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This paper aims to present an analysis of the role of financial incentives, moral hazard and conflicts of interests leading up to the 2008 financial crisis.

The study’s analysis has identified common structural flaws throughout the securitization food chain. These structural flaws include inappropriate incentives, the absence of punishment, moral hazard and conflicts of interest. This research sees the full impact of these structural flaws when considering their co-occurrence throughout the financial system. The authors address systemic defects in the securitization food chain and examine the inter-relationships among homeowners, mortgage originators, investment banks and investors. The authors also address the role of exogenous factors, including the SEC, AIG, the credit rating agencies, Congress, business academia and the business media.

The study argues that the lack of criminal prosecutions of key financial executives has been a key factor in creating moral hazard. Eight years after the Great Recession ended in the USA, the financial services industry continues to suffer from a crisis of trust with society.

An overwhelming majority of Americans, 89 per cent, believe that the federal government does a poor job of regulating the financial services industry (Puzzanghera, 2014). A study argues that the current corporate lobbying framework undermines societal expectations of political equality and consent (Alzola, 2013). The authors believe the Singapore model may be a useful starting point to restructure regulatory agencies so that they are more responsive to societal concerns and less responsive to special interests. Finally, the widespread perception is that the financial services sector, in particular, is ethically challenged (Ferguson, 2012); perhaps there would be some benefit from the implementation of ethical climate monitoring in firms that have been subject to deferred prosecution agreements for serious ethical violations (Arnaud, 2010).

The authors believe the paper makes a truly original contribution. They provide new insights via their analysis of the role of financial incentives, moral hazard and conflicts of interests leading up to the 2008 financial crisis.

This conceptual paper focuses on a common observation in the implementation stage of reward-based crowdfunding (RBC) – entrepreneurs' failures and delays in delivery of rewards to investors, which, in turn, may be perceived as violations of reward delivery obligations.

Drawing on entrepreneurial personality theory and psychological contract theory, this paper develops propositions and identifies factors related to both entrepreneurs (overconfidence and narcissism) and factors related to investors (types of motivators and psychological contracts) that may explain the perceived violations of reward delivery obligations. Implications for theory and practice are also discussed.

The theoretical analysis, by wielding two independently developed literatures, has demonstrated that it is important to investigate factors that are related to both investors and entrepreneurs in understanding issues and challenges at different stages of the RBC model. The authors believe that the current analysis provides an integrated understanding and a solid foundation for researchers to further examine these issues by empirically testing these propositions.

The authors examined two previously understudied psychological factors in the context of RBC – entrepreneurial traits, mainly overconfidence and narcissism, and the type of psychological contracts formed between investors and entrepreneurs, both of which, according to McKenny et al. (2017), need greater attention from researchers studying crowdfunding.

Due to the difficulty in obtaining data on life insurance contracts, previous studies on moral hazard of life insurance are confined to conceptual discussion or surveys of Korean health panel. To fill this gap, using comprehensive data from Postal insurance market, we perform an empirical study on moral hazard of life insurance from the period of 2008 to 2013. Our empirical findings are summarized as follows. First, employing the Heckman (1979)'s two stage model, we find that having indemnity private health insurance increases the number and period of medical utilization. In addition, number of private health insurance has a positive and highly significant effect on the number of period of medical utilization. Our empirical finding indicates that in a life insurance market with asymmetric information, there exists a moral hazard in order to maximize economic utility.

In the transitional process of promoting market-oriented interest rate, China is confronted with an important theoretical and practical issue: how to avoid bank runs and realize the smooth operation of the financial system. The purpose of this paper is to construct a bank-run dynamic model by taking into account a market environment with the transmission of multiple rounds of noise information, a comprehensive consideration of depositors’ expectation of return on assets (or earning rate/yields of assets), the efficiency of information processing and dissemination, and the different motives for premature withdrawal.

The authors discussed the dynamic process of bank runs, furnished the ratio and number of each round of bank run, and characterized the corresponding dynamic equilibrium as well. Furthermore, the authors expanded the benchmark model by incorporating the deposit insurance system (DIS) to discuss the action mechanism of DIS overruns.

The results show that DIS implementation has two opposite effects: stabilized expectation and moral hazard, by virtue of its influence over the two types of premature withdrawal motives of depositors; the implementation effect of DIS rests with the dual-effect comparison, which is endogenous to the institutional environment.

The policy implications are as follows: while implementing DIS, it is necessary to establish and improve the corresponding institutional construction and supporting measures, to consolidate market discipline and improve the supervisory role of the bank’s internal governance mechanism, so as to reduce the potential moral hazards. The financial system reform shall be furthered and the processing and dissemination efficiency of information be elevated to prompt depositors to form stable withdrawal expectations, thereby enhancing the stabilizing effect of DIS.

Over the last ten years (2010–2019), the amount of nonperforming loans (NPLs) has been more than tripled in the banking industry of Bangladesh. Thus, this paper explores the behavioral dimensions, which contribute to the NPLs.

By analyzing social, cultural, psychological, political, economic, internal control mechanism and law enforcement contexts of Bangladesh, this study identifies nepotism (NE), moral hazard (MH ), inadequate collateral (IC), poor credit assessment (CA), lack of proper monitoring (LPM), repayment flexibility (RF), business risk (BR) and lending interest rate (LIR) as the catalysts of raising NPLs. Next, a structured questionnaire survey has been performed in Bangladesh among bank officials who closely work in credit risk management, credit supervision, corporate finance and loan recovery department. Finally, partial least squares (PLS) path modeling, a variance-based technique of structural equation modeling, is used in this study as a statistical tool to analyze the data.

This study finds that moral hazard problem, lack of proper monitoring, inadequate collateral and nepotism have significant positive impact on the raising of NPLs. Unfortunately, this study does not find any statistical significance of poor credit assessment, business risk and repayment flexibility on the NPLs in Bangladesh. Finally, this study reveals that lending interest rate has significant positive impact on the NPLs. Hence, this study concludes that domestic lending interest rate is not lower enough, and so this double-digit interest rate affects negatively to loan repayment.

This study concludes that moral hazard problem of borrower, lack of board independence, lack of proper monitoring, form and extent of collateral, management lobbying, indecorous personal guarantee by management, dependent-independent directors and nepotism are extensively contributing for occurring NPLs in Bangladesh. These noninstitutionalized stimulators should adequately be scrutinized by regulatory bodies, policy makers and banks. Besides, LIR needs to be decreased in a convenient level for mitigating NPLs.

This study is the empirical evidence of behavioral dimensions related with the growth of NPLs in Bangladesh by taking direct response from knowledgeable bankers.

Contemporary supply chain relationships inherently rely on delegation of work between organizations and, thus, are subject to agency problems for which a wide range of governance mechanisms exist. This review of agency theory (AT), across four distinct fields, explains the connection between governance mechanisms and supply chain relationship types.

The study uses a systematic literature review (SLR) of articles using AT in a supply chain context from the operations and supply chain management, general management, marketing, and economics fields.

The authors categorize the governance mechanisms identified to create a typology of agency relationships in supply chains.

The developed typology provides parsimonious theory on different forms of supply chain agency relationships and takes a step towards a “supply chain-oriented agency theory” explaining and predicting relationship types and governance in supply chains. Furthermore, a future research agenda calls for more accurate measuring of agency costs, to examine residual gains alongside residual losses, to take a dual-sided perspective of agency relations and to adopt AT to examine more complex supply networks.

The review provides a menu of governance mechanisms and describes situations under which these mechanisms could be deployed to guide managers when developing their supply chain relationships.

The first review to combine and elaborate views from four major disciplines using AT as a lens to supply chain relationships. Expanding the traditional set of governance mechanisms provides academics and practitioners with a bigger “menu” of options to consider.

The restructuring of shipping and shipbuilding companies in the midst of rapidly shrinking global shipping demand has become a prominent issue in Korea. In shipping finance, loan syndication featuring many creditors surges as the preferred option. However, increasing the numbers of creditors in the syndicate results in two opposite effects. First is the beneficial effect from their enhanced monitoring power. On the other hand, there is the adverse effect resulting from increased difficulty in coordination when syndicate members increase, particularly in bankruptcy. Our aim of this paper is to analyze the role of finance in the shipping and shipbuilder markets, and determine the theoretical optimal number of creditors for the shipping finance syndicate based on Bolton and Scharfstein (1996). The two issues above result from moral hazard and non-verifiability: coordination among many creditors for collection of bonds in case of default, and the enhancement of monitoring private benefit exploitation by the ship-owner during default. Considering the two conflicting forces result from an increase in creditor membership, we draw conclusions on determining the optimal number of creditors by considering trade-offs between these two factors: More creditors are preferred when the monitoring effect dominates. Otherwise, less creditors are preferred.

The paper aims to identify the differences between developed and developing country firms with respect to firm-specific and country-level determinants of their capital structure. For this purpose, all constituent firms in one of the oldest Islamic equity indices, Dow Jones Islamic Market World Index (DJIM), are considered and the Muslim-majority status of each firm's domicile country is recognized.

The study employs Hausman–Taylor random effects regression with endogenous covariates to explain the debt ratios of firms in DJIM by separating them into developed and developing country subsamples in an unbalanced panel data setting. Developing country subsample is further split into two based on the Muslim-majority status of each firm's domicile country.

Consistent with the previous literature, this study finds that firm-specific characteristics are the main determinants of their capital structure. Additionally, the paper shows that country-level characteristics have an impact on the debt ratio, however, the types of factors vary across developed and developing countries. Debt ratios in developing country firms are lower than those in developed country firms, largely due to the significantly smaller leverage ratios of firms in Muslim-majority countries. Although the debt ratios of DJIM firms are higher in “non-Muslim” countries, the set of firm-level capital structure determinants are not statistically explained by operating in a “Muslim” country. The study also documents that, before the global financial crisis of 2008, companies in developing countries have gradually become less leveraged worldwide.

This paper provides a new perspective into the differences between developed and developing country firms' capital structures by focusing on a relatively homogeneous data set restricted by leverage screening rules of an Islamic equity index and recognizing the Muslim-majority status of each firm's domicile country.

This paper aims to explore the design of management teams when the critical task facing individual managers is monitoring the performance of worker teams and producing performance measures under uncertain information environments.

The authors use a multi-agent LEN framework – linear contract, exponential utility and normal density – to model the incentive provision and organizational design.

The main lesson is that the use of performance measures under uncertainty is greatly affected by the potential for free-riding in the very monitoring activities which generate the measures to begin with. Accordingly, the value of having a management team, that is the incremental benefit of having a second manager, depends on the monitoring technology. Of particular importance are the potential free-riding in monitoring effort among multiple managers and synergies gained from having more than one manager, such as correlation among the performance measures produced or improvement due to splitting workers pool into separate groups for each manager to monitor separately.

The paper pushes this line of research further by explicitly modeling the endogenous process of signal generation within a rich economic environment. In this environment, number of workers being evaluated and number of managers who produce the signals are both endogenous. Furthermore, both workers and managers are subject to moral hazard problem. In particular, the managers suffer from potential free-riding problems but may benefit from synergistic forces due to team monitoring.

The paper aims to disentangle the physiological credit risk from the credit risk coming from the inefficient screening and monitoring management process. The analysis is conducted on a sample of 338 Italian banks–56 joint-stock banks (SpA), 23 cooperative banks (Popolari) and 259 mutual banks (BCCs)–over the time period 2006–2017.

The authors use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the efficient frontier, as a set of best management credit practices, which minimises the credit risk defined on the basis of the level of loans granted, the technical structure of the loan portfolio (such as credit lines, mortgages, consumer loans and other technical loan categories) and the interest rate charges.

The empirical results show that the increase in non-performing loans (NPLs) is related both to the severe and protracted recession in Italy, which significantly reduced borrowers' capacity to service their debt, and to other factors, such as banks' lending monitoring policies with limited capacity to work-out defaulted loans.

The authors propose a new approach to the study of the performance of the credit process. With the stochastic frontier, the physiological credit risk, assumed by the bank according to its lending activity and management choices, is separated from the credit risk resulting from an inefficient management of the screening and monitoring process. In addition, the authors analyse the determinants of the excess of NPLs. This aspect is considered particularly original because the scientific contributions which consider the causes of NPLs have largely focused on the level of NPLs not considering the physiological part, linked to the structure of the bank's loan portfolio and its operational strategy and therefore not compressible and in any case not attributable to mismanagement or moral hazard.