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We investigate the determinants and consequences of nonprofit lobbying activity by analyzing 501(c)(3) nonprofit lobbying choices as reported on the primary tax form, Form 990. Under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), nonprofits may lose their tax exempt status if they engage in a substantial amount of lobbying. We examine lobbying choices across three dimensions: (1) the test used to determine whether lobbying activities are substantial (i.e., making an H-election) (2) whether lobbying activities are directly related to the mission of the nonprofit (i.e., program related) (3) whether an affiliate nonprofit lobbies on behalf of a nonprofit. Results indicate lobbying choices are associated with the amount of lobbying reported and the amount of contributions received. Additionally, our results provide some evidence that nonprofit lobbying choices allowed under the IRC are underutilized.

The aim of this research is to contribute to the understanding of how commercial diplomats lobby for public procurement contracts. The institutional environment has ramifications for the manner of lobbying and for the practice of commercial diplomacy. This research brings together these streams of literature, and a conceptual model is developed. By means of an in-depth, single-case study, investigating the lobbying activities of EU diplomats in Indonesia, the study aimed to illustrate the model and draw the list of lobbying activities applicable for commercial diplomats. The findings reveal that in a weak institutional development environment, the diplomats focus on informational lobbying and rely heavily on their networks. If the decision-making powers are decentralized, the diplomats target more decision-makers. If diplomats do not have an access to decision-makers then ‘voice’ lobbying is applied. If the decision-makers are not elected, the diplomats do not engage in constituency-building lobbying. The findings illustrate the plausibility of the introduced conceptual model. They also suggest that domestic factors, such as interest in the host country, priority status of the host country and historical bilateral ties can positively influence the lobbying activities of the diplomats as well.

Firms influence a government to their advantage in one of two ways: either through lobbying a government to change the rule, or through bribing bureaucrats to circumvent the rule. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether and under what conditions do corporate political activities facilitate firm growth in a multinational context, especially in developing economies.

This study is based on the data of the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, conducted by the World Bank in the 2002 to 2006 period in 12 countries. To deal with a multilevel structure, the authors applied multilevel regression as the main analysis method.

The analysis reveals that both political activities are prevalent in emerging markets, but they play very different roles on firm growth. The authors also find that the effect of lobbying is more pronounced in politically durable countries where firms can secure their vested benefits by lobbying.

The paper contributes to the corporate political activities literature by investigating the distinguishing and contingent role of bribery and lobbying on firm performance.

This paper aims to prepare executives to pilot a US lobbying effort within the bounds of the US Federal law. Lobbying law may be thought of as the “regulation of regulation”, as it defines the ground rules for those wishing to have a direct impact upon all other regulatory systems. The article outlines what the US lobbying law requires, what it forbids and, perhaps most important, what the law does NOT regulate.

The paper takes the full spectrum of US laws and regulations relevant to lobbying – including the Internal Revenue Service Code (tax code), the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Ethics in Government Act, the internal rules of both the House and Senate, the US Criminal Code and the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act – and organizes them into a single 2 × 2 matrix, explaining what all parties must do as well as what they must not do. Via this approach, the rules that govern the “marketplace” for lobbying in the USA are explained. The competition to shape US government policy transpires within this marketplace.

Few activities the executive may engage in carry the potential payback of a well-executed lobbying campaign: empirical estimates range to returns on investment in the thousands of per cent. But the uninitiated may easily step over the line and invite both legal and public relations (PR) nightmares.

Effective lobbying can afford a corporation or industry a lasting competitive advantage. Every well-rounded business strategy should include such a component, and every well-rounded executive should be capable of performing in this arena. A solid grounding in the legal matrix forming the boundaries of this activity is a prerequisite for effective performance.

The paper organizes and outlines lobbying law in a fashion digestible by executives without legal training. It is of value to anyone wishing to engage in lobbying activities targeted at the US Government.

Previous research combining corporate political activity and collective action theory has focused solely on industry structure and its role in predicting group lobbying or PAC participation. The purpose of this paper is to use a different context—franchise systems—to apply Olsonian collective action theory to political activities.

Using a random-effects technique in STATA on an unbalanced panel data set, this paper empirically models the effects of franchise system size and degree of franchising on the level of lobbying intensity.

Since franchise systems are made up of differing unit ownership structure, the author first model if those systems that are fully franchised lobby less than those with franchisor unit ownership (supported). Next, since collective action theory predicts that more participants in a space will lead to less collective action, the author predict that franchise systems with larger unit counts will lobby less than those with smaller counts (not supported). Finally, the author test the interaction of these two effects as systems that are fully franchised and of higher unit totals should have an even greater negative relationship with political activity (supported).

This paper uses both a novel data set and a novel context to study collective action. Previous research has utilized an industry structure context to model the level of lobbying and collective action, while the current research uses an analogous logic, but in the context of franchise systems.

In 1993, Congress eliminated the business deduction for lobbying. The disallowance extends to dues paid to tax-exempt trade and labor associations when those organizations conduct lobbying activities. Associations are required to notify members regarding the portion of their dues that is non-deductible or pay a flat 35% tax on their lobbying expenditures. This study examines the factors considered by associations in making the pay-or-notify decision, looking for evidence that associations consider the marginal tax rates of their members to insure that the party with the lowest marginal rate pays the tax. Data is obtained from the IRS and is supplemented by data collected in a mail survey. The evidence suggests that associations do not necessarily attempt to minimize the total tax cost to all parties. This study identifies a situation where non-profit firms might fail to implement an optimal tax planning strategy, and where the absence of a competitive market allows this inefficiency to persist.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how, in unpredictable policy environments, specific managerial choices play a vital role in designing lobbying capabilities through the choice of levels of investment in human capital, network relationships and structural modification.

Using an inductive case study approach, data were collected through 42 in‐depth, semi‐structured interviews and documented archival data. Cross‐case pattern sequencing was used to construct an interpretive model of lobbying capability design. Data were framed by the dynamic resource‐based theory of the firm.

Heterogeneous lobbying capabilities are adapted differently in private and state‐owned airlines as a result of diverse ownership structures and time compositions that interplay with organizational processes. The result is a divergence between private‐ and state‐owned airlines in how they engage with governmental actors and policies.

The paper contributes to ongoing discourse in and between the dynamic capabilities and corporate political activity literatures, particularly on how state/non‐state‐owned airlines design their political lobbying capabilities. The research is limited in so far as it only studies the European airline industry.

The paper illustrates how a specific and far‐reaching unanticipated external policy stimulus (the 9/11 terrorist attacks) impacted on management choices for lobbying design in the European airline industry.

Reviews a variety of academic and practitioner opinions on different types and definitions of lobbying and the purposes for which it is used, ranging from government relations to marketing communications. Distinguishes between what is termed loud lobbying, typically a highly visible media relations campaign providing an information subsidy to carefully targeted media, for marketing purposes; and quiet lobbying, discreet use of links with legislators, in order to encourage or block legislation. A model is given to aid clarification. The distinction is illustrated using examples of loud and quiet lobbying, including a case study of the campaigns for and against resale price maintenance (RPM). This shows Asda’s lobbying campaign to have been essentially a key element of the company’s marketing strategy. Concludes that the objectives of a lobbying campaign are crucial in determining whether loud or quiet lobbying would be more appropriate.

Presents a modern definition of lobbying suitable for the use of organizational lobbyists and a theory of lobbying as conflict accommodation which arouses ethical considerations. A contingency model of effective lobbying strategies and dynamics of lobbying is developed and tested in a multiple‐case study. Finnish interest group representatives are interviewed to construct cases based on their lobbying efforts on political issues at the national and the EU‐level of political decision making. It is concluded that the definition of lobbying corresponds well to the activities of the interviewees' associations and that it is fruitful to apply the theory of conflict resolution in the study of lobbying. The new model of lobbying reflects the reality excellently. It can be used as a tool for planning and evaluating lobbying in different political issues and at different levels of political decision making.