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This chapter explores how state–business relations (SBR) in the Arab world influence public policy on industrial clusters and the resulting economic benefits from these clusters on innovation and productivity. The main SBR actors are identified as the state, big capitalists (or tycoons), and small and medium business managers and owners (entrepreneurs). The framework used here focuses on interactors' power relations. Such power relations are reflected in the ability/inability of the state to enforce its will with less consultation with and/or favorite treatment to nonstate actors. It is also reflected in the ability/inability of nonstate actors to act individually or organize in order to defend their interests and influence government policy formulation and implementation. Such power relations are reflected in the ability of nonstate actors to organize – especially entrepreneurs – and the level of favoritism provided by state officials to tycoons. The power dynamics in SBR lead to different SBR modes and different economic outcomes, one of which is the development of industrial clusters and how efficient they are in fostering innovation and productivity in Arab countries. This chapter suggests that the development of industrial clusters in the Arab world necessitates institutional reform, addressing the power relations governing SBR in the region. A more open political system allowing the independence and growth of broad-based business associations and curbing favoritism is necessary for realizing the benefits from implementing recommended policies, leading to cluster development and reaping the economic benefits from such development. Using statistical and regression analysis, empirical evidence supporting these arguments is provided.