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This paper aims to examine whether CEO succession with gender change (male to female) affects audit fees in the Chinese setting. In addition, this study examines whether the relationship exists in both types of ownership, i.e. non-state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and SOEs.

This study uses data from all A-share non-financial firms listed on both the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) for the period 2009 to 2015. To draw inferences, this study uses pooled ordinary least squares regression as a baseline technique. This study performs sub-sample analyzes for robustness. To account for endogeneity, this study uses three techniques including firm fixed-effects regression, the two-step Heckman model and the system generalized method of moments (GMM).

This study documents a significantly negative relationship between CEO succession with gender change and audit fees. However, the negative effect of CEO succession on audit fees is more pronounced in non-SOEs than SOEs. This study also finds, in additional analyzes, a strong negative effect of female CEO succession on audit fees in sub-sample of large, high-risk, high-performance and firms audited by non-big auditors. The main finding is robust across three endogeneity techniques.

The findings add to the ongoing debate about the underrepresentation of women in key executive positions such as CEO. The results suggest that CEO succession from male to female has a favorable effect on the quality of internal monitoring mechanisms (due to the superior monitoring skills of women) and enhances the quality of financial reporting. The study has practical implications for regulatory bodies and corporate decision-makers; this study encourages them to look into considering women in the executive succession framework.

This study contributes to the literature by exploring the effect of CEO succession with gender change (male to female) on audit fees in the context of China and the existence of this relationship in non-SOEs and SOEs.

In this paper, the authors investigate whether an independent and gender-diverse compensation committee strengthens the relationship between top managers' pay and firm performance in Chinese companies. The authors also investigate whether the independent compensation committee composed of all male directors is effective in designing the optimal contract for executives.

The authors use data from A-share listed companies on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges from 2005 to 2015. As a baseline methodology, the authors use pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression to draw inferences. In addition, cluster OLS regression, two-stage least square regression, the two-stage Heckman test and the propensity score matching method are also used to control for endogeneity issues.

The authors find evidence that an independent or gender-diverse compensation committee strengthens the link between top managers' pay and firm performance; that the presence of a woman on the compensation committee enhances the positive influence of committee independence on this relationship; that a compensation committee's independence or gender diversity is more effective in designing top managers' compensation in legal-person-controlled firms than they are in state-controlled firms; that gender diversity on the compensation committee is negatively associated with top managers' total pay; and that an independent compensation committee pays top managers more.

The study results highlight the role of an independent compensation committee in designing optimal contracts for top managers. The authors provide empirical evidence that a woman on the compensation committee strengthens its objectivity in determining top managers' compensation. The study finding supports regulatory bodies' recommendations regarding independent and women directors.

The study findings contribute to the recent debate about gender equality around the globe. Given the discrimination against women, many regulatory bodies mandate a quota for women on corporate boards. The study findings support the regulatory bodies' recommendations by highlighting the economic benefit of having women in top management positions.

This study contributes to literature by investigating the largely overlooked questions of whether having a gender-diverse or independent compensation committee strengthens the relationship between top managers' pay and firm performance; whether an independent compensation committee is more efficient in setting executives' pay when it is gender-diverse; and whether the effect of independent directors and female directors on top managers' compensation varies based on the firm's ownership structure. Overall, the main contribution of the study is that the authors provide robust empirical evidence in support of the managerial power axiom.

This study aims to investigate the question concerning whether tournament incentives motivate chief executive officers (CEOs) to be socially responsible.

Data from all A-share Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the period from 2010 to 2015 are used. To draw inferences from the data, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and cluster OLS are used as a baseline methodology. To control for the possible issue of endogeneity, firm-fixed-effects regression, two-stage least squares regression and propensity score matching are used.

A reliable evidence is found that tournament incentives motivate CEOs to be more socially responsible. Additional analysis reveals that the positive effect of CEO tournament incentives on corporate social responsibility performance (CSRP) is more pronounced in state-owned firms than it is in non-state-owned firms. The study’s findings are consistent with tournament theory and the conventional wisdom hypothesis, which proposes that better incentives lead to competitiveness, which improves financial and social performance.

The study’s findings have implications for companies and regulators who wish to enhance CSRP by giving tournament incentives to top managers. Investment in social responsibility may reduce the conflict between executives and employees and improve the corporate culture.

This study contributes to the existing literature by providing the first evidence that CEOs’ tournament incentives play a vital role in CSRP. The study’s findings contribute to tournament theory.

This study aims to investigate whether the presence of female directors on audit committees affects audit fees in Chinese listed companies. This study also investigates whether the audit committee’s gender diversity moderates the relationship between the firm’s inherent situational factors (e.g. audit complexity and firm risk) and audit fees. Finally, this study investigates whether the effect of the audit committee’s gender diversity on audit fees varies with within-country institutional contingencies (e.g. state-owned enterprises [SOEs] vs non-SOEs and firms that are located in more developed regions vs firms that are located in less developed regions)

This study used the data of all A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the period from 2009 to 2015. The authors use ordinary least squares regression as a baseline methodology, along with firm fixed effect, Deference in Deference method, two-stage least squares regression, two-stage Heckman model and generalized method of moments models to control for the possible issue of endogeneity.

The study’s findings suggest that the presence of female directors on the audit committee improves internal monitoring and communication, which reduce the perceived audit risk and the need for assurances from external auditors. The results also suggest that female directors demand high-quality audits and further assurance from external auditors when the firm is more complex and riskier. In addition, the results suggest that within-country, institutional factors play significant role in shaping the governance role of gender-diverse audit committee.

The study contributes to the agency theory by providing evidence that the interaction between agency theory and corporate governance “board composition” generates an effective monitoring mechanism and contributing to the institutional theory by finding that role of female directors on audit committee varies from context to another. In addition, this study contributes to literature review of gender diversity in the boardroom by finding the economic benefit of having female directors on audit committee. Finally, this study has implications for policy-makers in promoting regulations to legalize women presence on the board, to external auditors in assessing control risk during planning the audit, to those who responsible for appointing audit committee members.

The authors extend earlier studies by providing novel evidence on the relationship between gender-diverse audit committees and audit fees in terms of both the supply- and demand-side perspectives; that female directors moderate the relationship between firm inherent situational factors (e.g. audit complexity and firm risk) and audit fees; and that the effect of audit committees’ gender diversity on audit fees varies with sub-national institutional contingencies.