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The purpose of this paper is to find an incentive strategy to enhance the interests of the main manufacturer by inducing the suppliers to conflict the fixed incentive provided by the main manufacturer.

The main manufacturer‐supplier model is widely applied in the R&D procedure of complex products such as aeroplanes. Because of the uncertainty in the R&D, the effort of the suppliers has an important effect on it. Considering the dynamic interaction between the main manufacturers and suppliers, with the main manufacturers as leaders and suppliers as followers, this paper establishes a Grey‐Stackelberg model to analyze the best change of the incentive strategies of the main manufacturers and the effort strategies under incentive‐conflict of suppliers under the uncertain environment. A numeric example is also computed in the last part of the paper.

The results show that the main manufacturer can increase its benefit without damaging the interests of suppliers by controlling the fixed incentives.

The paper succeeds in establishing the Grey‐Stackelberg model by analysing the grey area among the main manufacturer and the suppliers, and helps to develop grey systems theory.

Suggests that gaps exist between the product ranges or lines offered by manufacturers and the assortments selected and stocked by retailers. Looks at the extent to which differing levels of “product volatility” affect retailers’ selectivity in stocking items from a manufacturer’s line. Provides a limited test of several hypotheses about how the degree of product volatility of the category within which a manufacturer’s line belongs might affect the number of items in the line that will be stocked by a retailer. Analysis of stock‐planning data for two retailers in each of two product categories offers some support for the hypotheses. Interprets these results in light of theories of distribution channel co‐ordination and retailer expertise. They may reflect an alternative explanation for widely observed increases in retailer power.

Cooperative advertising is intended for the mutual benefit of channel partners. Shows that manufacturers and dealers/distributors in the boating industry view this marketing activity very differently. Manufacturers see no connection between cooperative advertising and other aspects of the relationships with their dealers. On the other hand, dealers relate their views of cooperative advertising to other facets of their relationships with manufacturers. Consequently, when there is conflict over cooperative advertising, it is liable to have a negative effect on other arrangements that dealers have with manufacturers. Manufacturers may not understand how negativity creeps into other relationships between dealers and themselves.

The Internet of Things (IoT) platform empowers the digital transformation of the manufacturing industry by providing information technology services. Simultaneously, it enters the market by offering smart products to consumers. In light of different service fee scenarios, this article explores the optimal decision-making for the platform. It investigates the pricing models and entry decisions of IoT platforms.

In this study, we have formulated a game-theoretic model to scrutinize the influence of the IoT platform ventured into the smart device market on the pre-existing suppliers operating under subscription-based and usage-based pricing agreements.

Our outcome shows that introducing an IoT platform’s smart device has a differential effect on manufacturers depending on their contract type. Notably, our research indicates that introducing the platform’s own smart device within the subscription-based model does not negatively impact the profitability of incumbent manufacturers, so long as there is a noticeable discrepancy in the quality of the smart devices. However, our findings within the usage-based model demonstrate that despite the variance in smart device quality differentiation, the platform’s resolution to launch their device and impose their pricing agreements adversely affects established manufacturers. Additionally, we obtain valuable Intel regarding the platform’s entry strategies and contractual inclinations. We demonstrate that the platform is incentivized to present its smart device when reasonable entry costs remain. Furthermore, the platform prefers subscription-based contracts when the subscription fee is relatively high in non-platform entry and entry cases.

These findings hold significant practical implications for firms operating in an IoT-based supply chain.

Manufacturers face various challenges and risks during their digital servitization (DS), due to the complexity caused by introducing breakthrough technologies, increasingly complex product-service solutions and new stakeholders in the business network. The process necessitates the implementation of various changes that usually happen over a long period of time. Using complexity management as a theoretical lens, this paper delves into manufacturers’ DS journeys and explores how manufacturers manage the associated complexities.

This paper investigates the DS journey of two manufacturers in a longitudinal case study from 2014 to 2021.

Three main complexity management actions during the DS journey were identified: shaping the digital service system, shaping the organization and shaping the network. Tied to different types of complexities, these actions demonstrate how manufacturers navigate their journey. The findings also reveal different complexity management approaches used at the different stages of this journey.

This paper offers a comprehensive framework for understanding complexity management in the DS journey, including the types of complexities, complexity management actions and complexity management approaches and their rationale. This paper shows that different requirements are created during emerge, consolidate and evolve stages of the DS journey. Manufacturers need a dynamic approach that considers changes in complexities and actions over time.

This paper forms an e-commerce supply chain that include a manufacturer providing products and an online platform providing service. The reselling platform mode and the agent platform mode are considered through an exploration of the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), vertical Nash (VN), platform Stackelberg (PS) power structures. The purpose of this paper is to explore the pricing and platform service decisions under different platform selling modes and channel power structures.

Based on the game theory models, this paper investigates the interaction between the manufacturer and the online platform under four different scenarios. The optimal solutions of four models are provided. Through comparison analyses, this paper evaluates the impacts of platform selling mode and channel power structure on the pricing and platform service decisions and the members’ profits.

The manufacturer prefers the MS power structure in any platform mode. The online platform prefers the PS (MS) power structure under a low (high) service cost efficiency in the reselling platform mode, while prefers the PS and VN power structures in the agent platform mode. Moreover, the manufacturer prefers the agent (reselling) platform mode under a low (high) service cost efficiency in any power structure. The online platform prefers the reselling platform mode in the MS and PS power structures, while prefers the reselling (agent) platform mode under a low (high) service cost efficiency in the VN power structures.

The analysis result provides important managerial implications that help the supply chain members develop a better understanding of the selection of the platform selling mode and the effect of the channel power structure in the presence of platform service.

Marketing is a hot topic, and the purpose of this study is to investigate how shareholding strategies can be applied to achieve strategic synergy between firms in vertical supply chains to improve retailers’ marketing efforts from a long-term perspective.

This study constructs Stackelberg models to analyze the operating mechanisms of shareholding supply chains under forward, backward and cross-shareholding strategies. The authors analyze the effects of shareholding on prices, marketing efforts and profits, and explore the strategic preferences and outcomes of different supply chain members.

Forward/backward shareholding plays the same role as cross/nonshareholding in supply chains because the effect of the retailer’s shareholding is offset by the power status of the manufacturer, and the retailer can still profit when wholesale prices are higher than selling prices in certain cases. A manufacturer’s shareholding in a retailer can benefit consumers and improve marketing efforts by reducing retailers’ marketing costs, while a retailer’s shareholding in a manufacturer has no such effect. None of all shareholding strategies can coordinate the interests of all members; however, an effective rebate policy can resolve this problem.

The results reveal the operational mechanism of shareholding supply chains and provide reference values for managers who want to improve marketing efforts and economic performance using a shareholding strategy.

The rapid development of the Internet has led to an increasingly significant role for E-commerce business. This study examines how the green supply chain (GSC) operates on the E-commerce online channel (resell mode and agency mode) and the traditional offline channel with information sharing under demand uncertainty.

This study builds a multistage game model that considers the manufacturer selling green products through different channels. On the traditional offline channel, the competing retailers decide whether to share demand signals. Regarding the resale mode of E-commerce online channel, just E-tailer 1 determines whether to share information and decides the retail price. In the agency mode, the manufacturer decides the retail price directly, and E-tailer 2 sets the platform rate.

This study reveals that information accuracy is conducive to information value and profits on both channels. Interestingly, the platform fee rate in agency mode will inhibit the effect of a positive demand signal. Information sharing will cause double marginal effects, and price competition behavior will mitigate such effects. Additionally, when the platform fee rate is low, the manufacturer will select the E-commerce online channel for operation, but the retailers' profit is the highest in the traditional channel.

This research explores the interplay between different channel structures and information sharing in a GSC, considering price competition and demand uncertainty. Besides, we also considered what behaviors and factors will amplify or transfer the effect of double marginalization.

The paper attempts to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a two-part tariff coordination mechanism.

To deal with this pricing conflict problems of dual-channel supply chain consisting of dominant manufacturer and a retailer, considering the fact that online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions, the authors establish some basic models and exploit them to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a profit-sharing coordination mechanism.

The results show that the optimal online direct selling price is positively correlated with product perceived quality obtained from online reviews and negatively correlated with the in-sale service. The traditional retail price is positively correlated with the in-sale service and weakly correlated with online reviews. For the manufacturer and retailer, whether decentralized decision or coordination contract, their profits increase with the increase of the in-sale service in a certain range and quality perceived from spontaneous online reviews. Online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions. Positive in-sale services and online reviews can provide consumers with a better shopping experience, thereby promoting their enthusiasm for shopping and improving their quality of life. The two-part tariff coordination mechanism improves the profits of the manufacturer and the traditional retailer, respectively, through the transfer fee.

The proposed approach can well analyze the channel conflicts and pricing problems between retailers and manufacturers with respect to product offline price and online price. The analysis and results can inform decision-making for manufacturers and retailers.

The purpose of this article is based on the unit patent license fee model in the closed-loop supply chain.

This paper analyzes the impact of the bundling strategy of the retailer selling new products and remanufactured products on the closed-loop supply chain under the condition that the original manufacturer produces new products and the remanufacturer produces remanufacturing products.

The results show that alternative products can be bundled, and in many cases, the bundling of remanufactured products and new products is better than selling alone.

If the retailer chooses bundling, for the remanufacturer, when certain conditions are met, the benefits of bundling are greater than the separate sales at that time; for the original manufacturer, when the recycling price sensitivity coefficient is high, the bundling is better than separate sales.