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This paper discusses the American debate over price controls and economic stabilization after World War II, when the transition from a war economy to a peace economy was characterized by bottlenecks in the productive system and shortages of food and other basic consumer goods, directly affecting the living standard of the population, the public opinion, and political discourse. Specifically, we will focus on the economist Franco Modigliani and his proposal for a “Plan to meet the problem of rising meat and other food prices without bureaucratic controls.” The plan prepared by Modigliani in October 1947 was based on a system of taxes and subsidies to foster a proper distribution of disposable income and warrant a minimum meat consumption for each individual without encroaching market mechanisms and consumers’ freedom. We will discuss the contents of the plan and its further refinements, and the reactions it prompted from fellow economists, the public opinion, and the political world. Although the Plan was not eventually implemented, it was an important initiative for several reasons: first, it showed the increasing importance of fiscal policy among postwar government tools of intervention in the economic sphere; second, it showed a third way between direct government intervention and full-fledged laissez faire, in tune with the postwar political climate; third, it proposed a Keynesian macroeconomic approach to price and income stabilization, strongly based on econometric and microeconomic foundations. The Meat Plan was thus a fundamental step in Modigliani’s effort to build the “neoclassical synthesis” between Keynesian and Neoclassical economics, which would deeply influence his own career and the evolution of academic studies and government practices in the United States.

The purpose of this article is to expose the Miller‐Modigliani 1961 Ponzi scheme that has masqueraded as a dividend irrelevance proof, and show that it constituted a Ponzi scheme at the time of publication and ever since publication. This is important especially as Miller‐Modigliani 1961 stated in the first sentence of their article that their dividend irrelevance proof was targeted at corporate officials, investors and economists seeking to undertake and appraise the functioning of capital markets.

The equations and notation used by Miller‐Modigliani 1961 to prove dividend irrelevance were carefully considered and analysed in order to establish whether proof reliably, validly and unambiguously proved dividend irrelevance. In addition, statute on both sides of the Atlantic, UK and USA, was considered in order to ascertain the legal standing of their proof.

This article shows that the Miller‐Modigliani 1961 dividend irrelevance proof constituted a recipe for a Ponzi scheme in terms of statute at the time of publication and ever since publication. Since Miller‐Modigliani 1961 made extensive reference to the works of eminent finance researchers and academics of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, as well as to their Modigliani‐Miller 1958 seminal article, and attentively present and discuss the intricacies of the arguments these researchers made to the progression of knowledge, it would be challenging to content that they were unaware or ignorant of important legislation that applied in 1961.

There is no evidence from a scrutiny of publicly available secondary sources to suggest that the Miller‐Modigliani 1961 Ponzi scheme, alias “dividend irrelevance” has previously been done or published. This is surprising because the Miller‐Modigliani 1961 dividend irrelevance proof has occupied a particularly prominent position in the finance literature and has been the subject of numerous studies and research projects.

The purpose of this paper is to offer a viewpoint on the 1961 scientific method and research methodology used by Miller and Modigliani to derive the conclusion that dividends are irrelevant, with reference to the UK Companies Act of 2006, specifically Sections 829‐840 that concern distributions, and Section 172 that stipulates the duties of the directors in their promotion of the success of the company.

The relevant sections of the UK Companies Act of 2006 concerning distributions and the duty of directors to promote the success of the company were studied. It was followed by a detailed analysis of the article by Miller and Modigliani, in particular the purpose, assumptions, the 30 equations that comprise their model, and their interpretive logic in drawing conclusions from their equations.

In effect, Miller and Modigliani exclude dividends as a determinant of share value, side‐step the purpose of their research, do not state assumptions upon which their analysis and interpretations are reliant, and disregard the conceptual difference between income and capital. On the basis of their interpretive logic not only is the dividend decision irrelevant but so too is the financing decision and important aspects of company law. Nonetheless, the erroneous doctrinal view that is presented by Miller and Modigliani continues to have obstinately resolute adherents, as evidenced by its uncritical presentation in authoritative textbooks on financial management.

This paper's view is that the continued uncritical presentation of Miller and Modigliani cannot be justified as an approach consistent with sound research methodology.

The primary purpose of this paper is to develop the translation formula between the required return on unlevered and levered equity for the specific case where cash flows have a finite lifetime and the flow to debt is prespecified. The secondary purpose of this paper is to underpin the importance of the type of stochasticity of cash flows for translation formulas. A general derivation of such formulas and the discount rate in the free cash flow approach is shown.

The paper starts with the same assumptions that have been applied by Modigliani and Miller (1963), Miles and Ezzell (1980) and other researchers. Then the paper develops the mathematical foundations to apply a deterministic backward-iterative scheme for valuing cash flows. After stating the valuation formulas for levered and unlevered equity, debt and tax shields, the authors mathematically derive the relationship between the unlevered return and levered return on equity.

Conventional translation formulas apply to very special cases. They can generally not be used for projects with nonconstant leverage and a finite lifetime. In general, translation formulas depend on continuing values, cash flows, leverage, taxation, risk-free rate, etc. In this paper, the translation depends on the structure of the debt in addition to the well-known parameters in conventional formulas. This paper formula contains the Modigliani-Miller translation formula as a special case.

The authors develop a novel formula for the translation of the required return on unlevered to levered equity. With this formula, the authors offer a solution for the consistent valuation of cash flows with a limited lifetime and given debt financing.

This paper seeks to evaluate the risk‐adjusted performance of the largest US‐based equity mutual funds using rigorous analysis grounded in modern portfolio theory and present the results in a manner which is comprehensible to a lay investor.

This study evaluates the performance of the 20 largest US‐based mutual funds using risk‐adjusted returns during 1995‐2004. In particular, a relatively new risk‐adjusted performance measure by Modigliani and Modigliani is used to evaluate these equity funds. This study also utilizes a variation of the Sortino Ratio to account for downside risk.

The results show that the funds with the highest returns may lose their attractiveness once the degree of risk had been factored into the analysis. Conversely, some funds may look very attractive once their low risk is factored into their performance.

Future researchers may want to investigate the effects of factors, such as fund manager, compensation, service fees, corporate governance metrics, and overweighting in risky industries on the performance of mutual funds.

The empirical evidence presented in this study can be used as input in decision making by investors who are exploring the possibility of participating in the stock market via large mutual funds, but are not sure of what selection criteria to employ.

The paper is one of the first studies that apply the new M² measure to evaluate the performance of mutual funds. Various other performance metrics are also utilized including the Sharpe, Sortino, Treynor measures and Jensen's α.

Professor Modigliani argues that, owing to considerations derived from the model of perfect competition, price controls in general enhance economic welfare and that this applies in particular to health care. Maintains the diametric opposite on both counts: that the perfectly competitive model is logically flawed and therefore cannot be applied to the real world of health care, and that price controls, there or anywhere else, have negative repercussions on economic welfare. Further, that the economics profession is well advised to reject the perfectly competitive model, and instead embrace one of rivalistic competition.

This study evaluates risk‐adjusted performance of socially responsible mutual funds during the period 1991‐2000, using objective statistical measures grounded in modern portfolio theory. A socially responsible mutual fund is defined as one which employs “social screens” in stock selection, such as whether a fi rm manufactures tobacco products, whether it is in the gambling business, whether it heeds environmental safety, its human rights records, etc. The main objective of this study is to provide empirical documentation on the risk‐adjusted returns of these mutual funds, for the benefit of investors. To our knowledge, this is one of the first, if not the first, academic study to utilize a relatively new risk‐adjusted performance measure, posited by Nobel Laureate Franco Modigliani and Leah Modigliani in 1997 (hereafter referred to as M Squared), to evaluate socially responsible mutual funds. The idea that underlies their methodology is to adjust the investment risk of a mutual fund to the level of risk in an unmanaged benchmark stock‐market index and then measure the returns on the risk‐matched fund. The M Squared measure not only relates the level of risk to the level of reward, but also enables risk‐adjusted returns to be reported on a percentage basis, rather than on an absolute basis, which makes them more easily understood by the average investor. The results of this study can be used in decision making by investors who seek objective criteria to select a socially responsible mutual fund from among a menu of several funds.

The purpose of this paper is to establish the flow-to-equity method, the free cash flow (FCF) method, the adjusted present value method and the relationships between these methods when the FCF appears as an annuity. More specifically, we depart from the two most widely used evaluation settings. The first setting is that of Modigliani and Miller who based their analysis on a stationary FCF. The second setting is that of Miles and Ezzell who worked with an FCF that represents an autoregressive possess of first order.

Inspired by recent observations in the literature concerning cash flows, discount rates and values in discounted cash flow (DCF) methods, we mathematically derive DCF valuation formulas for annuities.

The following relationships are established: (a) the correct discount rate of the tax shield when the free cash flow takes the form of a first-order autoregressive annuity, (b) the direct valuation of the tax shield from the free cash flow for a first-order autoregressive annuity, (c) the correct translation from the required return on unlevered equity to the levered equity, when the free cash flow is a stationary annuity and (d) direct calculation of the unlevered and levered firm values and the value of the tax shield for a stationary annuity.

Until now the complete set of formulas for the valuation of stochastic annuities by different DCF methods has not been established in the literature. These formulas are developed here. These formulas are important for practitioners and academics when it comes to the valuation of cash flows of finite lifetime.

This paper aims to evaluate the risk‐adjusted performance of US‐based international equity funds using objective statistical measures grounded in modern portfolio theory, and to present the results in a manner which is easily understood by the average investor.

This study evaluates the performance of 50 large US‐based international equity funds using risk‐adjusted returns during 1994‐2003. In particular, a relatively new risk‐adjusted performance measure (M squared), first proposed by Franco Modigliani and Leah Modigliani in 1997, is used to evaluate these equity funds.

The empirical results show that the funds with the highest average returns may lose their attractiveness to investors once the degree of risk embedded in the fund has been factored into the analysis. Conversely, some funds, whose average (unadjusted) returns do not stand out, may look very attractive once their low risk is factored into their performance.

It may be worthwhile to examine the effects of factors such as fund manager compensation, service fees, corporate governance metrics, and overweighting in risky countries/regions on the performance of international equity funds.

The evidence presented in this study can be used as input in decision making by investors who are exploring the possibility of participating in the global stock market via international equity funds.

This paper is one of the first studies that apply the new M squared measure to evaluate the performance of international equity funds using both domestic and international benchmark indices. Various other performance metrics are also utilized including Sharpe and Treynor measures, and Jensen's Alpha.

We examine the ability of co-founders of a firm to create an artificial (or “homemade”) dividend as in Miller and Modigliani (1961). We employ traditional discounted valuation in showing that the act of creating an artificial dividend may decrease the value of the firm because it can divert funds from investment to the consumption of perquisites. Only where there is complete trust in the party to which the shares are sold can a co-founder costlessly create an artificial dividend. It seems likely that a dividend policy, idiosyncratic to the firm’s founders, would be established at the founding of the firm.