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A major theme in the literature on bank regulation is that greater reliance on market forces can mitigate the moral hazard problem inherent in government sponsored deposit insurance. Specific proposals to impose greater market discipline on banks include minimum requirements on (1) uninsured subordinated debt financing (either fixed-term or with option-type features), and (2) private coinsurance on deposits. Both proposals amount to delegating the responsibility for bank regulation to various private sector claimholders. The results suggest that such delegation (with or without claims that include option-type features) may be ineffective in lowering bank risk, at least within the present regulatory and institutional framework. Alternative mechanisms exist that can mitigate the moral hazard problem; however, it may be necessary for the regulator/deposit insurer to be an integral part of the solution.

This paper aims to investigate the determinants of good governance in the US firms.

The data are taken from a sample of 624 US listed and non‐financial firms for the period of 1994‐2003. Four indices were constructed that summarize the governance quality: one indice for the board of directors, another one for the board committees, a third one for the audit committee, and a fourth representing an overall or total index. Multiple regressions analyses are used in the study to find the determinants of strong governance.

The empirical results show statistically significant and positive associations between each governance index (exception to board index) and firm size, investment opportunities, intangible assets and directors and officers ownership. Furthermore, institutional ownership and external financing needs are positively related to each governance index considered. However, growth opportunities and performance have no significant effect on governance quality.

Other corporate governance mechanisms could be considered (transparency and disclosure, anti‐takeover provisions and shareholder's rights).

This paper adds evidence to the important debate about corporate governance ratings. It gives a most comprehensive analysis to date in term of sample size and breath coverage. This paper also offers a new contribution to the debate on the determinants of good governance by isolating the effects of firm characteristics on the board of directors from the effect on compensation and nominating committees and from the effect on audit committee.

An optimal temperature monitoring is a prerequisite for cold chain management and thus for the production and supply of high quality and safe products as well as for the reduction of waste and economic losses. The aim of this paper is to identify and compare already existing temperature monitoring solutions in operation and novel temperature monitoring solutions with a view to their use for optimal temperature monitoring in meat supply chains. A special focus is placed on the identification and specification of challenges by the implementation of temperature monitoring systems which allow an optimal control of the temperature conditions in meat supply chains, as required by the new European food law.

The paper is a literature review of existing and novel temperature monitoring systems and challenges faced by the practical implementation of monitoring systems which allow continuous control of the temperature conditions in meat supply chains. First, the relevant literature relating to these aspects was examined and second, expert knowledge was applied with system developers of temperature monitoring and information management systems, participants in the meat supply chains and researchers

In the article different intra‐ as well as inter‐organisational challenges relating to the practical implementation of optimal temperature monitoring solutions have been identified and described.

The paper provides a holistic perspective of temperature monitoring solutions in meat supply chains. The challenges met when implementing temperature monitoring solutions have not been widely discussed in the literature. The proposed solutions to the specified challenges make an important contribution to developing guidelines for the implementation of optimal temperature monitoring systems in meat supply chains, resulting in improvements in food quality and safety.

The effect of corporate governance on firm performance has long been of great interest to financiers, economists, behavioural scientists, legal practitioners and business operators. Yet there is no consensus over what constitutes an effective corporate governance mechanism that induces agents or managers to consistently act in the interest of share value optimisation. The purpose of this study is to develop a model to resolve an on‐going issue in financial economics: how can CEOs be effectively monitored by the board of directors?

A survey of the literature on corporate governance and the relationship between board composition and financial performance leads to the development of the proposed model, which is based on a framework which takes into account the probability of success representing a CEO's ability, and the active monitoring function (which is represented by the numbers of control visits) carried‐out by the directors.

The design of the model is aimed at identifying an optimal level of monitoring, which will maximise share value, to guide internal and independent directors.

The model has limitations: it does not address the input of other directors and it focuses solely on the monitoring function, even though boards also play important roles in providing information and advice to management.

The finding of this study contributes to the Agency Theory debate, in essence that the board monitoring of CEO will improve the performance of the CEO and avoid possible conflict of interests.

The purpose of this paper is to test the theory of optimal monitoring, which posits that more generous county homestead exemptions lower the incentive for residents to monitor school operations, thereby increasing inefficiency in service outcomes.

This research uses two-stage Simar and Wilson’s data envelopment analysis to assess county school districts’ efficiency in the state of Georgia for each year from 2007 to 2012.

Controlling for other factors known to be correlated with government efficiency, such as fiscal capacity and competition, this study finds evidence that higher property tax burdens resulting from lower county school district homestead exemptions, as a proxy of more intense citizens’ monitoring pressures, are associated with improved county school district performance efficiency. These results provide empirical support for the theory of optimal monitoring.

Increased government funding toward education is more likely to improve education outcomes if accompanied by efficiency control mechanisms. One such mechanism could be increased transparency of government operations and accountability of public officials.

This research uses a newer and more robust estimation of relative efficiency and analyzes a more common type of property tax exemption. This improves the internal validity and generalizability of the findings regarding the theory of optimal monitoring.

The purpose of this paper is to study the optimal coverage limit in a model of deposit insurance with capital requirements and risk sensitive premia to prevent moral hazard.

The theoretical model has incorporated capital requirements, risk‐sensitive premium, and partial deposit insurance in a partial equilibrium model. The model discusses the interaction among risk‐taking banks, ex‐ante heterogeneous depositors, and a deposit insurer.

First, the paper shows that optimal coverage encourages depositors' monitoring and withdrawals. Partial deposit insurance improves social welfare. Second, risk‐sensitive premia and market discipline are essential to reduce bank risk taking behavior. Third, adjustment between level of coverage and the premium guarantees long term liquidity of the deposit insurance funds and makes banks better off. Fourth, numerical findings are consistent with the empirical evidence that shows differences in coverage between countries.

Timing and frequency of adjustments to coverage limits and the implementation of co‐insurance have been beyond the scope of this study but those implications are worth further investigation.

In the current crisis, banking regulations combined with poor management and supervision have been responsible for banks' improper leverages, lending and securitization. A bank failure could easily turn into a crisis when the financial institution is overly exposed to credit risks and when the government is least equipped to deal with those risks. Thus, the study of the partial deposit insurance is important in achieving stability in the banking sector.

Following Zingales (1994) and Gilson (2006), this paper assumes that controlling shareholders have incentives to secretly transfer parts of corporate earnings to themselves, and the government to reduce these corporate self-dealing activities. We study if there exist certain levels of government monitoring intensities which are optimal for all parties involved; controlling shareholders, public investors and the government. Our model shows that there exists Nash equilibrium in corporate self-dealing and governmental monitoring levels. At this equilibrium, the optimal corporate investment level is greater than the counterpart in the absence of self-dealings and government monitoring. Our model further shows that the main determinants for the equilibrium level are monitoring efficiency, severity of self-dealings penalty, and marginal return on investment. Interestingly, however, we can not conclude that either controlling shareholders’ equity ownership ratios or corporate tax rates determines the optimal investment level.