Search results

Environmental economics has typically adopted two approaches to the demonstration of the optimal level of pollution. The first superimposes a marginal pollution cost (MPC) function on the traditional model of the profit maximising firm and demonstrates that Pareto optimality requires the output price to be set equal to marginal social cost (MSC), defined as the sum or marginal private cost (MC) and marginal pollution cost. The second looks at the marginal pollution cost and compares it to the marginal cost of pollution control (MPCC). The optimum in this approach then exists when marginal pollution cost equals marginal cost of pollution control.

“Economics is a Serious Subject.” Edwin Cannan.

This paper aims to examine the effects of marginal and general wage subsidies on employment and income distribution.

The paper constructs a theoretical, partial‐equilibrium model of an economy in which a large number of competitive firms produce a homogeneous output good. Involuntary unemployment arises from a too high and rigid wage. By conducting comparative static analyses, the paper evaluates the impact of general and marginal wage subsidies on employment and incomes.

The paper shows that a marginal wage subsidy is a fiscally more efficient instrument for employment creation than a general wage subsidy because it resembles a combination of a general wage subsidy with a profit tax. These favorable effects persist even if between‐firm displacement effects are taken into account.

In line with most of the literature on marginal employment subsidies, attention is restricted to a partial‐equilibrium analysis in which the wage is assumed to be fixed. This helps to sharpen the focus on between‐firm competition, but is perhaps implausible when analyzing a general‐equilibrium setting. The inclusion of endogenous wage setting is bound to provide an interesting area for future research.

If politicians want to implement a wage subsidy scheme that has to be self‐financing, marginal wage subsidies are an effective policy instrument for employment creation. Its downside is an inefficient allocation of labor among firms, because some firms become larger than is necessary.

The paper provides a novel approach to model the between‐firm displacement effects of marginal wage subsidies and derives policy conclusions.

Allyn Young′s lectures, as recorded by the young Nicholas Kaldor, survey the historical roots of the subject from Aristotle through to the modern neo‐classical writers. The focus throughout is on the conditions making for economic progress, with stress on the institutional developments that extend and are extended by the size of the market. Organisational changes that promote the division of labour and specialisation within and between firms and industries, and which promote competition and mobility, are seen as the vital factors in growth. In the absence of new markets, inventions as such play only a minor role. The economic system is an inter‐related whole, or a living “organon”. It is from this perspective that micro‐economic relations are analysed, and this helps expose certain fallacies of composition associated with the marginal productivity theory of production and distribution. Factors are paid not because they are productive but because they are scarce. Likewise he shows why Marshallian supply and demand schedules, based on the “one thing at a time” approach, cannot adequately describe the dynamic growth properties of the system. Supply and demand cannot be simply integrated to arrive at a picture of the whole economy. These notes are complemented by eleven articles in the Encyclopaedia Britannica which were published shortly after Young′s sudden death in 1929.

This paper generalizes the critical loss concept of Harris and Simons to account for a broader range of possible cost structures. Our analysis presents a specialized market-level equilibrium for a relatively homogeneous good in which the Harris and Simons’ critical loss structure is appropriate for market definition. Then, we broaden the equilibrium and propose a generalized critical loss analysis. Of course, for relatively differentiated goods, market definition analysis would use firm-level modeling and therefore the standard market-level critical loss modeling could be inappropriate.

If the volume of current writing on the subject can be accepted as evidence, it is clear that economists are becoming increasingly concerned by the fact that business men do not use or even understand the jargon of marginalism, despite the fact that it would seem to be in their interests to operate their firms according to the rule “marginal costs equals marginal revenue determines optimum output”. Most attempts so far made to explain this phenomenon have followed one or the other of two lines. Either it is argued that the rules of thumb developed by the business man achieve at least approximately the same result as would the strict application of marginal theory, or that short‐period difficulties which are assumed away by the theorist render the operation of the rule impossible or undesirable.

A substantial part of airports’ revenues relates to charges covering the costs of services supplied by the airport. Charges are imposed on carriers, which in turn pass them or a percentage of them, on to passengers. In the present chapter, special attention is given to regional airports characterized by low traffic volumes, enabling only one or a few carriers to serve each destination. A classic economic model is presented to analyze how the pass-on rate depends on supply and demand characteristics and market structure. Some illustrative examples assuming combinations of common specifications for market characteristics are also presented, showing pass-on rates ranging from 50% to more than 100%. Consequently, market structure and characteristics of carriers and passengers are decisive for how passengers experience changes in airport charges. The differences between the optimal charge from the perspectives of the airport and the welfare of society are specifically addressed. It is demonstrated that knowledge of the pass-on rate in the monopoly cases may be sufficient to infer how the mark-up will be affected by a change in marginal costs. Consequently, the understanding of the pass-on rate is relevant for airport owners and for decision-makers when considering the welfare of passengers and other politically stated goals.