating behavior found in previous studies is indeed driven by nonfinancial firms. This unexpected finding contradicts the initial prediction of authors that option backdating may be more likely among financial firms.

Based on previous research, the authors recognize that generally the official grant dates of firms must have been set retroactively, as shown by Lie (2005). The findings, however, show that financial firms demonstrate only partial backdating behavior. This study opens a path for future research to further discover why financial firms exhibit less backdating behavior compared with nonfinancial firms, and if option backdating is not an issue for financial firms, why the share prices of these firms decline significantly prior to the grant date.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the models of Johnson and Stulz, Klein and Klein and lnglis to analyse the properties of vulnerable American options.

The presented model allows default prior to the maturity of the option based on a barrier which is linked to the payoff on the option. Various measures of risk denoted by the standard Greek letters are studied, as well as additional measures that arise because of the vulnerability.

The paper finds that the delta of a vulnerable American put does not always increase with the price of the underlying asset, and may be significantly smaller than that of a non‐vulnerable put. Because of deadweight costs associated with bankruptcy, delta and gamma are undefined for some values of the underlying asset. Rho may be considerably higher while vega may be smaller than for non‐vulnerable options. Also, the probability of early exercise for vulnerable American options is higher and the price of the underlying asset at which this is optimal depends on the degree of credit risk of the option writer.

This paper makes a contribution to understanding the effect of credit risk on option valuation.

This paper describes the design and development of a system for the selection and construction of vertical and horizontal machining center packages with a base machine and options format subject to budgetary constraints. Options are categorized and divided into groups depending on their utilization, and their selection is based on a priority setting. Options are categorized as those providing the capability for high speed, enhanced levels of productivity, high levels of machining complexity, high levels of machining accuracy, and potential for the inclusion of automation to facilitate and satisfy production requirements. A user‐friendly and object‐oriented computer0based decision support software system was developed incorporating real data from a machine tool sales organization.

The purpose of the paper is to correct a commonly mistaken notion that an Asian option is always cheaper than its plain vanilla European counterpart in a general setting.

The paper shows that by letting volatility go to zero, the lower bounds of Asian options and vanilla options are derived. Those bounds are then compared.

The paper finds that the notion can be violated for call options when the dividend yield of the underlying stock is higher than the interest rate, as well as for put options when the dividend yield of the underlying stock is lower than the interest rate.

The approach used in this paper, boundary analysis, can be applied to other exotic options.

The results in the paper may affect decisions on trading Asian options.

The paper will be of value to those interested in using/pricing/hedging Asian options.

This study examines put-call-futures parity in KOSPI 200 index futures and options markets for the sampling period between January of 2011 and December of 2013 in order to investigate whether option multiplier increasing affects on the arbitragee efficiency of an index option market and permanent relationship between futures and options markets by analyzing minute by minute historical index option and future intraday trading data.

What we find is that the arbitrage opportunities associated with put-call-futures parity increase to 5.16% from 1.75% after increasing option multiplier. Although there is no significant change of discrepancies in ATM options, a slight decrease of mispricing is found in the moneyness where call option is OTM. It turns out, however, that the arbitrage opportunities increase by 3.4 times in the moneyness below 0.97 or above 1.03, after increasing multiplier. Also ex-ante analysis shows that most of arbitrage opportunities disappear within one minute, but the speed of dissipation becomes to decrease in the moneyness where the liquidity of ITM options declines to be a very low level. Overall our results suggest that the arbitrage efficiency in the KOSPI 200 index option markets might be deteriorated after an increasing of option multiplier.

The Black‐Scholes (B‐S) model in its various formulations has been the mainstay paradigm on option pricing since its basic formulation in 1973. The model has generally been proven empirically robust, despite the well documented empirical evidence of mispricing deep‐in‐the‐money, deep out‐of‐the‐money and, occasionally, at‐the‐money options with near maturities [see Galai (1983)]. Research on explaining the observed pricing anomalies has focused on the variance of the return of the underlying asset, which, in the case of the B‐S model, is assumed to remain invariant over time. The variance term is not directly observable, leading researchers to speculate that pricing discrepancies may be caused by misspecification of this variable. More specifically, interest in the volatility variable has centered about the implied standard deviation (ISD).