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In this study negotiated exchange under the 1-exchange rule is considered in the whole population of 142,660 exchange networks up to size 9. A review shows that 51 of these networks have been studied in the literature. Predictions for the whole population of networks are derived by parsimonious versions of power-dependence and exchange-resistance theory. All but 301 networks are classified similarly as equal, weak, or strong power networks by the power-dependence and exchange-resistance theory. Only 4% of the networks is classified as a strong power network, as opposed to the 43% of the networks studied in the literature.

Weak organizational actors can overcome the consequences of their dependence by securing the control of valuable resources or by embedding dependence relationships into social networks. While these strategies may not eliminate the underlying dependence, they can curtail the ability or the willingness of the stronger party to use power. Embedding strategies, however, can also have unintended consequences. Because the network structures that confer power to the weak are inherently more stable, they can persist beyond the point of being beneficial, trapping weak actors into unsuitable network structures. The power of the weak can thus become the weakness of the strong.

The present study increases our understanding of strong power in exchange networks by examining its incidence in complex networks for the first time and relating this incidence to characteristics of these networks. A theoretical analysis based on network exchange theory (e.g., Willer, 1999) suggests two network characteristics predicting strong power; actors with only one potential exchange partner, and the absence of triangles, that is, one's potential exchange partners are not each other's partners. Different large-scale structures such as trees, small worlds, buyer–seller, uniform, and scale-free networks are shown to differ in these two characteristics and are therefore predicted to differ with respect to the incidence of strong power. The theoretical results and those obtained by simulating networks up to size 144 show that the incidence of strong power mainly depends on the density of the network. For high density no strong power is observed in all but buyer–seller networks, whereas for low density strong power is frequent but dependent on the large-scale structure and the two aforementioned network characteristics.

The field of Human Resource Management (HRM) has long recognized the importance of interpersonal influence for employee and organizational effectiveness. HRM research and practice have focused primarily on individuals’ characteristics and behaviors as a means to understand “who” is influential in organizations, with substantially less attention paid to social networks. To reinvigorate a focus on network structures to explain interpersonal influence, the authors present a comprehensive account of how network structures enable and constrain influence within organizations. The authors begin by describing how power and status, two key determinants of individual influence in organizations, operate through different mechanisms, and delineate a range of network positions that yield power, reflect status, and/or capture realized influence. Then, the authors extend initial structural views of influence beyond the positions of individuals to consider how network structures within and between groups – capturing group social capital and/or shared leadership – enable and constrain groups’ ability to influence group members, other groups, and the broader organizational system. The authors also discuss how HRM may leverage these insights to facilitate interpersonal influence in ways that support individual, group, and organizational effectiveness.

This chapter analyzes the ways that individuals develop person-to-group ties. The chapter reviews the development and evidentiary basis of the theory of relational cohesion, the affect theory of social exchange, and the theory of social commitments.

We survey twenty-five years of published literature on these theories, and review unpublished theoretical tests and extensions that are currently in progress.

The research program has grown substantially over the past twenty-five years to encompass more varied and diverse phenomena. The findings indicate that structural interdependencies, repeated exchanges, and a sense of shared responsibility are key conditions for people to develop affective ties to groups, organizations, and even nation-states.

The research implies that if people are engaged in joint tasks, they attribute positive or negative feelings from those tasks to their local groups (teams, departments) and/or to larger organizations (companies, communities). To date, empirical tests have focused on microlevel processes.

Our work has practical implications for how managers or supervisors organize tasks and work routines in a way to maximize group or organizational commitment.

This research helps to understand problems of fragmentation that are faced by decentralized organizations and also how these can be overcome.

The chapter represents the most complete and comprehensive review of the theory of relational cohesion, the affect theory of social exchange, and the theory of social commitments to date.

While classical exchange theorists excluded bargaining from the scope of their theories, most contemporary theorists have done the opposite, concentrating exclusively on negotiated exchanges with binding agreements. This chapter describes the theoretical logic and empirical results of a new program of research comparing the effects of reciprocal and negotiated forms of exchange. As the work shows, fundamental differences between the two forms of exchange affect many of the processes addressed by current theories. Reciprocal exchanges produce weaker power use, greater feelings of trust and affective commitment, and stronger perceptions of the partner’s fairness than equivalent negotiated exchanges. I discuss the implications of this work for theories of exchange and social interaction, and outline future directions for the next phase of the research program.

To use a behavioral measure of legitimacy to study how differences in negotiating style and status affect the legitimacy of persons in high-power network positions. Predictions include (1) that powerful network actors who negotiate using a pro-group style will maintain legitimacy better than will those who negotiate selfishly and (2) those higher in status will be granted more legitimacy both before and after exchange than powerful actors lower in status.

An experimental study in which participants were connected in networks to powerful partners who were portrayed as consistently high or low on several status characteristics. Both before and after exchange, participants evaluated partners on a number of dimensions and made decisions on whether to vote to join a coalition to take the partner's power away, a direct behavioral indicator of legitimacy.

High-power partners lost legitimacy over the course of exchange irrespective of whether they negotiated in pro-group or selfish ways, and irrespective of whether they were high or low in status. This effect was pronounced for partners who negotiated selfishly. Although partner status predicted legitimacy prior to exchange, legitimacy evaluations after exchange appeared entirely driven by the partner's negotiating style (how the power was used) and not by status.

The project introduces a new behavioral measure of legitimacy that correlated highly with self-report items and should be of value in future research. The study also indicates promising directions for future research that might disentangle effects of power and status on legitimacy, along with adjudicating among explanations for why this study did not find status effects on legitimacy.

This chapter reviews three analytical perspectives – ‘structural’, ‘network’ and ‘cultural’ – on the study of power and their implications for theorizing elites. It builds on this initial theoretical review by developing a critical realist approach to the study of organizational elites out of the structurally based perspective identified in the first section of the chapter. The explanatory potential of this critical realist approach is then illustrated through two case studies of ruling elites embedded in contrasting historical, political and social contexts. The final section of the chapter provides a discussion of the wider implications of these case study analyses for understanding and explaining the ‘new feudalism’ which is emerging in advanced political economies and societies.