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The purpose of this paper is to explore how public relations (PR) professionals develop co-narratives with legal counsel when formulating crisis communication strategies. Understanding how PR practitioners work with their legal counterparts may help lead to more advanced and effective PR practice in the area of crisis communication and management. The authors attempt to do so in this study through interviews conducted with PR practitioners in two Asian countries – South Korea and Singapore.

In total, 11 semi-structured interviews with PR consultants, 6 in Korea and 5 in Singapore were conducted between May and August 2016. Data analyses revealed key points of interest for PR practice.

First, PR consultants in both countries reported increased collaboration with legal counsel in times of crisis. Second, PR consultants report that legal professionals have begun to realize the significance of winning in the court of public opinion. However, the process by which PR–legal collaboration takes place to develop co-narratives followed extremely different patterns in the two countries.

This exploratory study is not exempt from limitations. The findings from this study may not be applicable to other countries. As data collection in both countries relied on snowball sampling techniques, the participants in the interviews may not be representative of PR consultants in South Korea and Singapore. E-mail interviews had limitations due to their lack of richness and details compared to other forms of interviews (i.e. face-to-face or Skype interviews). However, computer-mediated interviews including e-mail interviews can still create good level of understandings about the phenomenon in question.

This study was an attempt to understand PR–legal collaboration particularly in times of crisis and contribute to the development of Asia-centric models of PR practice. There has been little research that explores how legal and PR counsels actually collaborate to devise optional crisis communication strategies for their clients (or organizations) in the times of crisis. Given that crisis communicative strategies have been shown to affect publics’ perceptions of an organization’s credibility and trustworthiness, it is important to understand how PR work with legal practitioners to develop co-narratives for optimal crisis management, and understand how their different professional perspectives, practices, and approaches affect the collaboration.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the number of lawsuits on firm performance and in-house legal department size. More importantly, this paper also aims to explore the interaction effect of in-house legal department size on the aforementioned lawsuit-performance relationship.

The empirical analyses are performed by using secondary data. Structural equation modeling is employed in order to examine multiple structural relationships between the number of lawsuits, size of in-house legal department, and firm performance.

Three key findings were generated: number of lawsuits has a significant detrimental effect on firm performance; number of lawsuits is positively associated with size of in-house legal departments; and size of in-house legal departments negatively moderates the relationship between number of lawsuits and firm performance.

The results corroborate the harmfulness of lawsuits. On the one hand, a large number of lawsuits damage the firm’s financial performance directly; on the other hand, more lawsuits lead to enlarged in-house legal departments which further aggravate the negative effects of lawsuits on firm performance. These results suggest that firms should spend more effort in properly managing legal departments.

This paper contributes to the literature by empirically examining the economic impacts of lawsuits on firm performance. Moreover, it also explored the notion that having a large size of in-house legal department does not mitigate, but aggravates the harmfulness of lawsuits on firm performance.

The legal devices crafted within large organizations are a key component of legal endogeneity theory (LET). While symbolically complying with legislation, legal devices allow organizations to infuse managerial logics into the legal field, which eventually diverts law from its initial political goals. Although the LET has considered legal devices such as anti-discrimination guidelines and grievance procedures, this chapter argues that contracts also constitute a locus of symbolic compliance and contribute to the eventual endogenization of regulation. Supplementing LET with a focus on legal intermediation, this chapter explores how contracts are crafted and used by large organizations to respond to regulatory pressure. While other legal instruments are unambiguously managerialized from the outset, contracts are highly versatile legal objects that perform the seemingly opposite functions of symbolically complying with regulation and serving substantive commercial purposes. This discussion of the role of contracts as compliance mechanisms is based on an in-depth empirical study of the French retail industry and its response to a set of regulations that aimed at making their business practices fairer.

All clients are to some extent subject to their attorney's construction of their interests. This state of affairs reaches the extreme in the case of the class action because the class action permits masses of individual claims to be combined in one proceeding to promote efficiency and solve collective action problems. Class action scholars have long debated the role of class members without conclusion. The doctrine on whether and when the class member is considered a “party” to the litigation is incoherent. Neither courts nor commentators are clear on limits of the ethical duty of class counsel – does it run to individual class members or to the class as a whole? And if such a duty runs to the class as a whole, is the class an entity, like a corporation, or an aggregation of individuals each of whom is entitled to enforce class counsel's attorney–client obligations?

This paper seeks to describe and assess recent legal developments that affect the corporate attorney‐client privilege.

Discusses and analyzes the corporate attorney‐client privilege and work product doctrine and the role of such protections in US society; discusses how recent developments including policies of the US Department of Justice and the evolving role of corporate auditors have adversely affected these protections, and shows how some of these developments can be ameliorated so as to preserve the important principles underlying the corporate attorney‐client privilege.

The upsurge of investigations into alleged corporate criminality has reignited the debate over the value of the privilege and the ability to have confidential communications between corporations and clients. Although judicial decisions do not favor adoption of a “selective waiver” doctrine, concerns have also been raised that legislative adoption of a selective waiver in this current culture‐of‐waiver environment may practically prevent companies from ever being able to assert a privilege again in governmental investigations.

A useful update on developments affecting the attorney‐client privilege and work product doctrine from a lawyer who specializes in securities litigation and governmental enforcement and is a member of the New York State Bar Association Task Force on the Attorney Client Privilege as well as Liaison from the Corporate Counsel Consortium to the American Bar Association Task Force on the Attorney Client Privilege.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the marketing and legal departments within the corporation and how this relationship allows corporate attorneys to protect the firm against third‐party lawsuits.

A literature review is followed by a discussion of the relevant sections of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct which govern the professional conduct of all attorneys in the USA relative to how they treat the client, third parties, and relate to the court. Then, the concept of the client/customer from the viewpoint of marketers and “legal people” (corporate counsels) is examined.

After a thorough examination of the roles of corporate attorneys and the marketing department within the firm, the study concludes that the occasional turf wars between the two departments stem from the differences in the cultures and norms of the two departments.

To the extent that the study focused on the laws protecting consumers in the USA, and the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility as they relate to attorneys in the USA, its findings may be true only in the USA. However, the insights generated may have universal application.

Because the Model Rules of Professional Conduct dictate how lawyers in the USA conduct themselves vis‐à‐vis their clients, efforts on the part of corporate counsels to educate marketers on how these rules affect their conduct could elicit the support and cooperation of marketers within the firm. In addition, organizations must reorganize so that corporate counsels not only maintain an active presence in the marketing department, but also work together with marketers to craft language in warranties, ads, and other communications with third parties in order to fulfill the applicable legal requirements, and yet not perceived by consumers as too “legalease”.

The study sheds light on the causes of turf wars between the two important departments (legal and marketing folk) within the firm, and suggests ways to remedy the situation.

Managing the adverse visibility associated with a high‐profile legal crisis is a challenge faced by an increasing number of public relations professionals. This paper offers guidelines for effectively managing a legal crisis outside the courtroom while the case is pending before a court of law.

In recent enforcement actions by several capital market regulators in some common law jurisdictions, the issue of directors' reliance on legal advice in relation to compliance with their statutory duties has been raised. This paper aims to discuss the dilemma faced by directors and regulators in assessing the extent to which reliance on legal advice can provide sufficient protection against allegation of breach of directors' duties and the disclosure obligation.

This paper discusses recent case studies that highlight the often conflicting regulatory stance.

These cases indicate that the disclosure conundrum is a real challenge to regulators and directors alike. These enforcement activities have resulted in mixed views as to whether these decisions have rightly upheld the standard of care expected to be exercised by directors or are unduly burdensome and not pragmatic for honest and well‐meaning directors.

The legal position is still evolving in view of the numerous regulatory actions in various jurisdictions regarding financial reporting and disclosure obligation of directors and corporations.

Given the numerous disclosure and reporting obligations that a listed company must comply with and the regulatory enforcement actions that may be taken against the directors, it is important for directors to understand the implication of this case and similar enforcement activities on directors' oversight duty.

Legal intermediation is an emerging theoretical concept developed to grasp the importance of the process and actors who contribute to legal endogenization, in particular in the field of economic activities and work governed by various public regulations. This chapter proposes to extend the analytical category of legal intermediary to all actors who, even if they are not legal professionals, deal on a daily basis with legal categories and provisions. In order to deepen our understanding of these actors and their contribution to how organizations frame legality, this chapter investigates four examples of legal intermediaries who are not legal professionals. Based on field surveys conducted over the past 15 years in France on employment policy, industrial relations, occupational health and safety regulation, and forensic economics, I make three contributions. First, the cases show the diversity of legal intermediaries and their growing and increasingly reflexive roles in our complex economies. Second, while they are not legal professionals per se, to different degrees, these legal intermediaries assume roles similar to those of legal professionals such as legislators, judges, lawyers, inspectors, cops, and even clerks. Finally, depending on their level of legitimacy and power, I show how legal intermediaries take part in the process of legal endogenization and how they more broadly frame ordinary legality.

Increasingly, allegations of significant corporate wrongdoing and inquiries from governmental agencies result in companies initiating internal investigations as a practical tool to find out whether there was wrong doing, what happened, and how to prevent it from happening again. This article discusses five essential questions that a company must address when it is faced with a decision on whether to conduct an internal investigation. Do I have to investigate? Who should lead the investigation? How soon can the investigation be completed? What do I need to do to keep the information confidential? And finally, do I have to disclose this to the public.