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Considering two types of subsidies for producers (supplier and manufacturer) and one for consumers based on product greenness and sales quantity, this study aims to formulate optimal supply chain green innovation and subsidy strategies, and to achieve this goal with the support of information systems.

This study introduces a composite green-product supply chain where suppliers focus on green innovation for component greenness and manufacturers focus on green innovation for manufacturing process greenness. Game theory modeling is applied to investigate the differences of product greenness, supply chain members’ profit and social welfare under different government subsidy strategies.

Increasing the unit greenness subsidy coefficient can boost product greenness and supply chain members’ profits, but does not always raise social welfare. When the government exclusively offers subsidies to producers, subsidies should be allocated to suppliers when there is a significant disparity in supply chain green innovation costs. Conversely, it is more beneficial to subsidize manufacturers. Consumer subsidies have the potential to enhance both environmental and economic performance in the supply chain compared with producer-exclusive subsidies, but may not always maximize social welfare when supply chain members have low unit costs associated with green innovation.

This study examines the optimal decisions for green supply chain innovation and government subsidy strategies. Supply chain members and the government can use the information system to collect and evaluate the cost of upstream and downstream green innovation, and then develop reasonable collaborative green innovation and subsidy strategies.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of demand information sharing on products’ greening levels with downstream competition. Specifically, this study examine two types of green products, “development-intensive” (DI) and “marginal-cost intensive” (MI), in a two-echelon supply chain where the manufacturer produces substitutable products, and competing retailers operate in a market with uncertain demand.

The authors adopt the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game-theoretic framework and consider a multistage game. This study consider how retailers receive private signals about uncertain demand and decide whether to share this information with the manufacturer, who then decides whether to acquire this information at a certain given cost. This paper considers backward induction and Bayesian Nash equilibrium to solve the model.

The authors find that in the absence of competition, information sharing is the only equilibrium and improves the greening level under DI, whereas no-information sharing is the only equilibrium and improves the greening level under MI, an increase in downstream competition drives higher investment in greening efforts by the manufacturer in both DI and MI and the manufacturer needs to offer a payment to the retailers to obtain demand information under both simultaneous and sequential contract schemes.

This paper contributes to the literature by examining how the nature of products (margin intensive green product or development intensive green product) influences green supply chain decisions under information asymmetry and downstream competition.

This paper aims to study how the timing of these decisions affects the total profit and the individual profits of the two agents.

This paper study a supply chain for a network good where there is a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer determines its wholesale price and its share in the retailer’s advertising cost while the retailer decides the retail price and the advertising cost.

This paper finds that a stronger network externality leads to higher prices and higher advertising efforts. This increases the profits of both manufacturer and retailer, but the manufacturer’s share of advertising costs depends on the order in which the supply chain enterprise make their decisions, the strength of network externality and the effect of advertising determines which decision timeline results in a higher price and greater advertising effort. The manufacturer prefers the price decision to be made before the advertising decision, while the retailer prefers these decisions to be made simultaneously.

Although this paper studies the price and advertising decision-making order preferences of channel members based on network externalities, this research can also be expanded from the following aspects based on network effects. First, network externality affects advertising cooperation between both parties in the situation such that the pricing power of retail prices is transferred from the retailer to the manufacturer and the retailer relies on revenue sharing (revenue sharing contract, nonwholesale price contract. Second, the manufacturer dominates the issues in the supply chain, but in reality, a retailer can also be the dominator or there are no dominators (Nash equilibrium). Finally, it is possible to consider pricing and advertising decisions in situations where two manufacturers or retailers compete.

When the price is reasonable, advertising investment is the main determinant of product sales. The greater the intensity of network externalities the more retailers will be willing to invest in advertising. An increase in the intensity of network externalities may not necessarily enhance manufacturers’ motivation or cooperative advertising, but it depends on the decision-making sequence. The strength of network externalities determines the decision-making sequence preferences of supply chain channel members whose preferences vary leading to conflicts of interest.

The impact of cooperative advertising or decision sequence on corporate decision-making has not been considered. To fill this gap, the paper integrates network externality and supply chain cooperative advertising models, focusing on the impact of network externality on pricing and advertising decisions, as well as on the sequence of decisions.

This study aims to investigate the impact of channel diversity on constructive and destructive conflicts in manufacturer-distributor relationships, as well as the mediating role of distributor opportunism and the moderating role of distributor network centrality.

This paper collected channel dual data to represent channel behavior in manufacturer-distributor relationships accurately. Using 208 matched manufacturer distributor bilateral data from Chinese B2B firms validate the conceptual model. This paper tested the proposed hypothesis using AMOS 24.0 software.

Channel diversity strengthens constructive conflict and weakens destructive conflict between manufacturers and distributors. Distributor opportunism plays a mediating role between channel diversity and constructive conflict. Distributor network centrality reinforces the positive impact of channel diversity on constructive conflict and the impact of channel diversity on destructive conflict.

This research contributes significantly to developing channel diversity and conflict theory by expanding the dyadic view to a network view. It also provides valuable insights for managers, highlighting the importance of maintaining a good relationship with distributors with high network centrality. The research results allow the constructive aspects of channel conflict to manifest fully and enhance the effectiveness of channel management. Distributor firms should prioritize communication and contact with network members to increase their network centrality, enabling them to take more initiative, exert influence and establish advantageous cooperative partnerships with manufacturers.

To examine the impact of manufacturer reputation, retailer reputation, and product price on consumers’ perceived quality and purchasing behavior regarding organic milk.

Employing a 2 × 2 experiment, data were collected from 1,259 consumers in 32 provinces in China.

When a low-reputation manufacturer sells products through a high-reputation retailer, it improves consumers’ perception of quality and positively influences their purchasing behavior. Interestingly, setting higher prices for products manufactured by low-reputation companies and selling them through high-reputation retailers did not significantly enhance consumers’ perceived quality and deter their purchasing behavior.

The analysis expands the framework for cue diagnosis. While the existing framework primarily focuses on the influence of cue-type combinations on perceived quality, it does not integrate purchasing behavior into the conceptual framework. This limitation hinders people understanding of the theoretical mechanisms underlying the use of cues in purchasing decisions. This paper address this by gradually introducing variables, such as retailer reputation and product price, into the baseline model, thereby extending this theory. In addition, this paper advances the marketing research literature within the business-to-business-to-consumer context by examining the additive effects of manufacturer reputation, retailer reputation, and product price on consumers’ perception of quality and purchasing behavior.

The purpose of this study is developing a new buy-back coordination contract in the symbiotic supply chain. In this new contract, the goal of the supply chain members (profit maximization) is realized.

This paper encourages the manufacturer to order products optimally by presenting a new buy-back coordination contract, and in return, the supplier undertakes to buy the unsold products from the manufacturer at the buy-back price. By using data-driven decision-making and multiobjective decision-making and considering the existing conditions in the symbiosis industry, a contract has been presented that guarantees the profits of supply chain members.

In this paper, it was found out how the authors can determine the order quantity, buy-back price and wholesale price in a symbiotic supply chain in such a way that it makes a profit for both the supplier and the manufacturer. In other words, how to determine these variables to encourage the manufacturer to order more quantity to the supplier so that both will benefit.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper that defines a new buy-back coordination contract in the symbiotic supply chain by considering uncertain demand and a multiobjective model. Due to the importance of environmental issues, the sharing of resources by companies and organizations with each other, and the necessity of their cooperation, industries are moving toward a symbiosis industry.

This study aims to argue that manufacturers with more exploration orientation (compared to exploitation orientation) have higher degrees of export marketing internalization (EMI) of branding and channels.

The authors use a multisource survey collecting data from 161 Taiwanese high-tech manufacturers in emerging markets.

The results show that manufacturers with more exploration orientation have higher degrees of EMI of both branding and channels. This work also reveals that relational ties with supply chain peers can strengthen this proposed positive effect on the EMI of channels while weakening the positive proposed effect on the EMI of branding.

Accordingly, this study enriches the resource-based view (RBV) literature by showing how firms’ unique resource portfolios affect their adopted EMI strategies in two ways: (1) firms design their EMI based on their value maximization of core competences (e.g. ambidexterity capability), and (2) firms face resource inconsistency when designing their EMI of different marketing activities.

The Internet of Things (IoT) platform empowers the digital transformation of the manufacturing industry by providing information technology services. Simultaneously, it enters the market by offering smart products to consumers. In light of different service fee scenarios, this article explores the optimal decision-making for the platform. It investigates the pricing models and entry decisions of IoT platforms.

In this study, we have formulated a game-theoretic model to scrutinize the influence of the IoT platform ventured into the smart device market on the pre-existing suppliers operating under subscription-based and usage-based pricing agreements.

Our outcome shows that introducing an IoT platform’s smart device has a differential effect on manufacturers depending on their contract type. Notably, our research indicates that introducing the platform’s own smart device within the subscription-based model does not negatively impact the profitability of incumbent manufacturers, so long as there is a noticeable discrepancy in the quality of the smart devices. However, our findings within the usage-based model demonstrate that despite the variance in smart device quality differentiation, the platform’s resolution to launch their device and impose their pricing agreements adversely affects established manufacturers. Additionally, we obtain valuable Intel regarding the platform’s entry strategies and contractual inclinations. We demonstrate that the platform is incentivized to present its smart device when reasonable entry costs remain. Furthermore, the platform prefers subscription-based contracts when the subscription fee is relatively high in non-platform entry and entry cases.

These findings hold significant practical implications for firms operating in an IoT-based supply chain.

To motivate the supplier to exert more corporate social responsibility (CSR) effort, the manufacturer offers it either a revenue sharing contract or a cost sharing contract. We study the contract choice of the manufacturer.

We develop game theoretic models to investigate the manufacturer’s optimal contract choice and examine whether there is a conflict of contract preference between the manufacturer and the supplier.

First, the revenue sharing contract has more strict conditions regarding the unit cost of the supplier’s CSR effort and the manufacturer’s retail price. Second, the cost sharing contract enables the manufacturer to achieve a “win-win” performance in terms of both profitability and CSR effort. Finally, the supplier prefers the cost sharing contract when the manufacturer’s price is low, otherwise, it prefers the revenue sharing contract.

Differing from the papers on CSR, our paper focuses on the supplier CSR management problem, and analyzes the optimal contract to motivate the supplier to exert more CSR effort.

This study aims to examine how fairness concerns and power structure in dyadic green supply chains impact retail price, supply chain profits and greening level decisions.

This study develops game-theoretic models considering fairness concerns and asymmetric power structures under an iso-elastic demand setting. The research paper employs the Stackelberg game approach, taking into consideration the fairness concern of the channel leader.

The findings indicate that under fairness, there is an increase in both wholesale and retail prices, as well as greening expenditures. Notably, when comparing the two models (manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg), double marginalization is more pronounced in the retailer Stackelberg setup than in the manufacturer Stackelberg setup. In a traditional supply chain with iso-elastic demand, the follower typically extracts higher profit compared to the leader; however, our results show that, under fairness conditions, the leader achieves higher profit than the follower. Additionally, our study suggests that supply chain coordination is unattainable in a fairness setup. This paper provides insights for managers on the optimal supply chain structure and the level of fairness to maximize profit.

This paper investigates the impact of a leader's fairness on the optimal decisions within a green supply chain, an area that has received limited attention previously. Additionally, the study investigates how fairness concerns manifest in distinct power dynamics, specifically, in the contexts of manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg.