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To explain a joint effort by the national securities exchanges to implement a Tick Size Pilot program. The pilot program would widen the minimum quoting and trading increments for certain small cap stocks.

The article reviews the Tick Size Pilot plan generally, discusses how the final plan differs from proposed plan, describes securities that will be affected by the plan, and the various test groups under the plan.

Pilot program is designed to provide the SEC with empirical data regarding the impact that tick size may have on the trading of small cap stocks.

Exchanges will be required to adopt rules to implement the pilot program. Broker-Dealers will be required to adopt written policies and procedures to comply with the pilot plan when quoting and for trading.

Practical guidance from experienced securities lawyers. The article describes the operation of the new pilot program.

The SEC has proposed several rules and rule amendments that, if adopted, would impact market structure of the equities markets for years to come. This article summarizes those proposed changes and describes some of the early reaction to them by both industry and regulators. Regulation NMS, as the rule proposals are collectively called, is intended to accomplish three primary objectives: (1) to promote equal regulation of market centers, (2) to update antiquated rules, and (3) to promote greater order interaction and displayed depth. Regulation NMS, which is intended to “advance the dialogue” on market structure issues, consists of rule proposals in four substantive areas. First, the SEC has proposed a uniform trade‐through rule for all national market system (“NMS”) market centers that would affirm the principle of price priority while addressing the differences between automated and manual markets. Second, the SEC has proposed a uniform market access rule with a de minimis fee standard intended to assure non‐discriminatory access to the best prices displayed by NMS market centers without mandating hard linkages such as the Intermarket Trading System (“ITS”).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact on stock liquidity following the reduction of minimum tick size from $0.01 to $0.005 for a selection of dual-listed and property stocks on the New Zealand Exchange (NZX) during 2011.

Various liquidity measures were examined six months either side of the change in minimum tick size for the eligible stocks and these were compared to a sample of stocks matched on similar liquidity characteristics. Liquidity measures examined in the paper include quoted and effective spread, volume, depth and binding-constraint probability.

After controlling for firms matched on similar pre-period liquidity characteristics both spread and depth decline significantly. Evidence that small firms experience significant declines in trading activity was also found, and while firms with higher binding-constraints probability have greater declines in spread, their decline in depth is greater still.

The small sample of 17 stocks eligible for the $0.005 minimum tick size potentially impacts on the strength of the statistical analysis. As such, it is harder to detect statistically significant changes in liquidity.

These findings have important implications for policymakers as the hoped for benefits of smaller tick increments may only be fully realized by larger more active stocks.

The paper examines the impact of a change in minimum tick size on eligible New Zealand Exchange (NZX) stocks to determine whether it meet the stated NZX goal of boosting liquidity.

This paper aims to incorporate a market wide buying and selling pressure cost component into a spread decomposition model as spread cost component.

The paper extends a commonly used trade indicator spread decomposition model to include a component common to all stocks of a specialist firm and a market wide component common to all stocks.

Strong evidence is found that specialists consider this common factor cost component when they set bid and ask quotes. Some specialist firms also take the next logical step and specifically manage their firm wide stock inventories. The common factor is in percentage terms largest for securities with the highest trade frequencies.

The relative importance of the common factor spread component decreases as the pricing grid becomes finer, but remains highly significant under the decimal trading regime.

This is the first study to document not‐security‐specific spread cost components that are common to all stocks for which a specialist firm makes markets and to all stocks in the market. Using the model it is shown that market wide uncertainty translates into spreads of individual securities.

The purpose of this summary is to provide excerpts of selected Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Regulatory Notices and Disciplinary Actions issued in July, August, and September 2010.

The paper provides excerpts from FINRA Regulatory Notices and Disciplinary Actions.

Regulatory Notice 10‐32: Effective August 2, 2010, the Board composition and governance structure of FINRA Dispute Resolution, Inc. (a subsidiary of FINRA) will more closely parallel the composition and governance structure of the FINRA, Inc. Board of Governors (FINRA Board). 10‐34: The SEC approved amendments to FINRA Rule 8312, which governs the release of information 10‐36: Effective September 7, 2010, amendments to FINRA Rule 2360 (Options) extend the cut‐off time for the submission of certain contrary exercise advices (CEAs) by one hour to 7.30 pm Eastern Time (ET). 10‐42: Effective February 11, 2011, and May 9, 2011, are new FINRA rules that extend certain Regulation NMS protections to quoting and trading of over‐the‐counter (OTC) Equity Securities. 10‐43: On September 10, 2010, the SEC approved amendments to FINRA Rule 6121 (Trading Halts Due to Extraordinary Market Volatility) to expand the trading‐pause pilot, originally adopted on June 10, 2010, to include all stocks in the Russell 1000 Index and specified ETPs.

These are direct excerpts designed to provide a useful digest for the reader and an indication of regulatory trends. The FINRA staff is aware of this summary but has neither reviewed nor edited it. For further detail as well as other useful information, the reader should visit www.finra.org

Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely, innovative thought structures and attitudes have almost always forced economic institutions and modes of behaviour to adjust. We learn from the history of economic doctrines how a particular theory emerged and whether, and in which environment, it could take root. We can see how a school evolves out of a common methodological perception and similar techniques of analysis, and how it has to establish itself. The interaction between unresolved problems on the one hand, and the search for better solutions or explanations on the other, leads to a change in paradigma and to the formation of new lines of reasoning. As long as the real world is subject to progress and change scientific search for explanation must out of necessity continue.

The purpose of this paper is to provide the current state of knowledge about the Flash Crash. It has been one of the remarkable events of the decade and its causes are still a matter of debate.

This paper reviews the literature since the early days to most recent findings, and critically compares the most important hypotheses about the possible causes of the crisis.

Among the causes of the Flash Crash, the literature has propsed the following: a large selling program triggering the sales wave, small but not negligible delays suffered by the exchange computers, the micro-structure of the financial markets, the price fall leading to margin cover and forced sales, some types of feedback loops leading to downward price spiral, stop-loss orders coupled with scarce liquidity that triggered price reduction. On its turn leading to further stop-loss activation, the use of Intermarket Sweep Orders, that is, orders that sacrificed search for the best price to speed of execution, and dumb algorithms.

The results of the previous section are condensed in a set of policy implications and recommendations.

Salary scales for teachers in different grades are outlined, and examples are given to help newcomers from industry estimate their positions on the scale. In previous articles the general structure of the grades in Further Education has been described, as have the ways in which people in industry can prepare themselves for full‐time teaching careers.

Allyn Young′s lectures, as recorded by the young Nicholas Kaldor, survey the historical roots of the subject from Aristotle through to the modern neo‐classical writers. The focus throughout is on the conditions making for economic progress, with stress on the institutional developments that extend and are extended by the size of the market. Organisational changes that promote the division of labour and specialisation within and between firms and industries, and which promote competition and mobility, are seen as the vital factors in growth. In the absence of new markets, inventions as such play only a minor role. The economic system is an inter‐related whole, or a living “organon”. It is from this perspective that micro‐economic relations are analysed, and this helps expose certain fallacies of composition associated with the marginal productivity theory of production and distribution. Factors are paid not because they are productive but because they are scarce. Likewise he shows why Marshallian supply and demand schedules, based on the “one thing at a time” approach, cannot adequately describe the dynamic growth properties of the system. Supply and demand cannot be simply integrated to arrive at a picture of the whole economy. These notes are complemented by eleven articles in the Encyclopaedia Britannica which were published shortly after Young′s sudden death in 1929.