Search results

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the welfare and social policy ideas that characterize Chinese aid in Africa are influencing traditional donors and becoming global.

The paper utilised a qualitative study that has two main components: first, a comprehensive content analysis of over 50 key Sino–African, Chinese and Western policy documents from 2000 (since cooperation between Beijing and African countries first became institutionalised); and, second, there were semi-structured interviews with Chinese, African and Western stakeholders in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), who were directly involved in the relationship between China and Africa and related development issues.

The results of documentation and interview analyses show that there are currently significant differences between Chinese and Western approaches. China has developed much stronger and more explicit links between development aid and economic activity than most Western donors. The aid is usually implemented through specific projects rather than broader programmes or policies.

It is reasonable to assume that the new developments initiated by the Agency’s international pioneers are likely to be a new emerging trend. As the conditions and processes of social policy design in developing countries are so closely linked with the ideas of international development institutions (if not predetermined), a possible change in the direction of travel of the ideas and activities of this community requires close coordination analysis and evaluation.

The chapter traces the genealogy of the Education for All (EFA) Movement understood as a global regime of educational governance between 1990 and 2005. The chapter sets out the achievements of EFA including some success in uniting diverse interests around a common set of goals. It will also discuss the key tensions related to the Northern and Western-led nature of EFA; tensions between the multilateral agencies over the leadership of EFA and the issues associated with the hegemonic status assumed by the World Bank; the tension between a wider EFA agenda and a narrower focus on a few quantifiable targets; and the associated tensions between more economistic and rights-based views of EFA. It will be argued that the development of these tensions can be understood in relation to different kinds of power linked to the international political economy and to the impact of other global regimes.

This chapter highlights the characteristics of Asia through the analysis of policy-related documents by five donor countries, namely Japan, South Korea, China, India and Thailand. It will also examine the roles played by regional bodies such as the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) and ASPBAE (the Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Education) as the horizontal channels influencing aid policies in respective countries. Together with the analysis of the national and organizational policies, the regional process of building consensus on the post-2015 agenda is examined, with a particular focus on the Asia-Pacific Regional Education Conference (APREC) held in August 2014.

The analysis reveals that the region has two faces: one is imaginary and the other is functional. There is a common trend across Asian donors to refer to their historical ties with regions and countries to which they provide assistance and their traditional notions of education and development. They highlight Asian features in contrast to conventional aid principles and approaches based on the Western value system, either apparently or in a muted manner. In this sense, the imagined community of Asia with common cultural roots is perceived by the policymakers across the board.

At the same time, administratively, the importance of the region as a stage between the national and global levels is recognized increasingly in the multilateral global governance structure. With this broadened participatory structure, as discussed in the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’, the expected function of the region to transmit the norms and requests from the global level and to collect and summarize national voices has increased.

This paper examines the relationship between foreign aid, institutional democracy and poverty. The paper explores the direct effect of foreign aid on poverty and quantifies the facilitating role of democracy in harnessing foreign aid for poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

The paper attempts to address the endogenous relationship between foreign aid and poverty by employing the two-stage least squares instrumental variable (2SLS-IV) estimator by using GDP per capita of the top five Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries sending foreign aid to SSA countries scaled by the inverse of the land area of the SSA countries to stimulate an exogenous variation in foreign aid and its components. The initial level of democracy is interacted with the senders’ GDP per capita to also instrument for the interaction terms of democracy, foreign aid and its components.

The results suggest that foreign aid reduces poverty and different components of foreign aid have different effects on poverty. In particular, multilateral source and grant type seem to be more significant in reducing poverty than bilateral source and loan type. The study further reveals that democratic attributes of free expression, institutional constraints on the executive, guarantee of civil liberties to citizens and political participation reinforce the poverty-reducing effects of aggregate foreign aid and its components after controlling for mean household income, GDP per capita and inequality.

The methodological concern related to modeling the effects of foreign aid on poverty is endogeneity bias. To estimate the relationship between foreign aid, democracy and poverty in SSA, this paper relies on a 2SLS-IV estimator with GDP per capita of the top five aid-sending OECD countries scaled by the inverse of land area of the SSA countries as an external instrument for foreign aid. The use of the five top OECD's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) countries is due to the availability of foreign aid data for these countries. However, non-OECD-DAC countries such as China and South Africa may be important source of foreign aid to some SSA countries.

The findings further suggest that the marginal effect of foreign aid in reducing poverty is increasing with the level of institutional democracy. In other words, foreign aid contributes more to poverty reduction in countries with democratic dispensation. This investigation has vital implications for future foreign aid policy, because it alerts policymakers that the effectiveness of foreign aid can be strengthened by considering the type and source of aid. Foreign aid and quality political institution may serve as an important mix toward the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals 2030 and the Africa Union Agenda 2063.

As the global economy faces economic and social challenges, SSA may not be able to depend heavily on foreign partners to finance the region's budget. There is the need for African governments to also come out with innovative ways to mobilize own resources to develop and confront some of the economic challenges to achieve the required reduction in poverty. This is a vision that every country in Africa must work toward. Africa must think of new ways of generating wealth internally for development so as to complement foreign aid flows and also build strong foundation for welfare improvement, self-reliance and sustainable development.

This existing literature does not consider how democracy enhances the foreign aid and poverty relationship. The existing literature does not explore how democracy enhances grants, loans, multilateral and bilateral aid effectiveness in reducing poverty. This paper provides the first-hand evidence of how institutional democracy enhances the poverty-reducing effects of foreign aid and its components. The paper uses exogenous variation in foreign aid to quantify the direct effect of foreign aid and its components on poverty.

This explorative study aims to compare and analyze the behavior of a traditional and an emerging donor, namely, Germany and South Korea, in the field of climate change-related official development assistance (ODA). It analyzes their ODA projects in 2013 in four Southeast Asian countries severely affected by climate change, namely, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. It also adapts the existing framework to categorize ODA allocation according to receiving countries’ need and merit and donors’ self-interest.

The paper first describes both countries’ policies and activities. It then uses a country’s vulnerability to climate change as a measure of its need, its climate change readiness as a measure of its merit and its bilateral trade volume in environmental goods with donor countries as a measure of donors’ self-interest to analyze the allocation of climate-related ODA.

Results suggest that Korean ODA in the field of climate protection is driven more by receiving countries’ need and merit, but self-interest seems to be important for both donors. In addition, many projects labeled as adaptation or mitigation projects only have a weak link to these goals. There are limitations to the present paper. First, it could only analyze projects in 2013 because there are no earlier project data available in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Creditor Reporting System. Second, because of the simplifying assumptions of the need–merit–self-interest framework, possible other determinants of aid allocation were deliberately ignored. Finally, this explorative study is restricted to four vulnerable countries in Southeast Asia.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to compare a traditional and an emerging donor’s behavior and to explore the allocation of climate-related ODA using the need–merit–self-interest framework.

The emergence of the Chinese aid consensus has come to have profound implications for sustainability. The Beijing Consensus “sovereignty doctrine” of non‐interference, presents a stark contrast to the Washington Consensus architecture of imposed conditionalities and the serving of geopolitical interests. For this reason, from Africa's perspective, the Beijing Consensus appears to represent the preferred comprehensive meta‐narrative for Africa. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the attributes of “good” aid architecture in relation to the peculiarities of Africa's challenges.

In examining its principles, objectives, framework differences and impact, the Beijing model shows that it supports the human rights which “unleash”, empower and protect self‐directed development grounded in ownership and in the strategic interests of recipients.

The Washington Consensus has been problematic for African development because it is economistic and exclusively instrumentalist. While conceding to this shortcoming, the inability of the consensus to appreciate the unique and complex development problems of Africa is more troubling. Comparing the two, the Beijing Consensus, which is multidimensional and encompasses the intrinsic and non‐economic roles of development aid, with the consequence of over‐emphasizing expanding local policy, is adjudged practical for Africa. The conclusion is that the dominant Washington Consensus is too poorly articulated and structured to respond to declared determination for ownership, mitigating capabilities deprivation, and improving development control.

This paper has argued that the basic approach of the Beijing Consensus has been more generous and more attractive for sustainable development in Africa. Much more important, perhaps, is the ability of the consensus to appreciate the unique and complex development problems which occur as a consequence of donor deafness on limited rights and conditionalities. In sum, the Beijing Consensus results in exclusionary changes of “less magnitude and speed” and promotes poverty reduction and sustainable development. Taken together, these factors and practices mean that the Beijing Consensus best serves the staircase of a nation's pathway to indigenous development, when compared with the Washington Consensus. Such a comprehensive meta‐narrative that builds alliances and creates a foundation for enlightened and effective politics of development aid will “unleash”, empower and protect the full potential of Africa.

Capacity development in fragile environments in Africa has often proven to be a complex undertaking. This has largely been because of existing knowledge gaps on what exactly causes fragility of states, the economy and society. The liberal peace development model that generally informs post‐conflict reconstruction and capacity development has a limited conception of fragility by narrowly focusing on the national dimensions of the problem, promoting donor‐driven solutions, emphasizing minimal participation of beneficiary actors in the identification and prioritization of capacity development needs, and by subcontracting the design and management of projects and programs. The resulting capacity development impact has generally been disappointing. In the absence of homegrown strategic plans, stakeholder participation and ownership, international development partners have all too often addressed capacity gaps by financing training, supply of equipment and professional exchanges of parliamentarians and parliamentary staffers. These efforts usually achieved their presumed number targets but tended to ignore addressing the larger issues of political economy within which capacity development take place. However, the recent re‐conceptualization of parliamentary capacity development as a development of nationally owned, coordinated, harmonized, and aligned development activities seems to be gaining growing attention in Africa. As the experience of Rwanda eloquently demonstrates, capacity development is essentially about politics, economics and power, institutions and incentives, habits and attitudes – factors that are only partly susceptible to technical fixes and quantitative specifications. These structural factors have to be negotiated carefully and tactfully.

The purpose of this paper is to untangle the domestic and international factors that have affected policy making and implementation of the Japanese Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), particularly in education, at different times in its history.

The study is based on analysis of governmental policy documents and reports, minutes of ODA consultative meetings, and statistical data on Japanese financial and technical developmental assistance. The major methodology was discourse analysis of primary documents; secondary sources supplement this.

Japan was the first non-western Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) member and has always been in the ambivalent position of being both a DAC member and an Asian latecomer. As the Education for All paradigm took the ground, Japanese ODA to the education sector has shifted to the primary education from Technical and Vocational Education and Training and higher education from the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s. While the global trend is clear in Japanese ODA, it has always stressed the importance of establishing and demonstrating the “Japanese model” in ODA policy documents and practices. The sensitive balance between the demand to harmonize with mainstream aid modalities and the drive to demonstrate uniqueness characterize Japanese educational aid.

While many important works examined the decision-making mechanism and philosophies of Japanese educational ODA, this paper contextualizes governmental programs in the intersection between domestic factors – bureaucratic, political, and societal – and international influence. It clarifies the changing relationships between Japan and western and Asian countries in determining its agendas and directions from the 1960s to the present.

Fragile states (FS) are often neglected and categorized as “aid orphans”. In extreme circumstances, they are loaded with aid beyond their absorptive capacity. However, whether they receive little or too much, there is a compelling imperative to coordinate aid aimed at capacity development effectively. In an ever shrinking pot of funds from donors mainly due to the current global economic downturn, it is extremely important to coordinate and harmonise aid delivery. FS cannot afford to waste any money trapped under rubble of multi‐donor aid bureaucracy. Due to the multidimensional nature of fragility, we draw on case studies and interdisciplinary insights from Authority‐Legitimacy‐Capacity (ALC), Country Development Framework (CDF) and other models and frameworks of donor coordination. A number of asymmetries (e.g. technical, cultural and, financial) between donors and recipients need to be addressed. Donors can harmonise their respective Africa strategies reports and give priority to infrastructure instead of focusing exclusively on the social agenda as in the past. FS should fight the local culture of corruption, avoid fungibility, protect vulnerable groups in society, focus on reintegration as well as demobilizing ex‐combatants with employment provisions. Donors should not give mixed signals to recipients and need to be flexible in their operational procedures. Finally, we discuss the implications of key emerging issues that threaten or facilitate sustainable reconstruction, development and poverty reduction in post‐conflict environments.