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This study investigates Rokkan's research programme in the light of the differences between case- and variables-based methodologies. Three phases of the research process are distinguished. Studying the way Rokkan actually proceeded in the research within his Europe project, we find that he follows the protocols of case-methodologies such as grounded theory. In the second phase of the research process, however, he constructs variables-based models as tools for his macro-historical comparisons. To get to variables from the sensitizing concepts coded in the first phase, Rokkan defines his variables as close to cases as possible: variables as nominal level typologies, types as variable values. He thus faces two interrelated dilemmas. First, a philosophy of science dissonance: he legitimates his research only with reference to a variable-methodology, while his research is thoroughly case based. Second, a paradox of double coding: using variable-based models in the second phase, the status of the knowledge available in the first phase memos is degraded. Rokkan cannot decide between the two main solutions to these dilemmas: The first solution is to discard his heterogeneous data, instead working only with homogeneous data that opens up to more consistently variables-oriented research. The second solution is to replace the notion of variables/variable values with typology/types, thereby returning to cases, pursuing comparative case reconstructions in the third phase of research. The study concludes in favour of the second solution.

Scandal is the disruptive publicity of alleged misconduct and it is important for organizations because of its severe consequences. Distinguishing between single-actor scandals, i.e., scandals that result from publicity of misconduct by a single actor, and multiple-actor scandals, i.e., scandals that result from publicity of misconduct of a similar type by multiple actors, we develop a framework for studying scandal dynamics that draws a distinction between how scandals start (single-actor or multiple-actor) and how they end (single-actor or multiple-actor). We focus specifically on spillover scandals (from single to multiple actors) and scapegoating scandals (from multiple to single actors) and identify several mechanisms that affect the likelihood of these two important types of scandals. We conclude by developing a research agenda that builds upon the central contribution of our framework: the distinction between single- and multiple-organization scandals and the transitions that result in spillovers and scapegoating.

An emerging stream of research has identified critical events as spikes in societal interest that increase public attention to firm behavior and can function as exogenous triggers for change. With respect to misconduct, firms vary considerably in how they respond to critical events, and for a visible change in their undesirable behavior to transpire, there needs to be ongoing accumulation of work by social-control agents. While social-control agents are often boundedly rational in their decision-making, most studies have overlooked the ability of critical events to restrict or redirect collective attention among such agents. Drawing on the case of a regulatory agency’s enforcement actions against violations of anti-money laundering regulations by three European banks, we investigate the influence of critical events on social-control agents’ enforcement behavior. This study achieves two goals: first, we identify three types of fieldwide critical events that influence social-control agents’ behavior, and second, we demonstrate that these events may shape the regulatory environment in which firms operate, thus allowing for different organizational responses to enforcement actions. Our findings contribute to the literature on critical events and organizational misconduct.