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To discuss general legal considerations for non-US private equity sponsors who seek to market their funds to US institutional investors.

Explains relevant aspects of US securities laws, commodity exchange laws, pension and employee benefit plan laws, federal income tax laws, and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).

The evolving US regulatory regime necessitates careful planning and thorough knowledge of relevant laws and regulations to effect a successful US marketing effort.

Practical guidance from experienced investment funds and tax lawyers.

The purpose of this paper is to to summarize Advisers Act registration implications for non‐US advisers that now rely on the “private adviser” exemption from Advisers Act registration and to summarize the principal changes affecting investors in funds managed by non‐US advisers contained in the Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.

The paper explains the elimination of the “private adviser” exemption and the creation of the narrower “foreign private adviser” and other exemptions from Adviser Act registration, reporting and recordkeeping requirements relating to private funds; the Dodd‐Frank Act's provisions for information sharing by the SEC and the confidentiality of private fund information; the “Volcker Rule's” limitation of investment by banking entities and non‐bank financial companies in hedge funds and private equity funds; changes in the definition of “accredited investor”; and the future adjustment of the “qualified client” test for inflation.

The Dodd‐Frank Act will require many investment advisers and fund managers with their principal offices and places of business outside the USA to register with the SEC and to observe, with respect to US clients, the full spectrum of SEC regulations that apply to registered investment advisers. The Act will also impose new disclosure and recordkeeping requirements on many non‐US advisers.

The paper provides expert guidance from experienced financial services lawyers.

The authors analyze the equilibrium effects of non-tradable assets on optimal policy portfolios. They study how the existence of non-tradable assets impacts optimal asset allocation decisions of investors who own such assets and of investors who do not have access to non-tradable assets.

In this theoretical analysis, the authors analyze a model with tradable and non-tradable asset classes whose cash flows are jointly normally distributed. There are two types of investors, with and without access to non-tradable assets. All investors have constant absolute risk aversion preferences. The authors derive closed form solutions for optimal investor demand and equilibrium asset prices. They calibrated the model using US data for listed equity, bonds and private equity. Further, the authors illustrate the sensitivities of quantities and prices with respect to the main parameters.

The study finds that the existence of non-tradable assets has a large impact on optimal asset allocation. Investors with (without) access to non-tradable assets tilt their portfolios of tradable assets away from (toward) assets to which non-tradable assets exhibit positive betas.

The model provides important insights not only for investors holding non-tradable assets such as private equity but also for investors who do not have access to non-tradable assets. Investors who ignore the effect of non-tradable assets when reverse-engineering risk premia from asset covariances and market capitalizations might severely underestimate the equity risk premium.

The authors provide the first comprehensive analysis of the equilibrium effects of non-tradability of some assets on optimal policy portfolios. Thus, this paper goes beyond analyzing the effects of market imperfections on individual portfolio choices.

The purpose of this paper is to explain certain SEC and state registration, disclosure, and recordkeeping requirements for US and non‐US investment advisers and fund managers as defined in the Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.

The paper explains SEC and US state registration requirements; the elimination of the “private adviser” exemption; the creation of new, narrower adviser registration exemptions; reporting and recordkeeping requirements relating to private funds; information and confidentiality provisions for private funds; the SEC's authority to make rules and regulations defining technical, trade, and other terms used in the amendments set forth in the Act; provisions of the “Volcker Rule” concerning banking entities' ownership interests in hedge funds and private equity funds; the adjustment of the “qualified client” test for inflation; the definition of an “accredited investor”; and disqualifications from using Regulation D.

The Act will require many US and non‐US investment advisers and fund managers to register with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, particularly those advisers that have previously relied on the “private adviser” exemption from SEC registration, which has been eliminated by the Act. The Act will also impose new disclosure and recordkeeping requirements on many investment advisers, including some who are not required to register with the SEC.

The paper provides expert guidance from experienced financial services lawyers.

The equation of unified knowledge says that S = f (A,P) which means that the practical solution to a given problem is a function of the existing, empirical, actual realities and the future, potential, best possible conditions of general stable equilibrium which both pure and practical reason, exhaustive in the Kantian sense, show as being within the realm of potential realities beyond any doubt. The first classical revolution in economic thinking, included in factor “P” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of a model of ideal conditions of stable equilibrium but neglected the full consideration of the existing, actual conditions. That is the main reason why, in the end, it failed. The second modern revolution, included in factor “A” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of the existing, actual conditions, usually in disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium (in case of stagnation) and neglected the sense of right direction expressed in factor “P” or the realization of general, stable equilibrium. That is the main reason why the modern revolution failed in the past and is failing in front of our eyes in the present. The equation of unified knowledge, perceived as a sui generis synthesis between classical and modern thinking has been applied rigorously and systematically in writing the enclosed American‐British economic, monetary, financial and social stabilization plans. In the final analysis, a new economic philosophy, based on a synthesis between classical and modern thinking, called here the new economics of unified knowledge, is applied to solve the malaise of the twentieth century which resulted from a confusion between thinking in terms of stable equilibrium on the one hand and disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium on the other.

Although the focus of this issue is on investment in British industry and hence we are particularly concerned with debt and shares, the transactions and holdings in these cannot be separated from the range of other financial claims, including property, that are available to investors. In consequence this article focuses on an overview of the financial system including in Section 2 a presentation of the flow of funds matrix of the financial claims that make up the system. We also examine more closely the role of the financial institutions that are part of the system by utilising the sources and uses statements for three sectors, non‐bank financial institutions, personal sector and industrial and commercial companies. Then we provide, in Section 3, a discussion of the various financial claims investors can hold. In Section 4 we give a portrayal of the portfolio disposition of each of the major types of financial institution involved in the market for company securities specifically insurance companies (life and general), pension funds, unit and investment trusts, and in Section 4 a market study is performed for ordinary shares, debentures and preference shares for holdings, net acquisitions and purchases/sales. A review of some of the empirical evidence on the financial institutions is presented in Section 5 and Section 6 is by way of a conclusion. The data series extend in the main from 1966 to 1981, though at the time of writing, some 1981 data are still unavailable. In addition, the point needs to be made that the samples have been constantly revised so that care needs to be exercised in the use of the data.

This paper aims to focus on the performance of private equity real estate funds. Since many institutional investors have special programs to invest with first time managers, or emerging fund managers, it also seeks further evidence on how persistent the performance of real estate funds is and how the growth in fund size affects the realised returns of a fund.

The analyses performed are based on a large global sample of value‐added and opportunistic private real estate funds. Different model specifications are used to study the fund and sponsor‐related factors' correlation with fund performance.

It is shown that the realised performance is positively correlated with fund size but negatively correlated with the sequence number of the fund supporting the fact that emerging managers are likelier to achieve good returns. The data also reveal trends in fund performance and the growth of the fund size. Evidence from private equity buy‐out funds has also shown that better performing fund managers are likely to raise follow‐on funds and often larger funds than poorly performing fund managers which is also confirmed by the findings of this paper. There is also an evidence that top‐performing funds do not grow proportionally as much as the average funds.

Actual datasets used in the regression models are often limited by exclusion of immature funds to enhance reliability of results.

This paper expands the recent studies on private equity to private real estate, an area that has experienced substantial growth during the past ten years.

This book is a policy proposal aimed at the democratic left. It is concerned with gradual but radical reform of the socio‐economic system. An integrated policy of industrial and economic democracy, which centres around the establishment of a new sector of employee‐controlled enterprises, is presented. The proposal would retain the mix‐ed economy, but transform it into a much better “mixture”, with increased employee‐power in all sectors. While there is much of enduring value in our liberal western way of life, gross inequalities of wealth and power persist in our society.

The paper's aim is to analyze and assess the importance of a recent US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decision in the case of Sun Capital Partners III LP v. New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry Pension Fund with respect to the court's conclusion that a private equity fund constitutes a “trade or business” for purposes of the ERISA multiemployer pension withdrawal liability and that, therefore, the fund could, under a “piercing the veil” type of approach, be held liable for the ERISA withdrawal liability of a bankrupt portfolio company.

The paper provides historical background on termination and withdrawal liability under ERISA; explains the facts of the Sun Capital case; and offers preliminary reflections on the “investment plus” approach in ERISA context, the significance of the offset mechanism, why the Sun Capital decision is a significant victory for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the liability of one portfolio company for the pension obligations of other portfolio companies owned by the same private equity fund, potential unintended consequences for tax-advantaged benefit plans of portfolio companies; the possibility that different pension plans at different portfolio companies may violate non-discrimination rules, the application of Sun Capital beyond ERISA, and the potential effect of this ruling on taxation of carried interest.

The employer and all “trades or businesses” in its “controlled group, including, under certain circumstances, a private equity fund, are liable for the employer's share of unfunded pension liabilities if the employer withdraws from a multi-employer defined-benefit pension plan.

Practical guidance from experienced financial services lawyers is given in the paper.