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After the collapse of the USSR, Eurasian integration projects, proposed by Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkey, began to develop in the post-Soviet space. Hence, there is growing interest in Eurasianism as an ideology. In this context, the study of the use of the Eurasianism's ideas in practice becomes relevant. The argument of this article is that Russia, Turkey, and Kazakstan have their own interpretations of Eurasianism's ideas to develop the ideological basis of their own integration projects. The purpose of the article is to answer the question: How is the Eurasianism used in integration projects of Russia, Turkey and Kazakstan?

The concept of Eurasianism has been viewed in terms of constructivism. On the basis of the principles of social constructivism, and in particular the works of constructivist ideologue Alexander Wendt, a comparative analysis was made. The ideas of Eurasianism in the integration processes of Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkey has been carried out based on the criteria such as the role of common ideas, identity, consciousness, memory and culture. The examples of mentioned countries were compared, to consider the development of the ideas of Eurasianism in practice.

The ideas of Eurasianism have a significant impact on the integration processes of the post-Soviet space. Eurasianism advocates for important factors such as respect for cultural and civilizational differences between different nations, their equality in the overall union and common development opportunities. Such factors are undoubtedly important for the success of integration projects. The reflection of many individual thoughts of classical Eurasians and Neo-Eurasians can be seen in the statements of various ministers and leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkey. The initiatives of these countries in creating integration projects also show the influence of the Eurasian concept.

In the 1990s, the study of Eurasianism gained new significance in academic circles. Articles and periodicals devoted to this concept were published. However, all parallels between variations in concepts of Eurasianism have been conducted on a theoretical level. The importance of this article lies in the fact that conceptual differences are compared in practice. Researchers had not previously considered the study of the relevance and productivity of Eurasianism in practice by comparing examples and experiences from different countries. The novelty of this article lies in its attempt to solve this problem.

The purpose of this paper is to examine processes of Eurasian integration and the veritable ‘culture war’ between Russia and the West over it, while contributing to the theoretical paradigm of geopolitical economy. This paradigm invites us to consider the multiple manifestations of an emerging multipolar world order while scrutinising the extent to which previously popular approaches to the study of international political economy were themselves enmeshed in projects, the architects of which aspired to global hegemony.

The paper employs critical historicism, an approach in which cultural difference is seen as the sedimentation of historically constituted material and ideational processes and which eschews cultural essentialism and orientalising tropes. It is through this lens that Russian state attempts at normalising Eurasian integration processes are examined.

I demonstrate that Russian state organs and officials, as well as ‘political technologists’ attempt to de-politicise processes of Eurasian integration by appealing to both the logic of cultural/civilisational compatibility of affected parties, as well as the logic of economic integration. Such portrayals invite scrutiny; however, it is important that we also consider how Eurasian integration initiatives are the product of a post-Soviet struggle over Eurasian space but represent something more than mere neo-Soviet revisionism.

The paper demonstrates its originality by situating ongoing processes of Eurasian integration within the longer post-Soviet conjuncture and amid processes of international contestation. Moreover, it situates Russian officials and political technologists as active contributors to international debates about the emerging multipolar world order.