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Based on Behavioral Theory of Negotiations (Walton & McKersie, 1965), the purpose of this paper is to discuss the existing gap between negotiation theory and pedagogy and presents an experiential teaching tool that closes this gap. The tool is a ‘serious game’ (Abt, 1975) that reinforces all four core negotiation subprocesses while allowing students to practice their negotiation skills and several critical business competencies in a realistic and improvisational context.

After successfully using NegotioPoly for five years, qualitative and quantitative data were collected in three sections of negotiation classes to assess student learning and behaviors while playing NegotioPoly and to collect student feedback on the effectiveness of NegotioPoly in teaching and reinforcing key negotiation skills.

Findings support that NegotioPoly is highly effective in engaging students in a series of realistic negotiations, joint problem solving and strategic decision-making. Results show that, during the game, students demonstrate their negotiation skills and learnings, and they practice all four negotiation subprocesses of distributive, integrative and intraorganizational bargaining and attitudinal structuring.

NegotioPoly enables students to engage in distributive and integrative bargaining, multiple levels of negotiations and coalitions in quick succession. Students practice organizational politics and adjust their negotiations based on relationships and social realities, as they demonstrate advanced deal-making behaviors and core business competencies of problem solving, decision-making, analytical skills and ability to work with others.

NegotioPoly reinforces core business competencies such as negotiation, problem solving, analytical skills and the ability to work in teams that employers look for and, therefore, is a useful tool for preparing students for the business world.

NegotioPoly is an experiential learning tool that closes the gap between negotiation theory and pedagogy while providing deep learning and realistic practice opportunities for students where they can use their negotiation skills in a gaming environment that uses multi-party and multi-round negotiations.

The paper aims at modelling a game‐theoretical framework that covers the basic mechanisms of lease contract negotiations while making allowance for relevant behavioural aspects.

Based on a review of literature about negotiation processes the work initially models, analyses, and solves lease contract negotiations as basic non‐cooperative game situations. It develops a game‐theoretical model based on the simple bi‐matrix normal form and the Rubinstein bargaining game while successively approximating real estate practice by integrating behavioural concepts.

On a conceptual level the work demonstrates that a game‐theoretical modelling of lease contract negotiations allows for a systematic structuring of the conflict situation between landlords and tenants. Different market situations that affect the perception of utility of the negotiating parties, as well as the consequences of mutual concessions and the creation of additional negotiation subjects that enhance the perceived contract utility can be taken into account by integrating simple mental models. On a practical level the paper shows that brokers' influence on the behavior of the negotiating partners can contribute to the efficiency of negotiation processes and the perceived contract utility. It identifies mutual concessions and the creation of incentives and additional negotiation subjects as possibilities to improve the attractiveness of a lease contract and to reach more beneficial contract provisions.

The paper offers a systematic examination of bargaining processes between landlords and potential tenants which can help professionals to understand lease contract negotiations as conflict situations and reach more profitable and satisfying results.

Working conditions, pay rates and the rights of workers to collectively negotiate have become important points of discussions in recent years, with support for unions and union applications rising to levels long unseen in America. In many instances, though, companies have responded aggressively. This is not the first time such a dynamic has played out in American business. This study aims to take a fresh look at one of America’s most prominent historical disputes between labor and ownership – the Homestead Massacre of 1892 – to glean lessons from that conflict that remain relevant to today’s business environment.

This study adopts game theory and the principles of repeated interaction to assess how differing discount factors led to differences in time orientations between the workers and the Carnegie company. These differing time orientations affected both the strategy each side deployed in the negotiations and the payoffs received by the parties. Letters, contemporary news reports and histories of the events leading up to and immediately following the 1892 Homestead Massacre are qualitatively analyzed with a genealogical pragmatic approach.

Differences in temporal orientation between management and workers exacerbated the conflict, with the workers adopting a more cooperative stance and distal time orientation, while the Carnegie company negotiated with a proximal time orientation and played to “win” a game that, in fact, could not be fully won or lost given its infinitely repeating nature. The result was a short-term victory for the Carnegie company but with long-term negative consequences that highlight the suboptimal outcome the company achieved by playing a proximal strategy in an infinite game.

Although the incident at Homestead is a well-studied labor dispute, many of the themes that preceded the incident have resurfaced in the modern work context. This work, by adopting game theory as an analytical framework, provides new insights into management mistakes that led to the labor conflict and lessons for what present-day managers can do to avoid exacerbating labor strife.

When disasters occur, the Chinese national or local government and their relevant departments (hereinafter referred to as the government) probably need to acquire emergency supplies from suppliers. Before concluding a transaction, the public officials usually negotiate the quality and price of the emergency supplies with the suppliers. They expect to achieve the best relief effect while the suppliers want to maximize their own interests. Therefore, in order to help the government acquire inexpensive emergency supplies with high quality in a short time, the purpose of this paper is to examine the negotiation process and proposes a negotiation principle for the staff.

This paper first elaborates the characteristics and impact factors of emergency supplies requisition negotiation. Then it establishes a model describing the negotiation on price and quality of emergency supplies between the public officials and suppliers. Afterwards, it proposes an algorithm which can estimate the success rate of the negotiation. Finally, the paper employs the conclusion of the model and algorithm to analyze the emergency supplies requisition negotiation process during the China Lushan earthquake.

This paper proposes a “WRAD” principle of emergency supplies requisition negotiation of public officials in disasters. First, they should ensure the requisition price is not too low. Second, they would widen the difference between the high price and low price. Third, it is best for them to follow the principle of “ascending negotiation and descending choice” while selecting multiple suppliers to negotiate.

This paper establishes a model to study the emergency supplies requisition negotiation process between the public officials and suppliers based on evolutionary game theory. The model assumes that both the public officials and suppliers are not fully rational individuals, and they need time to consult with each other to find out the optimal solution. This paper proposes an innovative action principle of the public officials during the negotiation process which can help it to acquire inexpensive, high-quality, emergency supplies within a short period from the suppliers.

A laboratory experiment examined the effects of time pressure (high versus low) and accountability to constituents (not‐accountable‐to‐constituents versus accountable‐to‐constituents) on the competitiveness of negotiators' interaction and on the outcome (i.e., agreement or impasse) of the negotiation. Using a newly developed negotiation game with the payoff structure of a game of chicken, we predicted and found an interaction effect. Based on the pattern of results we conclude that the effect of time pressure is contingent on the accountability to constituents of the negotiator. When negotiators are negotiating only for themselves, time pressure makes the negotiators act less competitive, and a higher proportion of the negotiations will result in an agreement. In contrast, when negotiators are negotiating on behalf of their con‐stituents, time pressure will result in more competitive interaction and in a higher proportion of impasses.

This experiment analyzes multi-offer versions of the signaling and screening litigation games, as well as a bilateral multi-offer litigation game. A plaintiff has either a low or a high claim on an uninformed defendant, and the two negotiate in an attempt to reach a pre-trial settlement. Trial is costly, and settlement generates surplus over which the two parties can bargain. In the signaling game, the defendant has the power to make the offer, while the plaintiff makes the offer in the screening game. Previous experiments on single-offer games find that disputes occur even when offers contain surplus not predicted under the theory, and fairness appears to be important in explaining deviations from theory. This research examines whether renegotiation in the form of successive sequential offers can yield efficiency gains via lower dispute rates. There are four main findings. One, under the one-sided multi-offer structure the excess dispute rate is 23 percentage-points lower in the screening game, and the high-offer dispute rate is 31 percentage-points lower in signaling game. The bilateral game yields an additional 15 percentage-point reduction in the high-offer dispute rate, but excess disputes persist. Two, in these games, proposers take advantage of the multi-offer opportunity and make around three to four offers per negotiation. Three, across games the surplus in a fair offer remains constant at about one-sixth of the surplus, but the empirical benchmark from which this is measured varies according to which player has the power to make the offer. In the one-sided games, the benchmark is the respective zero-surplus endpoint, but in the bilateral game the benchmark is the surplus midpoint. Fourth, dynamic behavior plays an important but complex role in observed outcomes. Multi-offer mechanisms may be alternatives to costly information transmission mechanisms like disclosure or discovery.

Economic integration in the 21st century is driven largely by market signals, rather than by inter-governmental trading arrangements. It also means much more than “free trade.” Integration needs to consider all of the ways economies are connected in international markets, including trade in goods, services ideas and information, along with essential and complementary international movements of people and capital.

Except for a small number of sensitive products, especially in agriculture, most goods and services face no, or very low, formal trade barriers. Reducing border protection of the remaining sensitive products will certainly require negotiations, but they are no longer the most strategic obstacles to economic integration.

These days, the problems of most concern of those engaged in international commerce are logistics, communications, coping with security concerns and with different regulations in other economies. The effective constraint to designing and implementing cooperative arrangements to reduce such costs or risks of international commerce is the capacity to do so, rather than political resistance. Inter-governmental negotiations are not always necessary to deal with these practical issues.

Therefore, it should be possible to have a logical division of effort between APEC and the WTO in the Asia Pacific with the WTO dealing with those issues that do need to be negotiated; and APEC dealing with the many other issues where negotiations are not needed. In the longer term, an efficient division of labour could also emerge between the G20 and the WTO.

An original concept for a Web‐based role play “SurfingGlobalChange” is proposed on the basis of multi‐year interdisciplinary teaching experience and constructivist pedagogy. Underlying didactic orientation is towards self‐guided learning, acquiring socially compatible “competence to act” in a globalised world, self‐optimising social procedures inside teams, process‐orientation and peer‐review instead of teacher’s review. Participating students find themselves in an argumentative battle where they put their marks at stake. A comparison with similar games highlights the increased level of responsibility attributed to and expected from learners using this kind of “digital game‐based learning”.

This paper examines the profit distribution of engineering projects in the integrated project delivery (IPD) mode. IPD is a new delivery method that can ameliorate many of the disadvantages of traditional delivery methods and improve project results. In the implementation of IPD, the profit distribution is key for ensuring the success of IPD projects.

This paper described a new method for characterizing profit distribution in the IPD mode. The payment function and Shapley value of the cooperative fuzzy game of fuzzy alliance were defined by considering the Choquet integral of the fuzzy measure. The participation of each player was considered, and the influence of participation on the profit distribution was discussed. Lastly, changes in the profit distribution of core participants under different alliance combinations were studied.

A case from a report of The American Institute of Architects (AIA) was used to verify the fuzzy alliance model. There was a significant correlation between the degree of participation of the owner, architect and builder and the profit distribution among these three participants.

The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, this paper selects a case with only three key participants in order to simplify the research. When there are many core participants, how to establish the alliance in the IPD mode and how to establish the corresponding profit distribution model, further work is certainly required to disentangle these complexities in models. Second, in this case, BIM technology has little impact on the income of the whole project. Therefore, this paper does not consider the impact of BIM technology on the marginal effect of the IPD project. Third, the contract type in the case is a custom tri-party based on IFOA. There is no classified discussion of the impact of different contracts on the profit distribute in the paper.

Based on the in-depth study of cooperative game with alliance structure, this paper promotes the classic cooperative game with alliance structure. The authors define the payoff function of fuzzy cooperative games by Choquet integral of fuzzy measure, and introduce the idea into the field of IPD. It aims at extending the solution to a cooperative game without a core. It can be obtained through a simple calculation. In the IPD alliance, the fuzziness and uncertainty of the participation degree of each participant will affect the profit of the whole project. The authors find that the higher the participation rate of players, the more profit each participant has. The greater the influence weight of the designer on the alliance, the lower the influence weight of the contractor on the alliance, the lower the participation of the contractor and the designer, and the lower the income distribution value of the three core participants. It shows a monotonous decline status.

For any construction enterprise, it can make more profits if it joins the grand alliance. In the IPD alliance, each participant can maximize their own interests, which can also promote the enthusiasm of construction enterprises to participate in the alliance and increase the application of IPD mode in AEC industry. This research method provides a new fast, effective, and more realistic solution method for cooperative countermeasures. It can be further extended to other cooperative game fields and advance a new research perspective and solution for the distribution of cooperative interests.

The contribution of this paper is the development of a fuzzy alliance model that provides a tool for measuring the profit distribution in IPD. This is the first quantitative model to connect the degree of participation with the profit distribution in IPD using fuzzy alliance.

As both workplace and personal interactions increasingly move into online discussions, the impact of various technological devices (such as cell phones and laptops) on behaviors and decisions must be better understood. This study aims to assess whether tasks done on cell phones or laptops prompt more deception for the sake of personal gain in decisions and negotiations, based on the associations held about each device.

Four empirical studies plus a single-study meta-analysis explore the rates of self-serving deceptive behavior based on the type of device used in decision-making tasks (ultimatum-game bargaining and negotiations).

Results show that using a laptop prompted more self-serving behavior than using a cell phone. Follow-up studies suggest that the dominant associations that people hold with each device – professional ones for the laptop and personal ones for cell phone – may help drive this effect.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the first to establish a link between technological device and behavioral outcomes in negotiations, even when the exact format of the information sent and received is identical (i.e. text-only format). The findings have implications for selecting devices for important negotiations and decisions, as some may promote more ethical behavior than others.